aere-quantum/conformance/README.md

Conformance suite for the AIP-23 proof kinds

Every component beside this one ships its own verifier and its own way of saying no: the AIP-23 reference verifier prints four levels, the payment modules return reasons, the market judge motive, the dataset module ok, the audit log and the agents' ledger a refusal text, the identity verifier and the device verifier a list of labelled rows. This folder adds the one place that says, in the same form for all of them, this artifact passes or does not, at level N, for reason M, and a set of vectors that any implementation, in any language, can be run against.

It adds no verification rule. A verdict here is derived from the verdict of the published verifier of that artifact; the rule ids are the ones those verifiers name, read from their code.

The one verdict form

{ "v": 1, "kind": "aere-conformance-verdict", "artifact": "payment-receipt", "verdict": "INVALID",
  "levels": [
    { "level": "integrity",    "state": "FAILED",       "rules": ["receipt.chain"], "reason": "the transaction on chain is not this payment ..." },
    { "level": "authenticity", "state": "NOT_MEASURED", "rules": [], "cause": "absent", "reason": "the envelope carries no signature" },
    { "level": "anchoring",    "state": "NOT_MEASURED", "rules": [], "cause": "absent", "reason": "no notarization claimed and no --rpc given" },
    { "level": "finality",     "state": "NOT_MEASURED", "rules": [], "cause": "absent", "reason": "no notarization claimed and no --rpc given" } ],
  "failed": ["receipt.chain"] }

level	what it says
integrity	the artifact is what it says: its hashes bind its content, and the rules it declares (a policy, deadlines, a challenge window, Merkle paths, a payout) hold when recomputed from the evidence supplied
authenticity	the signature the artifact carries verifies, with a key of the scheme declared, and the identity it names is the one derived from that key (an ML-DSA signature on an AIP-23 envelope, the ML-DSA-65 signature of an audit head, the ML-DSA-65 key and signatures of an agent's ledger; the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, of its presentation and of each delegation link, both halves required; the same hybrid signatures on a device's manufacture credential, firmware release, transfers, authorization and status records, and the ML-DSA-65 signature of the device on its attestation)
anchoring	its statementHash (or, for a trust chain, the head of its ledger) is recorded in the notary contract, under a state root that a post-quantum anchor covers
finality	that anchor's post-quantum certificate verifies. The finality is the one of the chain the artifact was notarized on

Each level is PASSED, FAILED or NOT_MEASURED, with the reason; a level nobody judged says why (cause). The verdict is INVALID when a level failed; PARTIAL when nothing failed but something the artifact claims was not measured (a notarization claim not checked because the run was offline, a signature scheme the verifier cannot check, a timeline that is not terminal, a presentation judged without the verifier's audience, nonce or trusted issuers, a credential whose status list was not read, a device bundle with a link missing or a registry nobody read); VALID otherwise, and only with integrity passed. A claim that was not checked is never VALID. failed is the sorted list of the rule ids that refused; the suite compares it as an exact set.

A receipt or a market timeline that carries an AIP-23 envelope gets that envelope judged too, by the reference verifier, so one verdict covers the artifact: the receipt recorded on testnet 28001 comes out with integrity, anchoring and finality PASSED in one verdict (vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json).

What is enrolled

REGULI.json is derived from the code (node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica): 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 artifact kinds. By level: 142 rules are reported at integrity, 36 at authenticity, 3 at anchoring (one of them, envelope.finality, is reported at anchoring or at finality by the place that refused).

artifact kind	judged by	rules
envelope (every AIP-23 kind)	the AIP-23 reference verifier, run as the program it is (AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs>, published at aere.network/tools)	4: envelope.form, .integrity, .signature, .finality
payment-risk (a payment presented as allowed under a declared policy)	payments/risc.mjs	6: risk.form, .asset, .counterparty, .rate, .limit, .window
payment-receipt	payments/chitanta.mjs	5: receipt.binding, .amount, .policy, .risk, .chain
market-timeline	market-settlement/piata.mjs	10: market.form, .complete, .posting, .deadline, .window, .arbiter, .payout, .result, .replay, .proof
dataset-record, -answer, -consistency, -sample	verifiable-data/baza.mjs	10: dataset.form, .commitment, .field, .inclusion, .index, .range, .order, .completeness, .consistency, .sample
ai-trust-bundle (the trust chain of an AI result)	ai-trust/lant-de-incredere.mjs	21: aitrust.form, .identity-mismatch, .identity-key, .version-attestation, .version-artifact-mismatch, .version-label-mismatch, .runtime-record, .runtime-artifact-mismatch, .runtime-after-output, .audit-log-broken, .runtime-not-in-audit-log, .audit-head, .witness-head, .policy-hash, .ledger-invalid, .output-not-in-ledger, .action-refused, .ledger-time-mismatch, .policy, .provenance-envelope, .provenance-finality
audit-log (a hash-chained log, alone or against an attested head, signed or not)	verify-layer/sidecar.mjs	13: auditlog.entry, .seq, .chain, .hash, .head-form, .head-hash, .head-unsigned, .head-scheme, .head-key, .head-signature, .head-signer, .head-short, .head-rewritten
audit-inclusion, audit-consistency (RFC 9162 proofs over that log)	verify-layer/jurnal-arbore.mjs	12: audittree.proof-form, .head-form, .head-hash, .inclusion-index, .inclusion-entry, .inclusion-envelope, .inclusion-leaf, .inclusion-path, .inclusion-head, .consistency-start, .consistency-end, .consistency
agent-ledger (an agent's signed ledger under its policy)	agents/agent-ledger.mjs	16: agents.ledger-form, .policy, .other-policy, .session, .key, .identity, .anchor, .seq, .chain, .body, .signature, .hash, .time, .revocation, .approvals, .decision
identity-presentation (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed)	identity/identity.mjs	37: identity.form, .issuer-id, .holder-id, .credential-signature, .issuer-trusted, .credential-window, .status-list, .credential-revoked, .sd-distinct, .disclosure-readable, .disclosure-signed, .disclosure-once, .disclosure-plain, .claim-name, .binding-credential, .binding-disclosures, .binding-delegations, .presenter, .presentation-signature, .audience, .nonce, .freshness, .chain-length, .delegation-form, .delegation-ids, .delegation-from, .delegation-parent, .delegation-signature, .delegation-scope, .delegation-window, .delegation-depth, .delegation-narrows, .delegation-credential, .delegation-claims, .delegation-audience, .delegation-revoked, .unreadable
device-bundle (the chain of a device: the manufacturer's credential for the device key, a firmware release, the ownership transfers, the owner's authorization, the device's attestation and its AIP-23 envelope, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock, nonce and audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists, firmware policies and status records it read, its own reading of the notarized envelope)	device-identity/device.mjs	47: device.form, .manufacture-form, .manufacturer-id, .manufacture-holder, .manufacture-signature, .manufacturer-trusted, .manufacture-window, .manufacture-status-list, .manufacture-revoked, .device-key, .device-id, .firmware-form, .firmware-signer, .firmware-signature, .firmware-model, .firmware-retracted, .firmware-rollback, .firmware-software, .chain-length, .transfer-form, .transfer-device, .transfer-ids, .transfer-from, .transfer-prev, .transfer-signature, .transfer-time, .authorization-form, .authorization-device, .authorization-owner, .authorization-ownership, .authorization-signature, .authorization-window, .authorization-action, .status-retired, .status-suspended, .attestation-form, .attestation-key, .attestation-device, .attestation-signature, .audience, .nonce, .freshness, .attestation-firmware, .attestation-ownership, .witness-envelope, .witness-time, .unreadable

A module verifier exports the list of rules it can name (REGULI; its helper throws on any other) and marks its rules in one of two ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (nine modules), or the rule named at every call of the verifier's one refusal helper (ai-trust). The derivation requires declared == marked == mapped here. A rule added to a verifier and not mapped is a refusal of the derivation; a mapped rule without a vector is a refusal of the probe. For the reference verifier, a published program this suite does not edit, the rules are its level names, and each of the six places where its finality level can refuse is classified as anchoring or finality (a seventh place would be a refusal of the derivation).

The identity verifier does not stop at its first refusal: it makes every check it can reach and names every rule that refused, so a vector may expect several. What it could not judge because the verifier did not bring it (no audience, no nonce, no trusted issuer, the status list the credential names not handed or not current) leaves the verdict PARTIAL, never VALID; the cause is named not-supplied (added to the verdict form on 2026-10-05).

The device verifier (enrolled on 2026-10-05) works the same way. A link that is not in the bundle, the verifier's nonce, audience or trusted manufacturers not brought, a recall list, a firmware policy or the status registry not read, a recall list, a policy or a status record that is signed by who may give it and cannot be read, a notarization the envelope claims and the verifier did not read, a hardware root (which that verifier cannot judge): each leaves the verdict PARTIAL. The adapter refuses to run if the causes the module declares as keeping its verdict from VALID are not exactly the ones mapped here, and if the verdict of the suite is not the verdict of the module. The readings of a notarized envelope in these vectors are inputs (what a verifier would bring), not readings of a chain: the module's own probe reads testnet 28001.

Four things the device verifier names without changing its verdict, and what a VALID then does and does not say: a status record of a previous owner (it does not bind the owner of now: a seller could date a retirement before the sale after it; the manufacturer's retirement is final, an owner's lasts as long as its ownership), a status record dated in the verifier's future, a status record of a stranger, a credential that names no recall list. The one verdict form has no field for them: the adapter writes them in the reason of the integrity level, and the vectors compare verdicts, rules and level states, not reasons. So vectori/device-bundle/resold-after-retirement.valid.json is VALID here, and a verifier that drops the naming still passes it; that the naming is there is measured by the device component's own probe, not by this suite.

Not enrolled, counted in the same file: three verifiers of the identity component that sit beside the enrolled one or on top of it: SD-JWT (26 calls of its refusal helper), Travel Rule (20 places that add a reason) and compliance (3). Their refusals are texts, not rule ids. Their own probes and negative controls stay what checks them.

The vectors

vectori/ holds 422 vectors (413 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 16 MB, since every device and identity vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in vectori/INDEX.json: envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion 10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 149. By expected verdict: 59 VALID, 47 PARTIAL, 316 INVALID. None is typed by hand (node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica regenerates them and compares byte for byte):

• the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit log, its heads and its inclusion and consistency proofs come from the verify-layer producers on fixed inputs;
• the receipt, the five market timelines, the notarized dataset commitment and one trust chain of an AI result are the evidence recorded on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 beside those components;
• surse-proaspete.json holds what needed a key, randomness or the chain, made once by --proaspat (which only adds what is missing). Every key was generated and discarded in that call: a tree head signed with an ML-DSA-65 key and the same head "signed" with an Ed25519 key that declares itself ml-dsa-65; an audit head signed by an operator key, by another key, and by a classical key; the ledger of an agent (a tool call, a payment, a payment refused above the limit, a tool call) with the forged siblings that only the agent's key can make (an empty approvals list, a false decision, a revocation entry without a revocation) and one written with a classical key; three trust chains of a fresh agent (allowed, refused by the policy, dated apart); the presentations of one identity credential (an issuer, a holder, a phone, a session key, a stranger and an impostor issuer: six hybrid key pairs), its status lists, its delegations and revocations, with the forged siblings that only a key holder can make (a statement changed and signed again by the issuer, the holder or a delegate) and one credential from an issuer whose "ML-DSA-65" key is an Ed25519 key; the chain of one device (a manufacturer, two owners, a second identity the first owner sells to, a stranger, another manufacturer: six hybrid key pairs; the device key and a clone's key, ML-DSA-65), sold once, sold on, and bought back, its recall lists, firmware policies and status records, with the forged siblings that only a key holder can make and a device key that is an Ed25519 key (the firmware image and its Proof of Software attestation are the fixtures of the device component; --proaspat --refa device makes this one source anew when the producers of the device component change, and every other vector stays byte for byte); an envelope with random content that nobody notarized; a dataset of 16 records with random salts; and the transaction of the recorded receipt read from the chain (two read calls).

An INVALID vector names its base and its mutation: one operation (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in expected.failed, not merely refused: 209 of the 316 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner): the other 107 are made at the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared (mutation.changed). Eleven vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the ledger links; a delegation chain cut after it was signed for is also not presented by its last delegate; a manufacture credential whose signature is changed is also no longer the link the first transfer names; a clone that claims the device's id with another key breaks both the id derivation and the match with the manufacturer's credential).

Run it

AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs"              # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 413 offline vectors
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online     # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py"     # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 360 reported NOT COVERED
node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>"                          # yours
node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online]                 # one artifact { artifact, input }: its verdict

For the artifact envelope the input is { "envelope": <any JSON value> }, or { "raw": "<the text of the file>" } when the file is not JSON at all: a file that is not an envelope is refused at the form level, by name, like any other. The other inputs are the ones the vectors show ({ log, head?, signer? } for an audit log, { ledger, policy } for an agent's ledger, { bundle } for a trust chain, { presentation, now, audience?, nonce?, trustedIssuers?, statusLists?, revocations?, maxAgeS? } for a presentation of a credential, { bundle, now, nonce?, audience?, trustedManufacturers?, statusLists?, firmwarePolicies?, statusRecords?, softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? } for a device bundle: now, the verifier's clock, is required for both, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not reproduce).

An implementation is a command that answers three calls with JSON on stdout: --capabilities ({ artifacts, rules, online, batch }: what it claims to judge), <vector.json> [--online] (the verdict above for the file's { artifact, input }), and, if it says batch, --batch <list.json> (one verdict per line). A vector is scored only if the implementation claims its artifact kind and every rule the vector exercises; otherwise it is reported NOT COVERED, never passed. A scored vector passes when the verdict, the exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expected ones. No output is BROKEN: a crash is not a refusal. Without --online an implementation must not open a connection.

implementare-integritate.py is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 181 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 360 vectors, among them every vector of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations and the device bundles. For those six verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours.

How the suite itself is checked

Measured on 2026-10-05 (Node.js 24.14.1, Python 3.14.4, testnet 28001 read):

• node proba-conformance.mjs --online: every row green, 11 in this copy (a twelfth, the comparison of the 16 kind envelopes with the published AIP-23 kind vectors, runs where their generator is, in the development repository: 12/12 there, and here it is printed as information). The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now; every rule has a vector that expects it (181 of 181); every artifact kind has a valid vector (15); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (209) or one declared producer change (107); the published verifiers pass 422/422; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims; and 70,358 malformed inputs (every path of every offline vector that is not invalid removed, or replaced by null, a string, a number, a list, an object) given to the module verifiers each got a verdict, none threw. That row covers the modules of nine verifiers; the trust chain verifier is not in it (each case would run the reference verifier several times). The reference verifier, a program, has a row of its own: 183 malformed envelope files (every path of a signed tree head and of a notarized envelope removed or replaced; files that hold null, a number, a string, true, a list, an empty object, text that is not JSON, nothing) are given to it, and each gets a verdict. That row contacts no public endpoint: the program goes to the chain whenever a file claims a notarization, so a file that still carries the claim is run against a closed local endpoint and its finality is not measured. Without --online the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2.
• node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online: 263 rows green: 181 of 181 rules, 76 of 76 conditions of the device verifier, six controls of the instruments. Each rule is planted out of its verifier, one at a time, in a copy (every check that carries its marker made true at run time; for ai-trust, its refusal helper made to drop the refusals of that rule; for the reference verifier, the level made to pass); the suite is run against the planted verifier; the vectors that expect the rule, and only they, must fail, and none may break. A rule taken out whole says nothing about each condition of a check made of several: every vector of the rule fails, whichever condition it was written for. So, for the device verifier, the conditions are then planted out one at a time: 76 of 76. The plantings are those of that verifier's own negative control, read from its plantari-device.mjs and not typed again here (a credential that has not begun, each condition of the authorization window, the position of a transfer, the id of who gives one, the sequence and the digest the device attests, the model, the validity and the version of a policy, a date ahead of the verifier's clock, a signature in another base64 text, whose status record counts, and so on); under each, exactly the vectors written for that condition must fail (82 vectors in all). Of the 88 plantings that control makes in the verifier, 11 are reached by no vector and are not in this list: four are of the producers and two of the key files, which a vector does not exercise; four are of what the verifier names without changing its verdict, which the verdict form does not carry; and one empties the list of causes that keep a verdict from VALID, under which the adapter refuses to run at all (every device vector breaks, none passes). One more, the purpose separation of signatures, fails 123 of the 149 device vectors at once and is not a condition of one check. The other verifiers have no such list: for them the control shows that each rule is load-bearing, and --pe-loc below measures their checks. Then six controls of the instruments: an implementation that calls everything valid fails every vector that is not plainly valid (381 of the 413 offline vectors); the coverage gate goes red when one rule's vector is taken away; a rule added to a verifier and not mapped is refused by the derivation; a judge that throws again turns the malformed-input row red; a reference verifier that throws again turns the malformed-envelope row red; no planted copy is left behind.
• node proba-conformance.mjs --pe-loc is a measurement, not a gate: each of the 209 marked checks of the module verifiers planted out alone (the trust chain verifier has no per-check markers and is not in this count). For 174 of them a vector then fails (all 40 checks of the identity verifier and all 47 of the device verifier among them). The others are checks whose vector trips a second check of the same rule at the same time, so removing one alone changes nothing (the three checks of market.replay, the three of agents.anchor, the run and neighbour checks of dataset.completeness), or checks no vector reaches (a dispute timed out before the arbitration timeout; five of the six checks of agents.time). The control above shows that each rule is load-bearing, not each of its checks.

The suite found defects in the verifiers it enrols, on 2026-10-03, while they were being enrolled; all are fixed and each is now a vector or a probe row:

• three verifiers accepted a classical key under a post-quantum name. The AIP-23 reference verifier reported a signature that declared ml-dsa-65 and was made with an Ed25519, Ed448, RSA or P-256 key as signature PASSED: ml-dsa-65: verifies; the audit log verifier accepted a head "signed" the same way as a head signed with ML-DSA-65; the agents' ledger verifier did not require the agent key to be an ML-DSA-65 key, so the ledger of a "post-quantum identity" could be written and signed with an Ed25519 key and verify. In each, the key was never required to be a key of the scheme declared. Each is now a refusal by name (envelope/signed-head.signature-classical-key, audit-log/signed-head.head-scheme-classical-key, agent-ledger/four-entries.key-classical). The audit head has a second vector since 2026-10-05, audit-log/signed-head-any-signer.head-scheme-classical-key, the same head with no signer expected: with the scheme rule taken out of the verifier, the first is still refused, for its signer, and this one is accepted;
• the reference verifier exited with an exception on a file holding the JSON value null, let a statement that is a list pass its form level, and reported a malformed ML-DSA signature (no key, a key that cannot be parsed) as unmeasured "needs OpenSSL 3.5" on a runtime that has it; each is now a refusal by name, and a file that is not JSON is refused at the form level instead of ending the run;
• a malformed payment made the risk module throw instead of refusing by name; malformed dataset answers made the dataset verifier throw;
• the market judge accepted a timeline from which the submission event had been withheld, which skipped the challenge-window rule (the judge now requires every event the job state implies: market.complete);
• the market judge took the time an execution envelope was notarized from the envelope's own claim, so a claim written earlier than the truth passed. The time now comes from the reference verifier's reading under the anchor, and the claim is only compared with it (market-timeline/s1-28001.proof-claim-early).

On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed the same day:

• a fault of the issuer's keys was also blamed on the holder. When the issuer keys in a credential could not be read (for example an Ed25519 key in the field of the ML-DSA-65 key), the identity verifier refused the credential, as it must, and also reported that the holder id is not the id of its keys: the two ids were derived in one step, and the first failure left the second underived. The verdict was INVALID either way; the list of rules named one that had not been broken. Each id is now derived on its own, and the vector identity-presentation/direct.issuer-classical-key expects exactly the two rules of the issuer. That vector also measures that the identity verifier never accepted a classical key in the ML-DSA-65 field: its key type was checked before this suite.

What it is not, and what is not measured

• Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark. Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these 422 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
• The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors. The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers. The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 181; the other 175 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier and the device verifier, are judged here by one implementation.
• Finality is the chain's. The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.
• Five of the six finality refusals have no vector. The reference verifier can refuse at its finality level in six places; the vectors reach one (a notarization claimed that the chain does not hold). The others need an endpoint that lies or an anchor that does not verify: they are exercised by that verifier's own probe, through a local proxy that lies to it, not by these vectors.
• The chain vectors depend on the testnet's state. The notary contract is open: anyone can notarize the fresh envelope's hash on 28001, and envelope/fresh-28001.* then change verdict. The runner would show it; --proaspat makes a new one.
• Integrity is over the evidence supplied. A market timeline and the transaction facts of a receipt are the caller's reading of the chain; this suite does not certify that reading under an anchor. The market judge now refuses a timeline that lacks an event the job state implies; it does not prove that the job state shown is the chain's.
• Offline, a notarization time is only a claim. With the chain, market.proof takes the time an execution envelope was first seen from the reference verifier's reading under the anchor and refuses a claim that differs from it. Offline there is no such reading: the claim is all there is, the verdict is PARTIAL, and a certified field that an artifact brings itself is dropped.
• Authenticity is what each verifier checks. The reference verifier checks ML-DSA signatures on envelopes, the audit log verifier the ML-DSA-65 signature of a head, the ledger verifier the agent's ML-DSA-65 key and signatures, each with a key that must be of the scheme declared; the identity verifier the hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 signatures of a credential, a presentation and each delegation link (both halves, each with a key of its type). A hybrid signature on an AIP-23 envelope is still reported unmeasured by the reference verifier, and the verdict is PARTIAL.
• Most times in a trust chain and in a ledger are claims. A trust chain without a witness is PARTIAL: every time in it is the statement of whoever holds the keys. Three trust-chain vectors read a ledger head notarized on testnet 28001. No vector gives an agent's ledger an anchor that verifies: agents.anchor is reached only through an anchor that is refused, and five of the six checks of agents.time have no vector.
• An identity verdict is the verifier's. A presentation is judged on the clock, the audience, the nonce, the trusted issuers, the status lists and the revocations in the vector input: what a verifier brings decides the verdict. VALID for a delegated presentation says that no revocation handed to the verifier has taken effect, not that none exists; a revocation that cannot be attributed to the giver of the link or to the holder is ignored; a credential that names no status list cannot be revoked by its issuer and is still VALID. Every time in these vectors is the statement of a key holder: no vector notarizes a credential or a delegation. Nothing here says who an issuer is in the world.
• A device verdict is the verifier's too, and the device key is a software key. A bundle is judged on the clock, the nonce, the audience, the trusted manufacturers, the recall lists, the firmware policies, the status records and the readings in the vector input. VALID says that every link was brought and that what was read revokes nothing, not that nothing was withheld. No vector, and nothing in the device verifier, checks a hardware root: a device key is a key in software, and an attestation says what the holder of that key claims to run. A Proof of Software attestation handed with a bundle is checked for being the one the release names and for listing the image digest; its own signature is not verified there. An owner's retirement of a device does not survive a sale: after a transfer it is named and not applied (the manufacturer's is final). A retirement by an owner that holds across a sale needs a witness of when it and the transfer were signed, which is not built; every time in a transfer, an authorization and a status record of these vectors is the statement of the key holder that signed it.
• What a damaged artifact can still pass. Of the 70,358 malformed inputs, 3,889 were still accepted, at 192 distinct paths (81 of them in device bundles: a status record that decided nothing, such as a suspension already lifted, a stranger's record, a record not in effect yet or one of a previous owner; a recall list or a firmware policy that could not be read and stood beside a clean one, which damaged is no longer signed by the manufacturer and counts like one that was not handed; the envelope and its notarization claim, which are optional; and the signature of a Proof of Software attestation, which the device verifier does not read): parts a verifier treats as optional (the transaction facts of a receipt, the envelope of a timeline, the head of an audit log), a policy field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), a revocation that was not in effect (damaged, it is ignored as before), and fields no rule reads (node proba-conformance.mjs --acceptate lists them). A policy that cannot be defined makes the risk module throw, by design. Of the 183 malformed envelope files given to the reference verifier (the probe's own row, measured at every run), 16 are still called VALID: an envelope with its signature or its notarization claim taken off (an unsigned, unnotarized envelope), and an envelope whose outer v or kind was damaged. Those two fields are outside the statement hash and the reference verifier does not read them; the statement carries its own kind, which is under the hash. (This file used to quote 526 malformed envelopes, a figure of 2026-10-03 from a run whose script was not kept; the row above replaces it.)
• Not part of AIP-23. The rule ids, the four levels and the verdict form are this suite's reading of the published verifiers; AIP-23 defines the envelope. The device verifier is enrolled. Of the identity verifiers published beside these, the presentation verifier is enrolled; SD-JWT, Travel Rule and compliance are not.
• The Python implementation writes numbers the way JavaScript does only for integers and plain decimals, and sorts keys by code point (JavaScript's order for keys in the Basic Multilingual Plane).