aere-node/RUN-A-NODE.md

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# Run a node on Aere Network mainnet, chain 2800
This file plus `genesis.json` plus one bootnode enode (see the bootnodes section below) is
everything an outsider needs to bring up a full node that syncs chain 2800 from block 0. Until
2026-08-03 this repository shipped the precompile sources and the NIST vectors but not the chain
configuration, so nobody outside the Foundation could actually start a node, and the "verify it
yourself" claim the repository is built on could not be exercised end to end.
Nothing here is a key. `genesis.json` is public chain configuration; a node that nobody can dial
is a node nobody can sync from, and the bootnodes section says plainly how dialing works today.
---
## The one command
If you have JDK 21 and git, one command verifies the genesis and the registries by sha256, fetches
upstream Besu at the named commit, applies the four mainnet patches in order, builds the node, and
starts a full node syncing chain 2800 from block 0:
```
./run-node.sh --bootnode <enode://...@host:port>
```
That is the whole setup. The script is deterministic and idempotent: it refuses to run if the
genesis or the registries do not match their published sha256, it re-uses a build it already made,
and re-running it re-applies nothing and rebuilds nothing. It holds no key and signs nothing. It
configures a node that VALIDATES chain 2800, including the post-quantum certificate anchor, but does
not PRODUCE seals; producing seals needs a validator Falcon key, which is not in this repository and
is not required to follow the chain.
```
./run-node.sh --help # --data-path, --p2p-port, --rpc-port, --sync-min-peers, --no-start, --rebuild
./run-node.sh --no-start ... # verify, patch and build, but do not start the node
./run-node.sh --sync-min-peers 1 # on a young network with few reachable peers (Besu's default is 5)
```
You still need a bootnode enode for discovery (see the bootnodes section below for how to get one
today). Everything except peer discovery works without it; if you omit `--bootnode` the script says
so plainly and stops with instructions rather than starting a node that can never find a peer.
Everything the one command does is also written out by hand below, unchanged, for anyone who wants to
audit each step rather than run it.
---
## The five things you need
| What | Where |
|---|---|
| `genesis.json` | The genesis file, byte for byte as it sits on the Foundation nodes. sha256 `e5038e6a1437bd85fa51294609edf2126a997f14f4fa7a65a0d39bd0aa24d2e5` (of the published file with LF line endings, exactly as `curl` fetches it; a Windows checkout that converts line endings will hash differently) Updated 2026-09-10: the fleet genesis gained a third `config.pqRegistryHash` entry at 18,082,816 (block-0 hash unchanged; only `config` changed), so the file and its digest changed on that date. |
| `registries/` | The public Falcon validator registries. Without them a node imports fine to block 13,014,000 (the first anchor) and then refuses every anchor block, because it cannot map a certificate's seal indices to validator addresses. See `registries/README.md`; sha256 of each below. |
| a bootnode enode | one published in the bootnodes section below; run-node.sh uses it by default |
| `patches/`, `precompiles/` | The Besu fork, see `README.md`. Needed to sync past block 9,189,161 |
| **a clock within one second of real time** | not a file, but as hard a requirement as the four above. See below |
**Your clock, and why it is on that list.** QBFT header validation on this chain is
`TimestampBoundedByFutureParameter(1)`: a header whose timestamp is more than **one second** ahead of
your node's clock is invalid. Blocks here are ~0.6 s apart, so a machine running one second slow sees
every fresh head as "from the future" - and Besu does not treat that as a clock disagreement. It
treats it as `BREACH_OF_PROTOCOL` and disconnects the peer that served it:
```
INFO | TimestampBoundedByFutureParameter | Invalid block header:
timestamp 1789189254 is greater than the timestamp margin 1789189253
WARN | PipelineChainDownloader | Invalid block detected (BREACH_OF_PROTOCOL).
Disconnecting from sync target.
```
If you see that, nothing is wrong with the chain and nothing is wrong with this package. Your clock is
behind. The node recovers on its own ("Chain download failed. Restarting after short delay.") and will
still reach the head, but it drops good peers while it does. Run NTP - and check it actually took:
measured 2026-09-12 on our own import run, a machine where `timedatectl` reported
`NTPSynchronized=yes` was still a full second behind, because it was a VM whose host clock was right
and whose own was not. Compare against the chain itself rather than against a status flag:
```
curl -s -X POST -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getBlockByNumber","params":["latest",false]}' \
https://rpc.aere.network | grep -o '"timestamp":"0x[0-9a-f]*"'
```
Convert that hex to decimal and compare it with `date +%s` on your machine. A difference of 0 or 1 is
fine. More than that, in either direction, and you will see the behaviour above.
The registries are public (Falcon public keys and validator addresses, each carrying a proof of
possession and an ECDSA claim; no private key material). Their sha256, also in `registries/SHA256SUMS`:
```
006b1b3fb814ed84622539160956263faca7c0b76585c22f2e8acb926c0bcb7f manifest-13014000.json
23736b7d4ba1d3213496f8b5a5f756d5c958b08efebdeb1329b24d7dfa45fb6e manifest-13600000.json
c6601ae5159875a090066946991517c9a38e5d6206da76b018c0917e1ca6f12f manifest-18082816.json
35d69f60e357d405aff39fd33858de901dfb21327b0c4aeb18be17ffdaa115d6 hibrid-10.properties
c9a215d294e106f69fb2f16e3af21f9787523969e4b7260a3098f4b2cf458059 registru-2800-v2-13600000.properties
```
---
## Which Besu
Stock upstream Besu syncs chain 2800 correctly up to block **9,189,161** and then stops being able
to follow it. That block is the first with a timestamp at or after `activationTime` 1783820272, when
the five Aere post-quantum precompiles come into existence. A node without them computes a different
result for any block containing a call to `0x0AE1` through `0x0AE5` and falls off the chain.
So there are two honest paths:
- **Follow the tip.** Build the fork: apply `patches/0001-aere-pqc-precompiles-mainnet.patch` to
upstream Besu commit `d2032017bb3b8cb215a97303980a1e4a643f7180` and build it. Full instructions,
including the pre-image hashes that prove you are on the right base, are in `README.md`.
- **Verify the early chain only.** Stock Besu 26.4 or later will import blocks 0 through 9,189,160
from this genesis. That is enough to check the genesis allocation and the sub-second block period
transition against what we publish. It is not enough to reach the head.
There is a second Aere change to the client, and it is not in patch `0001`:
`patches/0004-aere-basefee-floor.patch`, one file, `LondonFeeMarket.java`. From block **10,141,734**
chain 2800 clamps the EIP-1559 base fee to a floor of 1 Gwei. The patch is fork gated by two JVM
system properties and is a byte behaviour no-op when they are unset, so a node that applies it
without setting them is stock Besu. Regenerated 2026-09-05 from the production tree: the previous
revision of this patch hard-coded both values as constants, so on a node built from this recipe the
two properties were dead (the floor was still 1 Gwei from 10,141,734, so the computed base fee was
the same, but the sentence above was not true of the code). Found by comparing the fleet's jars
with a build of this recipe class by class; the three consensus jars were already identical, this
one class was not.
```
-Daere.basefee.floor.forkBlock=10141734 -Daere.basefee.floor.value=1000000000
```
Pass those through `BESU_OPTS`. Apply this patch and set these flags if you want a client that
computes what the network computes. It was measured on 2026-08-02 that QBFT and IBFT2 in Besu do not
validate the base fee at import at all, upstream or in our fork, so a node without this change is
expected to import the chain anyway and only to disagree if it ever proposed a block. That is a
finding about a missing upstream rule and not a licence to skip the patch.
Do not apply `patches/0002-...-testnet.patch` for a mainnet node. It adds `0x0AE6` and `0x0AE7`,
which are not on mainnet, and a node that has them will not disagree with the chain today but is
running a configuration the chain does not.
## The post-quantum header anchor: apply patch 0003 to follow the current chain
Since block 13,014,000 every 32nd header of chain 2800 carries a sixth element in its QBFT
`extraData`: a certificate of validator Falcon-512 seals, universal since block 13,889,296 and
enforced at a minimum of three seals per anchor block (f+1 of nine) since 2026-08-14. A node
rejects an anchor block whose certificate holds fewer than three valid seals. (Correction 2026-08-19:
an earlier version of this paragraph said that from block 14,050,000 the network refuses to finalize
any block without a post-quantum quorum; the per-block rule armed at that height is retired in the
shipped code in favour of the anchor rules and changed no enforcement, so that sentence is withdrawn.)
The anchor ships in this repository both as source, under `anchor/`, and as
`patches/0003-aere-pq-anchor.patch`. A node built without it has not been shown to import
headers past block 13,014,000: the second client needed an explicit change to accept the sixth
element, and no floor-only build has been observed following the chain past that height. Apply
`0001`, `0003`, `0004` and `0005` together and treat a build missing any of them as unable to
follow the current chain.
## Patch 0005 exists because the import proof was actually attempted
Measured 2026-08-15, on a real from-genesis sync of a build from patches
`0001+0003+0004` alone: the node followed chain 2800 for 9.18 million blocks and stopped at
block 9,189,161, the `futureEipsTime` activation, with `failed persisting block due to
stateroot mismatch`. Not one cause but two, both in `MainnetProtocolSpecs.java`, both now
carried by `patches/0005-aere-eip2935-futureeips.patch`: upstream bases the futureEips
milestone on the unreleased amsterdam definition (Block Access Lists, a different state-root
committer), while chain 2800 isolates it on Osaka; and the fleet activates EIP-2935 historical
block hashes in that same fork, one system state write per block from 9,189,161 onward, which
a build without the patch never performs. No amount of green unit tests found this; importing
the real chain found it in one afternoon.
**Measured 2026-08-16: the from-genesis sync reached the live tip.** A node built only from these
packages imported chain 2800 from block 0 to height **14,088,211** and then followed the head,
crossing the 14,050,000 activation height (which, see above, changed no enforcement) with zero anchor rejections. Two more things
had to be true for that, both now carried by the patches and both described with their measured
boundaries in `IMPORT-PROOF-STARE-2026-08-15.md`: a historical window (anchor heights
13,267,824 to 13,268,944) in which anchoring was deliberately disarmed fleet-wide, and a recovery
window (13,268,976 to 13,890,544) in which proposers legitimately wrote shorter certificates.
Inside those windows the header is accepted as carried; outside them nothing changes. The
controls run in both directions (641 tests, 0 failures).
Measured 2026-08-15: on a pristine `d2032017` checkout, `git apply` (no flags) accepted
`0001`, `0003` and `0004` in that order, and `./gradlew --no-daemon installDist
-x spotlessJavaCheck -x test` exited 0 on JDK 21, producing
`besu/v26.8-develop-d203201/linux-x86_64/openjdk-java-21`. That proves the recipe builds. Measured again on 2026-09-05 with the regenerated `0003` (169 files: 30 upstream files modified, 139 new, among them the 22 of the SLH-DSA engine): on a pristine `d2032017` checkout `git apply --check` accepted `0001`, `0003`, `0004` and `0005` in the order `run-node.sh` uses, and the patched tree equals `anchor/` file for file. The `installDist` build and the from-genesis import were NOT repeated that day; see the revision note below.
The import proof above, measured 2026-08-16, proves the build follows the live chain from genesis
to the tip. The proof is repeated, not assumed: see `IMPORT-PROOF-STARE-2026-08-15.md` for the
measured heights of each run. **Revision note, 2026-09-05:** the anchor patch and the configuration
below were updated for the hybrid certificate and the interval schedule; the from-genesis import proof
has NOT yet been repeated against this revision (the last measured run is the one above, on the
previous revision). What is measured for this revision is that the same code follows the live tip on
the network's reading nodes, and validates every hybrid anchor there, since 2026-09-05. **Revision note, 2026-09-10:** patches `0001`, `0003` and `0004` were regenerated from the production tree over the same file sets (the source files now carry the Apache-2.0 section 4(b) modification notices that production carries; `0003` keeps its 169 files). Measured the same day: a build from this recipe reproduces the fleet's three consensus jars class by class, and `LondonFeeMarket` and the precompile classes byte for byte. What the recipe still does not ship is the fleet's parallel block processor (a separate package and one hunk in `MainnetProtocolSpecs`), which does not change consensus; it is listed by the comparison, not hidden.
---
## Sizing the JVM heap: bigger is not faster
Measured 2026-09-06 on one machine, one database and one chain, syncing chain 2800 from genesis in a
Linux VM with 8 GB of RAM. The same flag was measured at four values and at two different heights,
because the answer changes with the height:
| `-Xmx` | height reached | what the JVM did | blocks per minute |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 4500m | ~3.5 M | 89 `OutOfMemoryError`, 7.1 GB RSS, import stopped dead | 0 |
| 3200m | ~6 M | 24 OOM per 500 log lines, repeated `Chain download failed` | ~1,500 |
| 2400m | 6-8 M | no OOM at all | ~82,000 |
| 2400m | past 9.2 M | old generation 99.88% full, 1,409 full GCs, 19 minutes in GC | ~640 |
| 3400m | past 9.7 M | **zero** full GCs, 6 seconds of GC in total | ~28,800 |
| 2400m | ~8.4 M, measured 2026-09-11 | old generation 99.97% full, 1,073 full GCs, 26 minutes in GC, 49 `OutOfMemoryError` | ~120 |
| 3400m | ~8.5 M, measured 2026-09-11 | **zero** full GCs | ~9,000 |
**The band moves down as the chain grows, so read the dates in that table.** The 2400m row measured on 2026-09-06 held from
six to eight million blocks; the same flag on 2026-09-11, at 8.4 million and on a 7.9 GB machine, was already in full-GC collapse,
because the storage engine's working set had grown with the chain in between. Do not copy a number out of this table and hope. Use
the symptom instead, it is the same on any day: full GCs climbing while the height barely moves means the heap is too SMALL, and
`OutOfMemoryError` in the log means it is too LARGE for what the database also needs beside it.
Two things are going on, and they pull in opposite directions. **Heap is not memory**: the storage
engine keeps its block cache and write buffers OUTSIDE the Java heap, and past six million blocks that
off-heap part is larger than the heap itself, so a heap sized to fill the machine leaves nothing for it
and the node dies of `OutOfMemoryError`. But a heap that is too small is just as bad in the other
direction: past block 9,189,161, where the post-quantum precompiles go live, blocks get heavier, the old
generation fills, and the node spends its time in full GC instead of importing.
**How much RAM a from-genesis import needs, measured.** The requirement is not flat: it grows with the
height, because the storage engine's working set grows with the chain. On the machine above (8 GB for
the node), the same import that ran comfortably at three million blocks was, at 12.2 million, using
5.96 GB of resident memory with a 3.4 GB heap, with the old generation 99.8% full and four full GCs
every five seconds - and there was no room left to raise the heap without hitting `OutOfMemoryError`
instead. Treat 8 GB as the floor at which a full from-genesis import stops being practical, not as a
comfortable size; 16 GB gives the database the room this measurement shows it wants. Following the
live tip, once synced, needs far less: the network's own reading nodes do it inside their normal
footprint.
So do not pick a fraction of RAM and hope. Watch it: `jstat -gcutil <pid> 5000 3` prints one line every
five seconds. If `FGC` climbs while the height barely moves, the heap is too SMALL - raise it. If you see
`OutOfMemoryError` in the log, it is too LARGE for what the database also needs - lower it. On 8 GB, the
band that worked here was roughly 2.4 GB early and 3.4 GB past nine million blocks.
## The configuration a follower passes (BESU_OPTS)
The Aere fork reads its per-node configuration from JVM system properties passed through the
`BESU_OPTS` environment variable, not from the genesis file. `run-node.sh` sets these for you; this
is what it sets, and what a manual operator must export before the `besu` command below, or the node
will refuse the first anchor at block 13,014,000. Five of them are the ones without which a node stops
at block 17,047,600 (the first hybrid, v2 certificate) or at the first anchor after 17,225,968 (the
interval change): `anchorV2Block`, `schemeSchedule`, `hybridRegistry` (the SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public
keys, `registries/hibrid-10.properties` since 2026-09-10; `hibrid-1.properties` before), `anchorIntervalSchedule`, and the two dated steps in
`anchorMinSeals` (see `anchor/README.md`, scope item 3).
> **Correction, 2026-09-06.** On 2026-09-05 those five properties were added to THIS DOCUMENT and not
> to `run-node.sh`, while the sentence above already claimed the script set them. It did not. A node
> started with the published script therefore ran the pre-hybrid configuration, and the v2 activation
> height stayed at `Long.MAX_VALUE`: our own from-genesis import proof, built from the published
> revision, synced honestly to block 17,047,400 and then rejected every hybrid anchor 12,352 times
> (`REJECTED - carries a v2 (scheme-tagged) certificate below the v2 activation height
> 9223372036854775807`). Anyone following this package could not pass block 17,047,600. Since
> 2026-09-06 the block below and the one inside `run-node.sh` are both GENERATED from the live
> `BESU_OPTS` of the network's archive node, which has exactly a follower's role, with the two public
> reading nodes as witnesses that must agree on the anchor set; a gate refuses any divergence between
> the chain, the script and this page. Re-measured after the fix on the same node and database: past
> 17,047,600 with zero rejections.
The set below is the one the network's own archive node runs with, minus the signing keys.
```bash
REG=/path/to/aere-node/registries
export BESU_OPTS="\
-Daere.basefee.floor.forkBlock=10141734 \
-Daere.basefee.floor.value=1000000000 \
-Daere.falcon.anchor.address=0xC01Bb2843EFAF92D8389F14aC1dD26dbeAf9144C \
-Daere.falcon.anchor.block=13889290 \
-Daere.falcon.attachBlock=13889296 \
-Daere.falcon.attachInterval=32 \
-Daere.falcon.forkBlock=14050000 \
-Daere.falcon.manifest=$REG/manifest-18082816.json \
-Daere.falcon.minAttachFutureMargin=5 \
-Daere.falcon.registry.history=$REG/manifest-13014000.json,$REG/registru-2800-v2-13600000.properties \
-Daere.falcon.validatorCount=10 \
-Daere.pq.anchorBlock=13014000 \
-Daere.pq.anchorInterval=32 \
-Daere.pq.anchorIntervalSchedule=17225968:128 \
-Daere.pq.anchor.maxSeals=9 \
-Daere.pq.anchorMinSeals=13014000:0,13034000:3,14961456:6,17102384:0,17102416:6 \
-Daere.pq.anchorV2Block=17047600 \
-Daere.pq.chainId=2800 \
-Daere.pq.hybridRegistry=$REG/hibrid-10.properties \
-Daere.pq.schemeSchedule=17047568:falcon-512+slh-dsa-sha2-128s \
-Daere.pq.anchor.minSealsCeiling=1"
```
### Why the seal-threshold ceiling, for a from-genesis node
A node syncing from block 0 starts into the GENESIS validator set, which is small (three
validators). The startup threshold guard (`PqAnchorThresholdGuard`) refuses to arm a seal threshold
at or above that set's QBFT quorum, because a proposer at that set size could never gather it. The
published schedule reaches K=3 (block 13,034,000) and K=6 (block 14,961,456), both unreachable at
N=3, so without `aere.pq.anchor.minSealsCeiling` a from-genesis node refuses to start with
`AERE-PQC-THRESHOLD-01`. The ceiling lowers the EFFECTIVE threshold to what the genesis set supports
(`quorum(3) - 1 = 1`) WITHOUT editing the published schedule, exactly as that guard's own message
instructs (`--Xaere-pq-anchor-min-seals-max`). It does not weaken the post-quantum binding a
follower checks: every anchor must still carry a valid validator Falcon seal that verifies against
the registry, and its digest must still bind the certificate under the block hash; only the
seal-COUNT floor, which is a proposer-liveness property relative to the current set and not a
history-verification property, is relaxed to one. Real anchor blocks carry far more than one seal, so
all import cleanly: measured 2026-09-12 by our own second implementation walking the live chain, the
certificates carried 14, 16, 18 or 20 seals in total, which is seven to ten per half since the
certificate became hybrid on 2026-09-03. A validator, which starts into the full set and proposes,
does not set this.
**What you will see in the log, and why it is not an incident.** With this ceiling set, the node
prints a red startup banner (`AERE-PQC-EMG-BANNER-01`, "starting with 1 POST-QUANTUM SAFETY
CONTROL lowered") and then one ERROR line **per anchor block**:
```
ERROR | PqEmergencyShoutRule | AERE PQC EMERGENCY [AERE-PQC-EMG-CEILING-01]: height N validated
WITH A LOWERED SEAL THRESHOLD. The schedule in force asks for K=...
```
That is the binary doing what we asked it to do: a safety control that has been lowered must be
impossible to forget, so it shouts on every use rather than once at startup. On a from-genesis sync
it is loud - measured on our own import run, 2,786 such lines in three megabytes of log. It is not a
chain fault and not a failed verification.
What WOULD be a fault, and what you should watch for instead: an anchor **refused**. Those read
`IneligibleSeal`, `SealCountBelowThreshold`, or `AnchorDigestMismatch` and stop the import. If you
prefer a quiet log once you are past the early heights, restart the node without
`aere.pq.anchor.minSealsCeiling` after it is synced beyond block 13,034,000: by then the live
validator set is large enough for the scheduled threshold to arm, and the shouting stops because the
control is no longer lowered.
This is the FOLLOWER subset, and the distinction is in the code under `anchor/`, not guessed. A
validator additionally passes `aere.falcon.key` (the signing key), the `aere.falcon.attach*` and
`aere.falcon.validatorCount` properties (these drive seal PRODUCTION only), and
`aere.falcon.forkBlock` (a per-block Falcon rule the shipped code retires at the anchor block, so it
is inert; leaving it unset keeps the non-blocking baseline). What is above is exactly what the
IMPORT path reads: the registries (`aere.falcon.manifest` loads only together with
`aere.falcon.anchor.address`, so those two are registry wiring here, not attach knobs;
`aere.falcon.registry.history` carries every earlier registry the chain was signed against), the
anchor-validation schedule (`aere.pq.*`), and the 1 Gwei base-fee floor live from block 10,141,734.
---
## Start it
Export `BESU_OPTS` as above first, then:
```bash
besu \
--genesis-file=/path/to/aere-node/genesis.json \
--data-path=/path/to/data \
--network-id=2800 \
--sync-mode=FULL \
--data-storage-format=BONSAI \
--bootnodes=<the enode you were given> \
--p2p-port=30303 \
--rpc-http-enabled --rpc-http-port=8545 \
--rpc-http-api=ETH,NET,WEB3,QBFT \
--min-gas-price=0
```
One bootnode is published here (two from 2026-08-25 to 2026-09-11; the second address was withdrawn on 2026-09-11
because its host no longer fits the rule in the section below, and a replacement public read host will be
published when it exists). It is a public read host that is NOT in the validator set, so taking it down
cannot cost the network consensus; its address was already public through the service it serves. It runs Besu:
```
enode://7e8ff740b79bf28a6d7e46ea8d2317cea4a223e7af60be36e91e13dc7051f4cb29077631452e699a5e18e640a94fd6e370e9e51dd91ecba1f2ba9666e07ff01b@37.27.216.110:30303
```
`run-node.sh` uses it by default when `--bootnode` is not given. A written address is not a
live address: only your own `net_peerCount` proves it is up. If it is unreachable, write
to office@aere.network with the subject "bootnode" for a current enode by return.
Measured 2026-09-11: a node that cannot receive inbound
connections (behind NAT without a forwarded port) keeps that single peer, and Besu does not fetch the
bodies of blocks that carry transactions from a single busy peer: the log repeats
`Unable to retrieve blocks for block numbers ... Restarting after short delay` and the import crawls.
Forward your P2P port (30303 by default) and, when you run the manual command below, add
`--p2p-host=<your public IP>` so that peers can bond with you; once discovery works the node reaches the
rest of the network on its own (measured the same day with ten peers: about 1,300 blocks per second
from genesis, no body failures). With a single published bootnode this matters more, not less.
`--sync-mode=FULL` is deliberate. Chain 2800 runs QBFT with a half second block period, so the head
was about 12.2 million blocks when this was written (2026-08-03), passed 14.6 million on 2026-08-19,
and climbs by roughly two per second; read the live height with eth_blockNumber. Full sync from block 0 is the mode
that actually verifies the history we publish, which is the point of this repository. Snap sync
against a QBFT chain trusts a peer for the state and verifies far less.
`--min-gas-price=0` matches the network. Chain 2800 has a real 1 Gwei base fee from block
10,141,734, but the minimum gas price a node will accept into its own pool is a local policy and the
Foundation nodes run it at zero.
Outbound and inbound TCP and UDP on your p2p port must be open. Discovery is UDP; a TCP only
firewall gives you a node that dials out and is never dialled back.
---
## Check that you are on the right chain, before you trust anything else
Two facts settle it. Run these against your own node once it is up.
**1. Your block 0 must be the network's block 0.**
```bash
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8545 -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getBlockByNumber","params":["0x0",false]}' \
| grep -o '"hash":"0x[0-9a-f]*"'
```
Expected, and this is the whole test:
```
0xd86d57a899cbfa580669f0e1c7cd4ae5f525247c3c823f8f75df176a0c5d7f1a
```
That hash covers every consensus relevant field in `genesis.json`, including the state root of the
six genesis accounts. If it matches, your genesis file is the network's genesis file and no further
comparison of individual fields is needed. If it does not match, your node will never peer, and no
amount of correct bootnodes will help.
Compare against the public endpoints, which are separate machines with separate operators of the
same file:
```bash
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.aere.network -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getBlockByNumber","params":["0x0",false]}'
curl -s -X POST https://rpc2.aere.network -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getBlockByNumber","params":["0x0",false]}'
```
**2. You must have peers.**
```bash
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8545 -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"net_peerCount","params":[]}'
```
A nonzero answer means discovery worked. Zero after a few minutes means either your UDP port is
closed or the bootnode you were given is down; a plain TCP connect to its address distinguishes
the two.
---
## What the bootnode is, and what it is not
It is a full node that is **not** in the validator set. Chain 2800 seals blocks with ten QBFT
validators (nine from 2026-08-09, seven before; ten since 2026-09-11), and none of them is listed here, on purpose. Publishing a validator's p2p
address hands an attacker a target whose downtime costs the network consensus headroom, which is why
sentry style architectures exist. The node above carries no consensus responsibility: if it is
taken down, new nodes cannot bootstrap until it is replaced, and block production is unaffected.
**Update, 2026-08-28.** The bootnode (37.27.216.110) now also serves the devp2p
`snap/1` protocol (`SnapServer ... Bonsai full flat db` in its startup log, capability list
`[eth/68..71], [istanbul/100], [snap/1]`). A client that chooses `--sync-mode=SNAP` against it
downloads headers plus the state at the pivot instead of replaying every historic block body,
which on this chain of empty blocks removes most of the multi-day full-sync cost. Honest limits,
measured versus not: the server capability and the public endpoint answering are measured today;
a complete stranger's snap sync to head against it has not yet been run, and the one-command
`run-node.sh` path deliberately stays `--sync-mode=FULL`, because a validating node that replayed
every block is a stronger statement than one that trusted a pivot.
A written address is not a live address. This file cannot prove the bootnode is up at the moment
you read it; only your own `net_peerCount` can.
Both were reachable and serving blocks when this file was written. Both are Foundation operated, so
this is one operator's word for two addresses. That is a real centralisation fact about chain 2800
today and not a documentation gap.
---
## Measured, 2026-08-03
The recipe on this page was executed rather than written. A Besu node with an **empty data
directory** was started from exactly this `genesis.json` and exactly these two bootnode URLs, on a
machine that is not a validator, with `--sync-mode=FULL` and no static nodes, no other peer hints
and no copied database.
- Its own block 0 came out as
`0xd86d57a899cbfa580669f0e1c7cd4ae5f525247c3c823f8f75df176a0c5d7f1a`, which is the live chain's
block 0. That hash covers the state root, so the six accounts in `alloc` are the network's down to
the last wei, and so is every header field in the file.
- It reached **11 peers** knowing nothing but the two enode URLs above.
- It imported from block 0 to **block 2,221,580** in about thirty minutes, with **zero** rejected
blocks, which carries it through the sub-second block period change at roughly 2,137,652 and out
the other side.
The honest limits on that run, stated because they are the difference between this section and an
advertisement:
- It was stopped at ~2.2 million rather than carried to the head, so it never reached the precompile
fork at 9,189,161 or the base fee floor at 10,141,734. **"Reaches the current head" is not
measured.**
- It ran the Foundation's build of the fork, not a build a third party made from `patches/`. That
those patches build, and that the built precompiles answer the NIST vectors, is measured
separately in `README.md`; that the two together sync to the head is not.
- Nothing here proves the bootnodes will be up when you read this.
---
## A number in this file that the chain does not agree with
`config.transitions.qbft[0].block` reads **2138451**. That is the height at which the file says the
block period drops from one second to half a second. The chain says otherwise. Sampling header
timestamps on the public endpoints puts the change just after **2,137,652**. Measured spans of
twenty blocks: from 2,137,600 the twenty blocks take 20 s, from 2,137,656 they take 15 s, from
2,137,657 they take 12 s, and from 2,137,700 they take a flat 10 s, which is 500 ms a block and
stays there through 2,138,400. The published 2138451 is roughly eight hundred blocks late and
describes a boundary that is not in the data.
It is published anyway, unaltered, because this file is the file the network runs and its value as
evidence comes from being exactly that. Two things make the discrepancy harmless to you rather than
merely tolerated: the field only governs how fast a proposer may seal, so it has no effect on a node
that follows; and it was measured, on the sync run described above, that a node carrying this exact
value imports the blocks either side of both numbers without rejecting one.
Correcting it means editing a file on live validators, which is a change to running consensus
infrastructure and is not made as a side effect of publishing a document.
## A note on the `comment` fields in `alloc`
The six genesis accounts carry `comment` strings. No client reads them; they are not consensus data
and they are inside the file only because they have always been. Two of them are wrong and are left
uncorrected here rather than quietly edited, because this file is published byte for byte as the
running nodes hold it: the dash characters are mangled, and the 1,400,000,000 AERE account is
labelled "Mining Reserve" although chain 2800 has no mining and never has. It is the staking and
emissions reserve. Correcting the text means editing a file on live nodes, which is a change to
running infrastructure and is not made as a side effect of a documentation fix.