aere-quantum/proof-kinds/README.md

proof-kinds: one builder for every AIP-23 proof kind

A generic builder of AERE Proof Protocol envelopes (AIP-23) for the standard proof kinds: data, execution, identity, compliance, runtime, location, device, payment, ownership, time, block, authorization, settlement, provenance, since 2026-10-18 secret-access and since 2026-10-19 agent-witness-checkpoint. Every kind produces the same envelope (statement plus statementHash, the SHA-256 of the canonical statement text), so the same AIP-23 reference verifier checks all of them with no kind-specific verification code.

import { buildProof, KINDS } from './proof-kinds.mjs';
const envelope = buildProof('runtime', { host, artifactContent, attested, matches: true, createdAt });

A kind is a schema: its required fields, some of them digests, plus createdAt. Raw content given for a digest field is hashed (bytes as they are, strings as UTF-8, other values as their JSON text), and a value that is already a 32-byte digest is kept, so an envelope carries digests, never the raw content. A missing required field stops the build with an error instead of producing an incomplete envelope. Notarization and the post-quantum certificate over it come from AIP-23, not from this builder.

secret-access is the audit entry of the secrets service (pq-secrets/): the service (its audience), the secret name, the version, the operation, the verdict (allowed, refused, or since 2026-10-18 failed: allowed and entered, then the change could not be stored) with the rules that refused, the grant that allowed, the holder and the presenter (key-derived aere-id identities, verified), the digest of the presentation's signed binding (presentationHash) and of the grant's policy (policyHash). It never carries the secret value, nor a digest of it: a digest of a guessable value does not hide it. Since 2026-10-18 (the adversarial review of the secrets service) it may also carry requestHash (the digest of the request received, already a 32-byte hash), claimedHolder / claimedPresenter (ids a presentation claimed and nobody verified) and judged (on a refusal, each grant judged with the rules it refused on); envelopes without these fields are byte for byte what they were.

agent-witness-checkpoint is the checkpoint of the hosted agents witness (agents/martor-agenti.mjs), in the form of a transparency log checkpoint (C2SP tlog-checkpoint: the log's name, its size, its RFC 9162 root): root and previous (the statementHash of the checkpoint before it, absent on the first) are already 32-byte hashes and are refused in another form; log, witness (the id derived from the witness's ML-DSA-65 key, which signs the envelope), chainId (where checkpoints are notarized), treeSize and maxMergeDelay (seconds between receiving a head and covering it with a notarized checkpoint) have a vocabulary (below). The leaves of the tree are digests of the signed ledger heads it received, nothing of any ledger.

A kind may have a vocabulary (valori in its schema: per field, a predicate and what it says), judged by buildProof on every field present; two kinds have one. secret-access: verdict is allowed, refused or failed, operation one of the operations of the secrets service (SECRET_ACCESS.operations, which the service requires to be its own list), version an integer of at least 1 or null, rules a list of rule names, ids aere-id: + 40 hex or null, createdAt an RFC 3339 time. An envelope with the verdict banana is no longer built. The reference verifier does not judge vocabularies (it judges the form and the hash of any kind), so an envelope written by hand with such values stays VALID there: the vocabulary is the builder's promise, not the verifier's. agent-witness-checkpoint (since 2026-10-19, the adversarial review of the hosted witness): root and previous 0x + 64 lowercase hex, log 1 to 256 printable ASCII characters without spaces, witness aere-witness: + 40 lowercase hex, chainId, treeSize and maxMergeDelay integers of at least 1, createdAt an RFC 3339 time; the vocabulary is one exported object (AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT) that the witness's own judge of a checkpoint (verificaPunct in agents/martor-agenti.mjs) imports, so the builder and the judge cannot drift apart. Until then a checkpoint with treeSize "5" or maxMergeDelay 0 was built, and VALID at the reference verifier, while the witness refused it. KINDS.json of the published copy names the values of each field that has them.

Test: node proba-proof-kinds.mjs (32 checks since 2026-10-19, after the review of the hosted witness: every kind built and found VALID by the reference verifier, eight negative controls such as content changed after hashing, a required field missing or a secret-access value outside its vocabulary, no raw content in any envelope, bytes hashed as bytes, the new secret-access fields, the two vocabularies held by those two kinds alone, eleven values outside the vocabulary of the witness checkpoint refused, and that vocabulary being the very object the witness imports). It needs the AIP-23 reference verifier: AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<path to verify-proof.mjs> (as published at aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done there); without it the test reports that it did not measure and exits with 2. Node.js 24.