Measured 2026-08-16: a 42-byte contract that merely STORES the constant 0x0AE1 and never calls anything still scores GREEN, with the reference marked medium confidence. So the headline colour does not separate a resolved call from a bare constant, and a client who tests that in five minutes would find it before we admitted it. The scan text now says, per address, whether a CALL to each verifier resolved from the bytecode or whether only the address is present, and says plainly that a present address can also be plain data. The colour stays what the scanner computes; the sentence next to it carries what it means. |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| controale | ||
| certificat-exemplu.json | ||
| emite-certificat.mjs | ||
| README.md | ||
| verifica-certificat.mjs | ||
The notarization half: issue a certificate, and check one without asking us
A notarization is worth exactly as much as an outsider's ability to check it without asking the
notary. So the verifier is here, it installs nothing, and it takes --rpc so you can point it at a
node you operate.
Check a certificate
node verifica-certificat.mjs certificate.json --fisier your-document.pdf --rpc https://your-node
Five links, each reported separately as PASS, FAIL or NOT MEASURED:
- the file you hold hashes to the digest the certificate names;
- the transaction named exists, succeeded, and called the named registry;
- the transaction sits in the block named, and the chain serves the same block hash;
- the attestation was recorded only because a NIST post-quantum signature verified on chain, inside that transaction, by a live precompile. Re-checked on every run through the registry's own free read method;
- the block is covered by the chain's post-quantum validator certificate.
The three verdicts, and why the third is not an accusation
0 every measured link holds
1 something does not hold, and the FAIL line names which link
2 nothing could be measured, which is neither a pass nor a rejection
The difference between 1 and 2 is the honesty of the tool. "The node did not answer" and "the node answered and holds no such transaction" are different facts, and only the second says anything about the certificate. Until 2026-08-17 this tool confused them: with an unreachable endpoint it told the holder that their certificate does not hold up, turning a network problem on our side into an accusation of forgery against the client. That is the worst way a notarization product can be wrong, and it is fixed.
Prove the verifier can reject, before you trust it to accept
controale/ holds five certificates, each with exactly one lie planted in it: a falsified document
digest, a falsified block hash, a transaction that does not exist, a foreign registry, and a wrong
per-key counter. Run them:
for f in controale/*.json; do node verifica-certificat.mjs "$f"; done
Measured 2026-08-17: all five exit 1. The genuine certificate in certificat-exemplu.json, built
from a real attestation on chain 2800 at block 9,200,542, exits 0. An unreachable node exits 2 with
every line NOT MEASURED.
Issuing: it never signs anything, on purpose
node emite-certificat.mjs pregateste document.pdf # unsigned request + the challenge
... the key holder signs the challenge and submits the transaction ...
node emite-certificat.mjs finalizeaza cerere.json --tx 0x...
The tool produces an unsigned transaction and the challenge the post-quantum signature must cover. Signing is a separate act by whoever holds the key, in a wallet they control. A notarization service that quietly holds a hot key and signs on your behalf has made itself the thing you were supposed to be able to check.
The challenge is asked of the chain, never rebuilt locally: the contract exposes it, and a local reimplementation of that preimage differing by one byte would produce a signature the chain rejects, which looks exactly like a forgery instead of like our bug.
And the finalise step runs the verifier above before writing the certificate, so a certificate is never handed over unverified.
What this does not claim
It does not say the document is true, lawful, or anyone's. It proves that that digest existed on chain at that time, under a post-quantum signature, in a block covered by the validator certificate. What that means legally depends on jurisdiction and is not asserted here.