04f735eda6
Measured 2026-08-16: a 42-byte contract that merely STORES the constant 0x0AE1 and never calls anything still scores GREEN, with the reference marked medium confidence. So the headline colour does not separate a resolved call from a bare constant, and a client who tests that in five minutes would find it before we admitted it. The scan text now says, per address, whether a CALL to each verifier resolved from the bytecode or whether only the address is present, and says plainly that a present address can also be plain data. The colour stays what the scanner computes; the sentence next to it carries what it means.
266 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript
266 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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'use strict';
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/*
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* verifica-certificat.mjs - verifies an AERE post-quantum notarization certificate.
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*
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* THE POINT OF THIS FILE. A notarization is worth exactly as much as an outsider's ability to
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* check it without asking the notary. So this verifier:
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* - installs nothing (no npm, no dependencies; the Keccak it needs is inlined below),
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* - talks only to a public read endpoint, and accepts a DIFFERENT one via --rpc, so you can
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* point it at a node you run yourself and never trust ours,
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* - re-derives every link of the chain from the certificate and the public chain, and prints
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* each link as PASS, FAIL or NOT MEASURED. NOT MEASURED is never counted as a pass.
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*
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* WHAT IT CHECKS, and each is a separate claim:
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* 1. document the file you hold hashes to the digest the certificate names.
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* 2. on chain the transaction named by the certificate exists, succeeded, and called the
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* attestation registry the certificate names.
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* 3. in the block that transaction sits in the block the certificate names, and the block hash
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* served by the chain equals the one in the certificate.
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* 4. post-quantum the attestation was recorded only because a NIST post-quantum signature
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* verified ON CHAIN, inside the transaction, via a live precompile. Re-checked
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* here by calling the registry's own free read method.
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* 5. sealed the block carrying it is covered by the chain's post-quantum validator
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* certificate, so rewriting that block later needs post-quantum forgeries, not
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* just a broken elliptic curve.
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*
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* Usage:
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* node verifica-certificat.mjs certificat.json # checks links 2-5
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* node verifica-certificat.mjs certificat.json --fisier a.pdf # also checks link 1
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* node verifica-certificat.mjs certificat.json --rpc https://your-own-node
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*
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* Exit: 0 every measured link passed, 1 something failed, 2 nothing could be measured.
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*/
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import fs from 'node:fs';
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// ---------- Keccak-256, inlined so this file needs nothing installed ----------
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const RC = [1n,0x8082n,0x800000000000808an,0x8000000080008000n,0x808bn,0x80000001n,0x8000000080008081n,
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0x8000000000008009n,0x8an,0x88n,0x80008009n,0x8000000an,0x8000808bn,0x800000000000008bn,0x8000000000008089n,
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0x8000000000008003n,0x8000000000008002n,0x8000000000000080n,0x800an,0x800000008000000an,0x8000000080008081n,
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0x8000000000008080n,0x80000001n,0x8000000080008008n];
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const R = [0,1,62,28,27,36,44,6,55,20,3,10,43,25,39,41,45,15,21,8,18,2,61,56,14];
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const M = (1n << 64n) - 1n;
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const rotl = (x, n) => n === 0 ? x : ((x << BigInt(n)) | (x >> BigInt(64 - n))) & M;
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function keccakF(A) {
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for (let r = 0; r < 24; r++) {
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const C = new Array(5);
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for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) C[x] = A[x] ^ A[x + 5] ^ A[x + 10] ^ A[x + 15] ^ A[x + 20];
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for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) {
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const D = C[(x + 4) % 5] ^ rotl(C[(x + 1) % 5], 1);
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for (let y = 0; y < 25; y += 5) A[x + y] ^= D;
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}
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const B = new Array(25);
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for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) for (let y = 0; y < 5; y++) B[y + 5 * ((2 * x + 3 * y) % 5)] = rotl(A[x + 5 * y], R[x + 5 * y]);
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for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) for (let y = 0; y < 5; y++) A[x + 5 * y] = B[x + 5 * y] ^ ((~B[(x + 1) % 5 + 5 * y] & M) & B[(x + 2) % 5 + 5 * y]);
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A[0] ^= RC[r];
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}
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return A;
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}
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function keccak256(bytes) {
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const rate = 136;
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const pad = new Uint8Array(rate - (bytes.length % rate));
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pad[0] = 0x01; pad[pad.length - 1] |= 0x80;
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const msg = new Uint8Array(bytes.length + pad.length);
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msg.set(bytes); msg.set(pad, bytes.length);
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let A = new Array(25).fill(0n);
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for (let off = 0; off < msg.length; off += rate) {
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for (let i = 0; i < rate / 8; i++) {
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let w = 0n;
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for (let b = 7; b >= 0; b--) w = (w << 8n) | BigInt(msg[off + i * 8 + b]);
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A[i] ^= w;
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}
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A = keccakF(A);
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}
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const out = new Uint8Array(32);
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for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) { let w = A[i]; for (let b = 0; b < 8; b++) { out[i * 8 + b] = Number(w & 0xffn); w >>= 8n; } }
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return out;
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}
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const hex = (u8) => '0x' + Array.from(u8).map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
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const octeti = (h) => { const s = String(h || '').replace(/^0x/, ''); const u = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2); for (let i = 0; i < u.length; i++) u[i] = parseInt(s.substr(i * 2, 2), 16); return u; };
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// First item of an RLP list, which for a QBFT extraData is vanityData. This is the ONLY field in
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// the header that a post-quantum anchor changes and that keccak covers, so it is the field that
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// tells an anchored header from a merely seal-heavy one. Byte length alone cannot: attaching
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// seals and anchoring a digest are two different switches, and a header can be large because of
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// the first while the second never turned on.
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function primulElementRLP(u8) {
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if (!u8.length) return null;
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let i = 0;
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const b = u8[0];
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if (b >= 0xc0 && b <= 0xf7) i = 1;
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else if (b >= 0xf8) i = 1 + (b - 0xf7);
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else return null; // not a list
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if (i >= u8.length) return null;
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const c = u8[i];
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if (c <= 0x7f) return u8.slice(i, i + 1);
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if (c >= 0x80 && c <= 0xb7) { const n = c - 0x80; return u8.slice(i + 1, i + 1 + n); }
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if (c >= 0xb8 && c <= 0xbf) {
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const k = c - 0xb7;
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let n = 0;
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for (let j = 0; j < k; j++) n = n * 256 + u8[i + 1 + j];
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return u8.slice(i + 1 + k, i + 1 + k + n);
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}
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return null; // nested list where a string was expected
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}
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const areTextASCII = (u8, s) => {
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const t = Array.from(u8).map((x) => String.fromCharCode(x)).join('');
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return t.includes(s);
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};
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// ---------- report, three verdicts only ----------
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const linii = [];
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const PASS = (id, ce, obs) => linii.push({ id, ce, obs, v: 'PASS' });
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const FAIL = (id, ce, obs) => linii.push({ id, ce, obs, v: 'FAIL' });
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const NM = (id, ce, de_ce) => linii.push({ id, ce, obs: de_ce, v: 'NOT MEASURED' });
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const arg = (n, d) => { const i = process.argv.indexOf(n); return i > 0 && i + 1 < process.argv.length ? process.argv[i + 1] : d; };
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const CALE = process.argv[2];
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const RPC = arg('--rpc', 'https://rpc.aere.network');
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const FISIER = arg('--fisier', null);
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async function rpc(method, params) {
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const r = await fetch(RPC, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', connection: 'close' },
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body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method, params }), signal: AbortSignal.timeout(20000) });
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if (!r.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + r.status);
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const j = await r.json();
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if (j.error) throw new Error(JSON.stringify(j.error));
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return j.result;
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}
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(async () => {
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if (!CALE || !fs.existsSync(CALE)) {
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console.error('folosire: node verifica-certificat.mjs certificat.json [--fisier document] [--rpc URL]');
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process.exitCode = 2; return;
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}
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const c = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(CALE, 'utf8'));
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console.log('AERE post-quantum notarization, independent verification');
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console.log('certificate : ' + CALE);
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console.log('read node : ' + RPC + (RPC.includes('aere.network') ? ' (point --rpc at your own node; this check does not need ours)' : ' (not ours: good)'));
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console.log('');
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// 1. the document itself
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if (FISIER) {
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if (!fs.existsSync(FISIER)) NM('document', 'the file you hold hashes to the digest in the certificate', 'file not found: ' + FISIER);
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else {
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const h = hex(keccak256(new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(FISIER))));
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if (h.toLowerCase() === String(c.documentHash || '').toLowerCase()) PASS('document', 'the file you hold hashes to the digest in the certificate', h);
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else FAIL('document', 'the file you hold hashes to the digest in the certificate', 'file is ' + h + ', certificate says ' + c.documentHash);
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}
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} else NM('document', 'the file you hold hashes to the digest in the certificate', 'no --fisier given, so the document side was not checked');
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// 2. the transaction
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//
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// The distinction below is the whole honesty of this tool. "The node did not answer" and "the
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// node answered, and there is no such transaction" are different facts, and only the second one
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// is about the certificate. Conflating them means a network problem on our side gets reported to
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// the holder as "your certificate is a forgery", which is both false and the worst possible
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// failure mode for a notarization product.
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let rc = null, tx = null, aRaspuns = false;
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try {
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[rc, tx] = await Promise.all([rpc('eth_getTransactionReceipt', [c.txHash]), rpc('eth_getTransactionByHash', [c.txHash])]);
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aRaspuns = true;
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} catch (e) {
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NM('on-chain', 'the transaction exists, succeeded, and called the named registry',
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'the node did not answer (' + e.message + '), so NOTHING is claimed about this certificate. Try another --rpc, ideally one you operate.');
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}
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if (aRaspuns && rc && tx) {
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const ok = rc.status === '0x1';
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const catre = (tx.to || '').toLowerCase() === String(c.registry || '').toLowerCase();
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if (ok && catre) PASS('on-chain', 'the transaction exists, succeeded, and called the named registry', c.txHash);
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else FAIL('on-chain', 'the transaction exists, succeeded, and called the named registry',
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(ok ? '' : 'status not success. ') + (catre ? '' : 'called ' + tx.to + ', certificate names ' + c.registry));
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} else if (aRaspuns) {
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// The node answered and said there is no such transaction. That IS a statement about the
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// certificate, so it is a failure and not an unmeasured line.
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FAIL('on-chain', 'the transaction exists, succeeded, and called the named registry',
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'the node answered and holds no such transaction on this chain');
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}
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// 3. the block
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if (rc) {
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try {
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const blk = await rpc('eth_getBlockByNumber', [rc.blockNumber, false]);
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const nr = parseInt(rc.blockNumber, 16);
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const potrivit = blk && blk.hash.toLowerCase() === String(c.blockHash || '').toLowerCase() && nr === Number(c.blockNumber);
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if (potrivit) PASS('in-block', 'the transaction sits in the block the certificate names, and the chain serves the same block hash', 'block ' + nr.toLocaleString('en-US'));
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else FAIL('in-block', 'the transaction sits in the block the certificate names', 'chain says block ' + nr + ' hash ' + (blk && blk.hash) + ', certificate says ' + c.blockNumber + ' / ' + c.blockHash);
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} catch (e) { NM('in-block', 'the block matches the certificate', e.message); }
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}
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// 4. the post-quantum signature, re-checked live
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try {
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// isValidAttestation(uint256 keyId, uint64 nonce, bytes32 messageHash) -> bool. Signature read
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// from the contract source, not guessed: the middle argument is uint64, and a wrong ABI here
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// reverts in a way that looks exactly like an invalid attestation.
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const sel = hex(keccak256(new TextEncoder().encode('isValidAttestation(uint256,uint64,bytes32)'))).slice(0, 10);
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const pad = (v) => BigInt(v).toString(16).padStart(64, '0');
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const data = sel + pad(c.keyId ?? 0) + pad(c.nonce ?? c.attestationIndex ?? 0) + String(c.documentHash || '').replace(/^0x/, '').padStart(64, '0');
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const r = await rpc('eth_call', [{ to: c.registry, data }, 'latest']);
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const adevarat = r && /1$/.test(r.replace(/0+$/, '') ) === false ? BigInt(r) === 1n : BigInt(r || '0x0') === 1n;
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if (adevarat) PASS('post-quantum', 'the registry still reports this attestation as valid, and it was recorded only because a NIST post-quantum signature verified ON CHAIN inside the transaction', 'isValidAttestation = true');
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else FAIL('post-quantum', 'the registry reports this attestation as valid', 'isValidAttestation returned ' + r);
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} catch (e) { NM('post-quantum', 'the registry still reports this attestation as valid', 'call failed: ' + e.message); }
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// 5. the block is under the chain's post-quantum validator certificate
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//
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// NOTHING HERE IS A WRITTEN-IN CONSTANT ANY MORE, and that is the point. This check used to
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// carry `anchorInterval || 32` and `plainHeaderBytes || 634` as fallbacks, plus a fixed
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// "header must exceed base + 600 bytes" threshold. On 2026-08-09 five gates on this chain went
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// wrong in one day for exactly that reason: the validator set grew from seven to nine, the
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// plain header base moved from 525 to 634, and every gate holding the old number reported a
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// perfect fleet or an empty one. So: the schedule comes from the certificate or the link is
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// NOT MEASURED, never from yesterday's default; and the plain-header baseline is measured now,
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// from a neighbouring non-anchor header on the same chain.
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//
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// And the discriminator is vanityData, not size. Attaching seals and anchoring a digest are two
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// separate switches; a size-only test passes on a fleet where anchoring never started.
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if (rc) {
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try {
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const nr = parseInt(rc.blockNumber, 16);
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const ancora = Number(c.anchorInterval), start = Number(c.anchorBlock);
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if (!Number.isFinite(ancora) || !Number.isFinite(start) || ancora <= 0) {
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NM('sealed', 'the block is covered by the chain post-quantum validator certificate',
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'this certificate carries no anchorBlock / anchorInterval, and this check will not fall back to a hard-coded schedule: those numbers change when the validator set changes. Re-issue the certificate with them, or verify the anchor by hand.');
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} else {
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const urm = nr <= start ? start : start + Math.ceil((nr - start) / ancora) * ancora;
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const blk = await rpc('eth_getBlockByNumber', ['0x' + urm.toString(16), false]);
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if (!blk) NM('sealed', 'the block is covered by the chain post-quantum validator certificate', 'the covering anchor at ' + urm.toLocaleString('en-US') + ' is not on chain yet; re-run later');
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else {
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const vanity = primulElementRLP(octeti(blk.extraData));
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const oct = (blk.extraData.length - 2) / 2;
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// Measured baseline: the header right before the anchor is not an anchor height, so its
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// size is what a plain header costs on this chain today.
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let de_baza = null;
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try {
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const vecin = await rpc('eth_getBlockByNumber', ['0x' + (urm - 1).toString(16), false]);
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if (vecin) de_baza = (vecin.extraData.length - 2) / 2;
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} catch { /* baseline stays unmeasured; the vanityData test below does not need it */ }
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const marime = de_baza === null
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? 'header ' + oct + ' bytes (plain-header baseline NOT MEASURED: the neighbouring header did not load)'
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: 'header ' + oct + ' bytes against a measured plain header of ' + de_baza + ' bytes at ' + (urm - 1).toLocaleString('en-US') + ', so ' + (oct - de_baza) + ' bytes of validator certificate';
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if (!vanity) {
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NM('sealed', 'the block is covered by the chain post-quantum validator certificate',
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'extraData at anchor ' + urm.toLocaleString('en-US') + ' did not decode as an RLP list, so nothing is claimed either way');
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} else if (vanity.length === 32 && !areTextASCII(vanity, 'besu')) {
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PASS('sealed', 'the anchor at or after this block carries a post-quantum validator certificate whose digest is inside the block hash preimage, so rewriting this block later needs post-quantum forgeries',
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'anchor ' + urm.toLocaleString('en-US') + ', vanityData is a 32-byte digest ' + hex(vanity) + '; ' + marime);
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} else {
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FAIL('sealed', 'the anchor at or after this block carries a post-quantum validator certificate',
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'anchor ' + urm.toLocaleString('en-US') + ' carries ordinary vanityData (' + vanity.length + ' bytes' + (areTextASCII(vanity, 'besu') ? ", client string containing 'besu'" : '') + '), not an anchor digest; ' + marime);
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}
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}
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}
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} catch (e) { NM('sealed', 'the block is covered by the chain post-quantum validator certificate', e.message); }
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}
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// ---------- verdict ----------
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console.log('');
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for (const l of linii) console.log(' [' + l.v.padEnd(12) + '] ' + l.id.padEnd(13) + ' ' + l.ce + '\n' + ' '.repeat(32) + l.obs);
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const f = linii.filter((l) => l.v === 'FAIL').length, p = linii.filter((l) => l.v === 'PASS').length, n = linii.filter((l) => l.v === 'NOT MEASURED').length;
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console.log('\n PASS=' + p + ' FAIL=' + f + ' NOT MEASURED=' + n);
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if (f > 0) { console.log('\nVERDICT: this certificate does NOT hold up. See the FAIL lines above.'); process.exitCode = 1; return; }
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if (p === 0) { console.log('\nVERDICT: nothing could be measured. That is not a pass.'); process.exitCode = 2; return; }
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console.log('\nVERDICT: every measured link holds. NOT MEASURED lines are not confirmations, and they say why.');
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process.exitCode = 0; return;
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})().catch((e) => { console.error('ERROR: ' + e.message); process.exitCode = 2; });
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