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Both are prerequisites for any external review programme, and one of them was already promised by our live security.txt to a file that did not exist. SECURITY.md states the scope, the response times we hold ourselves to, and three things we would rather a reviewer heard from us than discovered: there has been no third-party audit, every validator is operated by the Foundation, and the post-quantum guarantee is at anchor heights rather than on every block. AUDITS.md opens by saying we have had no third-party audit, and keeps that first line until it stops being true.
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Security audits and reviews
AERE Network has had no third-party security audit. That is the first line of this page on purpose, and it stays here until it is no longer true. Everything below describes what we have verified ourselves, which is a weaker thing, and we do not want the difference blurred.
Last updated: 2026-09-01.
External audits
| scope | auditor | date | report |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | none | — | — |
There is nothing to put in this table yet. When there is, the full report goes here, including any findings we chose not to fix and why.
What we have done instead, and what it is worth
- Continuous self-verification. The chain's live properties are re-measured automatically rather than asserted in prose: validator set size, quorum, the post-quantum anchor threshold, the base-fee floor, backup coverage, and the public verifier. A claim that stops being true shows up as a failed check, not as stale documentation. This is real, and it is still us checking us.
- Negative controls on every gate. A check that has never been shown to fail is not evidence. For each safety-relevant check we plant the defect it is supposed to catch and require it to go red, then restore the source and require it to go green. A check that cannot fail is treated as broken.
- A reproducibility package prepared for an external reviewer. The consensus code under review, a threat model naming the attack surfaces we consider realistic, a pinned reproduce guide, and a manifest of file hashes. It is ready to hand over.
- Independent verification by a second implementation. The post-quantum anchor certificates on the live chain are validated by a second client, written in a different language on a different codebase, which reaches its own verdict on every anchor.
None of that is an audit. Self-verification finds the mistakes you thought to look for.
Verify the chain yourself, without trusting us
The post-quantum anchor is designed so you do not have to take our word for it: from block 13,014,000, every 32nd block carries a Falcon-512 certificate, and the block hash covers it. From block 14,961,456 that certificate requires at least six valid seals out of nine. The verifier is public, the signatures are in the headers, and the check runs against any node — ours or your own.
Reporting a vulnerability
Report to security@aere.network, or see https://aere.network/security for the full policy.
- We aim to acknowledge within 72 hours.
- Public credit on this page unless you ask to remain anonymous.
- We will not pursue legal action against good-faith research conducted under the published policy.
- If a report leads to a fix, the fix and the finding are published here together, including the window during which the issue was live.
What this page will never do
It will not describe a self-review as an audit, and it will not report a fix as complete before it has been verified on the live chain. If you find a claim on this page that you can measure and disprove, that itself is a valid security report, and we would like to receive it.