dd1410c266
The published line and the local line of this repository had no common ancestor: the public one carried the hygiene pass (no host names, no internal paths), the local one carried a month of corrections that never shipped. This commit ports the local work onto the public line, keeping the public hygiene wording wherever the two touched the same sentence, and keeping the public version of AERE-CROSS-CLIENT-DETERMINISM.md entirely. Carried: LICENSE/LICENSING corrections, VERIFY-POLICY.md, CITATIONS-UNRESOLVED.md remeasured 2026-08-11, the 'audited' adjective removed from next to Bouncy Castle, citation paths rewritten to published form, AIP-8, the QA consolidation report, the second EIP validation pass, fork-height corrections, the AereSink / threshold-factory correction, the forge test floor, and the architecture-map updates.
63 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
# Spec #14: Account migration + network key rotation (quantum layer 11)
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Built the LAST account-layer quantum-resistance piece: a real, no-custody,
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tested contract for moving assets off a classical ECDSA EOA onto a post-quantum
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account, plus a design doc covering both that and network key rotation (gated).
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## Deliverables
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1. Contract: `aere-contracts/contracts/pqc/AereAccountMigrator.sol` (solc 0.8.23,
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OZ SafeERC20 + ReentrancyGuard). New file; deployed contracts untouched.
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- `migrate(destination, tokens[], amounts[], moveNative)`: atomic sweep of ERC-20
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balances + optional native AERE from caller (old EOA) to a destination PQC
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account, one tx, authorized by caller's ECDSA key.
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- `migrateToPqcAccount(factory, falconPubKey, salt, expectedDestination, ...)`:
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DERIVES the destination from the Falcon-512 key via the live
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AerePQCAccountFactory.predictAddress, so the sweep is cryptographically bound
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to the PQC account that Falcon key controls. Optional expectedDestination guard.
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- `predictPqcAccount(...)` view for frontends.
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- Authorization documented BOTH ways: pre-approval (default) OR EIP-7702
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delegation (Aere supports 7702 per the EIP matrix; single-tx approve+migrate).
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- No custody (caller is `from`, destination is `to`, one hop; native forwarded
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in full same-call). No owner/admin/upgrade/withdraw/rescue/sweep. Only recipient
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is the caller-specified destination.
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- Fail-closed + atomic: zero destination reverts; length/zero-token/zero-amount
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checks; strict native (StrayNative / ZeroNative / NothingToMigrate); any failed
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transfer reverts the WHOLE tx (SafeERC20). Emits Migrated(old, new, tokens,
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amounts, nativeAmount).
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2. Test: `aere-contracts/test/account-migrator.test.js`. RAN it:
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`npx hardhat test test/account-migrator.test.js` -> **9 passing** (2026-07-19).
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Destination in strong-path tests is a REAL AerePQCAccount deployed via the REAL
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AerePQCAccountFactory (Falcon verify mocked; CREATE2 + asset moves fully real).
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Covers: one-tx ERC-20 migration (both entrypoints), native forward, zero-dest
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revert, atomicity (first token NOT moved on a failed second leg), only-destination
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(third party gets nothing), no-admin-drain (ABI has no owner/withdraw/rescue/
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sweep; force-sent tokens unrecoverable), fail-closed native + malformed sets.
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3. Doc: `aerenew/docs/AERE-QUANTUM-MIGRATION.md`. Dual:
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- Part A (real): harvest-now-decrypt-later rationale, the live PQC destinations
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(AerePQCAccount / AerePQCAccountFactory / AereHybridAuth / verifier / key
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registry), the contract, user flow, and the real 9/9 test result. References
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the pqc-migration-toolkit as the companion scanner/derivation/simulator.
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- Part B (design only, gated): Foundation operator key rotation = operational
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role transfer to a PQC/threshold account, founder-gated, NOT coupled to
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consensus. Validator signing key rotation = coupled to the gated consensus-PQC
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activation (seals are classical ECDSA QBFT today), founder + external-audit +
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N>=9 + soak gated. Explicit: none of this makes consensus post-quantum by itself.
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## Honesty flags carried in the doc
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- `[VERIFY]`: live addresses (factory 0xd5315Ea7...CE58, sample account
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0xa42a5e7F...4326f, verifier 0x4E8e9682...D8fFC, key registry 0x1eCa3c5A...3691);
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AereHybridAuth is repo source, no mainnet address; which threshold account is the
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intended operator destination.
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- `[MEASURE]`: full operator role-rotation cost across the live role set;
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consensus-PQC flip fork-freedom / halt-recover behavior at N>=9 soak.
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## Scope boundary kept
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Account migration hardens ACCOUNT authorization only. It does NOT make consensus
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post-quantum. Validator-key rotation is coupled to the separate gated consensus-PQC
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item, not a today-action. No new token; no real user/Foundation funds moved (this is
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the mechanism, not an executed migration). No em-dashes in prose; brand "Aere
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Network"/"Aere", ticker AERE.
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