Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Aere Network
2293c1da86 agents/x402: an agent wallet that pays over x402 only what the agent's ledger records and its policy allows, run on the public testnet
The agent does not hold the payment key: the wallet holds it for the owner and signs an EIP-3009 authorization only for a payment the
agent wrote into its signed ledger, verified without trusting the agent under the policy the owner pinned and against the ledger heads
the wallet itself saw (a branch is refused with a proof of equivocation, a backdated entry is refused), naming exactly this purchase,
written now, and within the limit judged also against what the wallet itself has signed. The authorization nonce is sha256(entry hash),
so the on-chain payment names the ledger entry. The policy gains an optional `wallet` field. Also: an x402 v2 client, a minimal resource
server, a local facilitator for tests, and verifica-plati.mjs, which proves from outside that a wallet's on-chain payments were allowed
by the agent's policy (with --all-transfers, that no payment left the wallet without a ledger entry).

Tests: wallet 25/25 and payment verifier 10/10 without a network (the verifier on chain responses recorded on testnet 28001), negative
control 21/21; policy 27/27, agents control 26/26. On the public testnet 28001 through its x402 facilitator: 9/9, with the evidence in
agents/x402/dovezi-28001/. Needs ethers (npm install in agents/x402).
2026-09-30 00:01:34 +03:00
Aere Network
35d711fa55 verify-layer: signed heads. keygen makes the operator's ML-DSA-65 head key; attest-head --sign-key signs the head statement in the form the AIP-23 reference verifier checks at its signature level (outside the statement, so the statementHash and its notarization are unchanged); verify-log --attested --signer requires the expected key, and without it says who signed and that no expected signer was compared. A signature says who vouches for the head, not when and not that the history is true. Tests 44/44 with the reference verifier (39 run and 5 skipped without it); negative control 9/9 here. 2026-09-29 22:58:20 +03:00
Aere Network
6e62b1ad1a Add agents: a post-quantum identity, a policy and a signed action ledger for AI agents, with human approval and revocation
An agent gets an ML-DSA-65 identity and a policy (spending per time window, allowed tools and recipients, which actions need human
approval, who may revoke it). Every action it proposes is judged against the policy, signed by the agent and chained; a verifier that
does not trust the agent re-runs the policy over the whole ledger. Approvals and revocations are signed by people with their own
ML-DSA-65 keys. The ledger of an agent under a policy is one ledger: a second history is a branch, and two branches are a proof of
equivocation anyone can check with the public key alone. The README says what the verifier cannot see: entry times are bounded from
below only with a witness (anchors or a start time), and someone who sees one branch cannot know of another.

Tests: policy 23/23 with the AIP-23 reference verifier (21 run without it), ledger 51/51, approval and revocation 39/39, command line
23/23; negative control 25/25.
2026-09-29 21:59:41 +03:00
Aere Network
a7165164eb Add control-plane (plan, execution with consent per action, remediation recipes and proof, compliance report, console) and readiness (the post-quantum readiness scanner of a hostname) 2026-09-29 21:21:59 +03:00
Aere Network
3465550e91 Add verify-layer (an audit-log sidecar whose head can be notarized on Aere Network for post-quantum finality) and proof-kinds (the AIP-23 envelope builder it uses) 2026-09-29 18:09:34 +03:00
Aere Network
2a2ed74d32 README: say exactly which parts are in English 2026-09-29 17:46:20 +03:00
Aere Network
0f081f0847 Add crypto-inventory: a cryptographic inventory of source code as a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM, with linear cost on hostile input; PKI DER messages in English 2026-09-29 17:42:36 +03:00
Aere Network
7d814d1bb8 Aere Quantum: a post-quantum TLS 1.3 gateway (X25519MLKEM768, optional ML-DSA client authentication), a hybrid KMS (X25519 + ML-KEM-768, Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65; root key from the environment or sealed by an HSM through PKCS#11) and an ML-DSA private CA (X.509 v3, RFC 9881). Zero dependencies, Node.js 24 with OpenSSL 3.5. Each with its test suite and a negative control. 2026-09-29 16:24:04 +03:00