3.2 KiB
AIP-11: Interoperability: Hyperlane-Compatible Messaging plus zk Light Clients, not IBC
Preamble
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| AIP | 11 |
| Title | Interoperability: Hyperlane-Compatible Messaging plus zk Light Clients, not IBC |
| Author | Aere Network Foundation |
| Type | Informational |
| Category | (none) |
| Status | Final |
| Created | 2026-07-19 |
| Requires | None |
| Supersedes | None |
| Superseded-By | None |
| Ratification | Foundation-ratified (pre-decentralization) |
Abstract
This AIP records the decision to build cross-chain interoperability as an EVM-native, Hyperlane-compatible messaging layer plus zero-knowledge light clients, rather than adopting IBC natively. It backfills a decision already made and partly deployed.
Motivation
Aere's value proposition is that it is an ordinary EVM chain. Cross-chain interop must serve permissionless, EVM-familiar builders while also offering trust-minimized verification of a counterparty's finality, and those two goals pull in different directions.
Specification
- An EVM-native, Hyperlane-compatible messaging layer: a Mailbox-compatible
AereMessengerand an interchain gas paymasterAereIGP. - An ERC-7683 intent layer and an Across-v3-compatible spoke pool.
- A zero-knowledge interop path: on-chain zk light clients verifying a counterparty's consensus finality from inside a contract (inbound Ethereum sync-committee finality, outbound Aere QBFT finality) via SP1 Groth16 proofs.
Rationale
IBC's design philosophy, verifying the counterparty's consensus rather than trusting a bridge committee, is the right one, and Aere adopts the philosophy directly. Aere splits the problem: for permissionless, developer-familiar interop it uses the Hyperlane-compatible interfaces the EVM tooling ecosystem already speaks; for the trust-minimization that is IBC's real contribution it built the zk light clients, which capture "verify the counterparty's consensus, do not trust a relayer" without leaving the EVM world.
Alternatives rejected. IBC as a protocol: it is built around Tendermint-style light clients and a non-EVM connection, channel, and packet model. Adopting it natively would import a substantial non-EVM stack and its tooling into a chain whose entire premise is that it is an ordinary EVM.
Backwards Compatibility
None.
Security Considerations
The Hyperlane-compatible endpoints are interface-faithful and deployed, but a live decentralized relayer and interchain-security-module network is not yet stood up: the current bridge path runs through a single Foundation signer with a relayer pending. Until that changes, the messaging layer's trust assumption is the Foundation, not a validator set.
The zk light clients are trust-minimized, not trustless, and not quantum-safe: their committed seals are classical secp256k1 and the proof wrap is Groth16 over BN254, which is Shor-breakable. A post-quantum-sound replacement is recorded in AIP-16 and is not live.
Reference Implementation and On-Chain Deployment
Deployed messaging and intent interfaces are listed in sdk-js/src/addresses.ts.
The zk light-client and verifier-gateway work is under aere-contracts and
the zk work trees.
Errata
None.
Copyright
Released to the public domain (CC0). No rights reserved.