Block a user
3ff53e4c05
tools/verify-anchor.mjs: the certificate form is judged by height, as the clients do (v1 below V, v2 from V: 17,047,600 on 2800, 176,000 on 28001; v3 from H_r), and the v1/v2 certificate rows are decoded canonically (whole scalar values, known scheme tag, index in four bytes, non-empty signature, at most 64 rows in v2); a v1 height accepts Falcon-512 only. Before this change the tool took the form from the bytes below H_r and accused 20 of 20 healthy v1 anchors of testnet 28001 (175,360 to 175,968). Measured: chain 2800 201 of 201 anchors past V verified, testnet 28001 40 of 40 past V; same verdict as the previous tool on anchor 23,452,880 of chain 2800.
0c8f1de3fd
identity: the SD-JWT form of an AERE hybrid identity is judged on its ML-DSA-65 half by default, the Ed25519 half only on explicit request, and every verdict says postQuantum (rule sdjwt.hybrid-half); pq-pki: the signature algorithm a certificate or a revocation list declares must be its issuer key's (ALG_KEY, CRL_ALG_KEY); agents: an equivocation proof requires the agent's ML-DSA-65 key; pq-gateway: the status names the path to the backend and hybrid-only refuses a plain-HTTP backend; conformance 241 rules, 631 vectors
b1c6c6d1e9
run-node.sh, RUN-A-NODE.md, SPEC.md: the follower options re-derived from the live archive node (30 properties); the four message-type post-quantum enforcement heights of chain 2800 (commit 17,250,000, proposal 17,400,000, round change 17,550,000, prepare 17,700,000) were missing
3ff21f7758
README: the conformance row states what a fresh clone gives (11/11, the comparison with the published AIP-23 kind vectors reported as information because their generator is not part of this copy); .gitignore for node_modules/ and package-lock.json, so the tree stays clean after the npm installs the READMEs ask for
b544cc1b11
pq-secrets: the negative control finds its sibling components in the published layout (pq-kms/, identity/, proof-kinds/, verify-layer/ beside it) as well as in the development tree, and refuses with the list of what is missing when neither is complete; README: compliance and Travel Rule name the verifier they need; conformance README: the online run of 2026-10-18 21:25Z
ad16b1f69b
pq-secrets: a zero-trust secrets service on top of pq-kms (each request authorized by an Aere Identity presentation signed for that exact request, per-secret policy whose non-admin grants can only narrow, the same refusal for every unauthorized caller, every operation a signed AIP-23 secret-access envelope); identity: a presentation optionally signed for one exact request; proof-kinds: secret-access with requestHash; conformance 240 rules, 626 vectors
316ba7171f
AIP-23 proof kinds: secret-access carries requestHash (the presentation is signed for this exact request), claimedHolder/claimedPresenter, judged, and the allowed values of each field
6110ef2047
AIP-23 proof kinds: secret-access (a secrets service judged one request on a named secret: verdict, rules, presented identity and policy by digest; never the value); 17 kinds
8c7d72c1a7
verify-layer README: the test table names the complete served verifier set (verify-proof.mjs alone gives 41/45), the negative control from a fresh clone (37/37), and the one adapter check that needs the verifier
ac14880703
verify-layer: cloud exports (AWS ECS/EC2/Lambda, Azure VMs/Container Instances/Container Apps/Web Apps, GCP Compute Engine/Cloud Run) read from the operator's own CLI export, never from an account; fixtures derived from the vendors' documented examples; a real account is unmeasured and the README says so
ea695dcf32
identity: the Travel Rule and compliance-policy verifiers name their rules; a missing originator id or nonce is now a refusal in acceptBeneficiary; conformance: Travel Rule and compliance presentations enrolled (239 rules, 15 verifiers, 21 kinds, 619 vectors), nothing of identity left out
c1909c2afb
.gitattributes (text=auto eol=lf) for every checkout; README: running the tests from a fresh clone (npm ci in sdk-pq-sign first)
c3910c07a2
Proof of Software 1.6.0: sbom-maven from the committed lockfile.json of the maven-lockfile plugin (deterministic CycloneDX 1.6, re-derived by verify --rebuild-from), --source-path . for a repository root
e1bb4e25d8
identity: SD-JWT interoperability measured in both directions with @sd-jwt/core 0.23.0 and jose 6.2.12 (ML-DSA-65 included), nested _sd_alg refused, the SD-JWT VC profile (draft-19, dc+sd-jwt, vct, Token Status List offline); conformance: SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC enrolled (213 rules, 13 verifiers, 553 vectors)
fab02f7952
crypto-inventory: the negative control reads files normalized to LF (a Windows checkout without git attributes gave 34/35); .gitattributes with text=auto eol=lf for every checkout
b6ed4d2b71
crypto-inventory 0.4.0: Swift and Kotlin detectors (CryptoKit, CommonCrypto, Security.framework, Android Keystore, Tink, OkHttp, the libsignal Swift and Android APIs), Apple and Android manifests; remediation recipes for Apache and HAProxy measured on real servers, HAProxy precondition fixed
e453c0c42d
crypto-inventory 0.3.0 and the control-plane planner after the second run on a tree that is not ours (libsignal): BoringSSL, Noise hfs, libcrux Kyber, the libsignal Java/Node API; self-signed trust anchors are blocked, test code is LOW with its own scope
f971fa9e28
crypto-inventory 0.3.0: glob imports resolved, libcrux and spqr, libsignal KEM key pairs; control-plane: a key agreement or client-side TLS called by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway (planner 35/35, B1 negative control 4/4)
f2f6217b4c
crypto-inventory 0.3.0: Rust detector (use-resolved names, static calls, generics, ring constants, Noise patterns), Cargo.toml manifests, BLAKE3; 44/44, negative control 21/21