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19039e5b71
Citations: regenerated CITATIONS-UNRESOLVED.md (O-017, 2026-10-12); the cross-repository citation in the rewrite-bound note written in the side-by-side form; AIP-8 restaged
092ea48988
x402 payment probe: the mock node serves only recorded code (a missing field is a JSON-RPC error, never '0x'); EOA recordings carry code 0x explicitly; control 14 states the empty code explicitly
54028e07f4
device-identity: what a machine is, as a chain of signed statements checked offline (manufacturer credential, owners, firmware attestation, anchored on 28001; 175/175 with the AIP-23 verifier); conformance: the device-bundle vectors and the rules that cover them; control-plane console; README
1096c078cd
1.8.0: the Payments API in all five clients (paymentsRisk, paymentsReceipt, paymentsVerify: POST /v1/payments/risk, /receipt, /verify; JS, Python, Go, Java, C#), with their tests and negative controls
381c8e508b
AIP-22: correction dated 2026-10-11 - the external audit is no longer a precondition of the chain 2800 heights (scheduled after the remaining stages since 2026-09-30); stages 4 and 5 follow testnet 28001 with both clients and an internal adversarial review, which is not a third-party audit; the rows that said otherwise are kept as written
37f603d06f
notarization verifier: the covering anchor is the first one STRICTLY after the block (an anchor's certificate signs its parent); 32 zero bytes are not a digest; the certificate form is named (v1, v2 scheme-tagged, v3 round-bound) and an unknown form fails the sealed link
8de1ab2184
tools/verify-anchor.mjs: a certificate in v3 form below the commit-round height is refused with AERE-PQ-V3-01 before any decoding (form on height first, as both clients do); an index wider than 31 bits and an element 6 that is not a list are named refusals; v1/v2 verdicts unchanged (20 anchors on chain 2800 and 20 on 28001, identical rows)
9fe4dac73e
SPEC 2.6 and 3.1, README, anchor/README: message-layer enforcement stated per client (corrected 2026-10-09; from 2026-09-17 the text said all four message types are refused on both clients, while the second client enforces commits since block 18,131,633 and applies the other three types from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800; on testnet 28001 since 1,314,403 and 3,117,000); dated notes, nothing removed
3b62b2c757
AIP-20, AIP-22, README: message-layer enforcement stated per client (corrected 2026-10-09): every validator refuses a commit without a post-quantum seal, the nine primary-client validators any consensus message since block 17,700,000; the second client enforces commits since 18,131,633 and the other three types from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800; dated notes and an Errata entry, nothing removed
76a70f6422
Patch 0009: the chain-2800 fleet distribution of 2026-10-02 (heard-seal judge and pending-commit buffer, both acting only from the AIP-22 stage 4 height; snap-request cap, GHSA-pcv4-pxhv-99m7); fifteen 4(b) notices of patch 0008 now name patch 0008; run-node.sh applies 0009; anchor corpus restaged from the recipe; measured: the recipe build equals the fleet distribution class for class
c05b2ba97b
tools/verify-anchor.mjs: certificate form v3 (round-bound commit seal, AIP-22 erratum): dispatcher on the first element, refusal codes AERE-PQ-V3-01..08, validator set of the parent, 'PARENT DECIDED IN ROUND r' only at a QBFT quorum of verified members; v1/v2 verdicts unchanged (20/20 on chain 2800 and 28001 before and after)
e05efd57f2
SPEC/RUN-A-NODE: reference point aere.pq.checkpoint documented, rewrite bound of 2026-10-07 in the formal table, 3.1 corrected by dated note; nothing removed
2fe5a51bbd
formal-consensus, research: the rewrite bound under the round-free seal model (2026-10-07): the security argument and its z3 model, 13 proofs with 8 negative controls; 37 of 37 models in the suite