dd1410c266
The published line and the local line of this repository had no common ancestor: the public one carried the hygiene pass (no host names, no internal paths), the local one carried a month of corrections that never shipped. This commit ports the local work onto the public line, keeping the public hygiene wording wherever the two touched the same sentence, and keeping the public version of AERE-CROSS-CLIENT-DETERMINISM.md entirely. Carried: LICENSE/LICENSING corrections, VERIFY-POLICY.md, CITATIONS-UNRESOLVED.md remeasured 2026-08-11, the 'audited' adjective removed from next to Bouncy Castle, citation paths rewritten to published form, AIP-8, the QA consolidation report, the second EIP validation pass, fork-height corrections, the AereSink / threshold-factory correction, the forge test floor, and the architecture-map updates.
57 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Spec 4: Aere Network Post-Quantum Finality Certificate
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Built the flagship ADDITIVE post-quantum finality feature: one succinct proof that a quorum of
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Aere validators attested to a finalized block with HASH-BASED (post-quantum) keys, verifiable
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on-chain in ONE call, WITHOUT changing QBFT consensus and WITHOUT a re-genesis.
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## Deliverables (all new, no deployed contract modified)
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1. `aere-contracts/contracts/pqfinality/AerePQAttestationKeyRegistry.sol`
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- Per-validator hash-based attestation public key (XMSS / WOTS+ / leanSig / SLH-DSA / XMSS^MT),
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SEPARATE from the ECDSA consensus key. This is the PQ finality key.
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- Maps validator -> current key + monotonic keyEpoch. One-time/few-time keys rotate: registering
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again appends a new record, marks predecessor superseded, bumps epoch. Append-only history,
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fail-closed, no silent rewrite.
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- Governed membership (Ownable enrollValidator = the N=7 set + root ordering), self-custodied
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keys (validator registers its OWN key; owner cannot forge it).
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- Deterministic `validatorSetRoot()` = keccak over (validator, keyEpoch, keyHash) leaves in
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enrollment order. Any rotation changes the root.
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2. `aere-contracts/contracts/pqfinality/AereFinalityCertificateVerifier.sol`
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- Verifies ONE SP1 proof via the live gateway (0x9ca479C8...70628), pinned PROGRAM_VKEY.
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- Public values (192 bytes): blockHash, blockHeight, validatorSetRoot, validatorSetSize,
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quorumCount, attestationDomain.
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- Fail-closed: binds root+size to the LIVE registry, binds attestationDomain (chainId+registry),
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requires quorumCount >= ceil(2N/3) = 5 of 7, rejects zero block, then one verifyProof (reverts
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on bad proof). Cost independent of N.
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- `isFinalPQ(blockHash)` consumer gate + `recordCertificate` + `assertFinalizes(claimedBlock)`
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for bridges confirming a specific block.
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3. `aere-contracts/test/AerePQFinalityCertificate.test.js` - 12 passing (MockSp1Verifier).
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Covers all required cases: 7-validator set registers (threshold 5); valid quorum-5 cert records +
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isFinalPQ true; below-quorum rejects; wrong root rejects; wrong block/height/zero-block rejects;
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invalid proof fail-closed; key rotation changes root and old-root cert no longer matches; empty
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set fails closed; append-only + owner-gated enroll + self-register.
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4. `aerenew/docs/AERE-PQ-FINALITY-CERTIFICATE.md` - architecture (dual-sign ECDSA+hash-based,
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off-chain zkVM aggregates into one STARK/SP1 proof, on-chain one verify), why additive (no flip,
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no re-genesis), quantum-safety argument (hash-based sigs + hash-based FRI STARK are Shor-
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resistant vs classical ECDSA seals + BN254 Groth16), consumer use cases (light client/bridge/
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L2/AI agent), live-first framing (ships ahead of Ethereum Lean Consensus ~2027 because N small),
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honest [MEASURE] status.
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## REAL test result
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`npx hardhat test test/AerePQFinalityCertificate.test.js` from aerenew/contracts: 12 passing (2s),
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0 failing. Contracts compile under solc 0.8.23 (repo config).
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## Honesty flags
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- [MEASURE] / NOT implemented: the off-chain XMSS/leanSig aggregation zkVM guest circuit (verify N
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hash-based sigs against the root inside the zkVM, emit public values). Novel research. leanSig or
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XMSS-in-zkVM is the target; ML-DSA-in-zkVM is a lattice alternative (loses the hash-only argument).
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- On-chain verifier + registry are REAL and tested against a MOCK SP1 gateway. NOT proven end-to-end.
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Do NOT claim PQ finality is live.
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- [VERIFY]/design-only: the Shor-resistant end-to-end claim holds for a NATIVE hash-based STARK proof;
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a Groth16 wrap would reintroduce a BN254 leg. Stated in the doc.
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- Scope boundary kept: base QBFT consensus is STILL classical ECDSA. This is additive attestation ON
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TOP; it never flips or gates consensus and is not live.
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