4a0b48588c
Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network). Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
148 lines
7.2 KiB
Markdown
148 lines
7.2 KiB
Markdown
# AIP-5: sAERE Receipt Token and AereSink Immutable Flywheel
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## Preamble
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| Field | Value |
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| --- | --- |
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| AIP | 5 |
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| Title | sAERE Receipt Token and AereSink Immutable Flywheel |
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| Author | AERE Foundation |
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| Type | Standards Track |
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| Category | ARC |
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| Status | Final |
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| Created | 2026-07-11 |
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| Requires | 2 |
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| Ratification | Foundation-ratified (pre-decentralization) |
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## Abstract
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This AIP documents AERE's protocol-revenue flywheel: an immutable three-bucket
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router (AereSink) that splits incoming fee streams into burn, buyback-and-burn,
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and staker-yield, and an ERC-4626 receipt token (sAERE) whose exchange rate drifts
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up as the staker-yield bucket flows in. Neither contract has an owner, admin, or
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upgrade path. It is a retro-filed record of contracts already live on chain 2800.
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## Motivation
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AERE wanted a single, credible mechanism to accrue protocol revenue to AERE
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holders that no one, including the Foundation, could later divert or turn off. The
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two failure modes to avoid were (1) an admin-controlled treasury that could
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redirect fees, and (2) a receipt token whose yield could be gamed by
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flash-loan sandwich attacks around the moment revenue arrives.
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The design goal was an immutable router with fixed, publicly verifiable split
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percentages, feeding a receipt vault that vests arrivals smoothly instead of in a
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single-block step, so that stakers earn deterministically and no admin key is a
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point of trust or a point of failure.
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## Specification
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### AereSink (immutable three-bucket router)
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Address `0x69581B86A48161b067Ff4E01544780625B231676`. Source
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`contracts/contracts/sink/AereSink.sol`.
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Fee-source contracts call `flush(token, amount)` after approving the sink. The
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sink splits the amount into three buckets by immutable basis points that MUST sum
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to 10000 (the constructor reverts otherwise):
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- **BURN_BPS = 1500 (15%)** to AereFeeBurnVault
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(`0x696afDF4f814e6Fd6aa45CE14C498ed9375fB2c6`), an extra burn on top of the
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37.5% coinbase burn in AIP-2.
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- **BUYBACK_BPS = 4000 (40%)** buyback-and-burn: non-AERE fees are swapped to AERE
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via the DEX router and then burned.
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- **STAKER_YIELD_BPS = 4500 (45%)** to the sAERE vault, lifting its exchange rate.
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If the flushed token is AERE (WAERE, `0x7e84d7d66d5da4cfE46Da67CDEeB05B323e1f5e8`),
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the burn and buyback buckets merge into a single transfer to the burn vault and the
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staker bucket transfers to sAERE directly, no swap. If the token is not AERE, each
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bucket is swapped along `[token, AERE]` with an oracle-derived `amountOutMin` floor
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so the swap cannot be sandwiched via pool-reserve manipulation.
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Immutability invariants (enforced in code and tests): no owner, no admin, no
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governance role; no `setBucket`, `setRecipient`, `setRouter`, or `pause`; bucket
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recipients and basis points are set at deploy and are immutable. Replacing the
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router means redeploying and rewiring fee sources, not mutating this contract.
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### sAERE (ERC-4626 receipt token)
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Address `0xA2125bE9C6fd4196D9F94757Df18B3a2A5e650b0`. Source
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`contracts/contracts/staking/sAERE.sol`.
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sAERE is a standard ERC-4626 vault: deposit WAERE, receive sAERE shares. The
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WAERE-per-sAERE rate rises as the staker-yield bucket arrives. Two hardening
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choices are normative:
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- **Linear drip.** Arrivals are not recognized as an instantaneous jump in
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`totalAssets`. They vest linearly over `DRIP_DURATION = 7 days`. `totalAssets()`
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excludes the not-yet-vested reserve, so share price grows continuously, not in a
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single-block step. `sync()` is permissionless and is called inside every deposit
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and withdraw; AereSink also pings it after transferring yield in.
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- **Inflation-attack widening.** `_decimalsOffset()` is overridden to 6 and a
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dead-share seed is minted at construction, so the classic first-depositor
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inflation attack is economically infeasible.
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sAERE has no admin, no owner, no pause, no upgrade proxy, and no parameter
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setters. `DRIP_DURATION` and the decimal offset are compile-time constants.
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## Rationale
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Immutability is the whole point. An admin-configurable router would reintroduce
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exactly the trust assumption the flywheel is meant to remove, so AereSink has no
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setters at all; changing the policy requires a visible redeploy and a rewire that
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the community can observe. The 15/40/45 split weights holder accrual (buyback plus
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staker yield is 85%) over pure burn (15%), on the view that a rising sAERE rate
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plus buyback pressure is a stronger, more legible incentive than a large flat burn
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alone.
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The linear drip exists specifically to defeat the deposit-then-flush-then-redeem
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sandwich: if yield landed as a step, a flash-loaned depositor could capture it in
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one block. Vesting over seven days makes the per-block share-price change
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negligible relative to any single attacker's position. Choosing an ERC-4626
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receipt token (rather than a rebasing balance) keeps sAERE composable with the
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wider DeFi tooling that already understands 4626.
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## Backwards Compatibility
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None. sAERE is a standard ERC-4626 token and AereSink is an additive router. They
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introduce no new base token (AERE, via its WAERE wrapper, is the only token) and do
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not change existing contracts. Fee sources opt in by calling `flush`.
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## Security Considerations
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- **No admin is a feature and a constraint.** Because neither contract has an
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owner, a bug in either cannot be patched in place; the only remedy is a redeploy
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and a rewire of fee sources. This is the accepted trade for removing admin trust.
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- **Sandwich resistance depends on the oracle.** The buyback swap's `amountOutMin`
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is computed from an oracle price floor, not from pool reserves. If AereSink is
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deployed with a zero oracle (a test-only mode), swaps accept any non-zero output
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and are sandwich-able. Production deployment MUST set a real oracle. The drip
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mitigates the yield-timing sandwich independently of the swap path.
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- **Swap liveness.** If a non-AERE buyback swap fails (no liquidity, slippage),
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the tokens remain as dust and `sweepDust()` can re-flush later; a single dead
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pair does not lock the whole flush. This is a liveness, not a safety, concern.
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- **Unaudited.** These contracts have not had an external security audit. They
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have been hardened across several internal review rounds (the drip and the
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inflation-offset widening are outputs of those rounds), but internal review is
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not an external audit.
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- **Thin usage.** As with the rest of AERE today, real flush volume through the
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sink is thin. The mechanism is live and immutable, but its economic effect is
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only as large as the fee streams actually routed into it.
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## Reference Implementation and On-Chain Deployment
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- `contracts/contracts/sink/AereSink.sol` -> `0x69581B86A48161b067Ff4E01544780625B231676`
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- `contracts/contracts/staking/sAERE.sol` -> `0xA2125bE9C6fd4196D9F94757Df18B3a2A5e650b0`
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- Burn destination: AereFeeBurnVault `0x696afDF4f814e6Fd6aa45CE14C498ed9375fB2c6` (AIP-2)
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- Base token: WAERE `0x7e84d7d66d5da4cfE46Da67CDEeB05B323e1f5e8`
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- Deploy script: `contracts/deploy/deploy-saere-sink-stack.js` (splits 1500/4000/4500)
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All addresses copied verbatim from `sdk-js/src/addresses.ts`. The immutable split
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is readable on-chain via `AereSink.BURN_BPS()`, `BUYBACK_BPS()`, and
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`STAKER_YIELD_BPS()`, which sum to 10000.
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## Copyright
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Released to the public domain (CC0). No rights reserved.
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</content>
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