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aere-docs/AERE-PQ-AGGREGATE-SUMMARY.md
Aere Network dd1410c266 The unpublished line of work joins the sanitized public line 
The published line and the local line of this repository had no common
ancestor: the public one carried the hygiene pass (no host names, no internal
paths), the local one carried a month of corrections that never shipped. This
commit ports the local work onto the public line, keeping the public hygiene
wording wherever the two touched the same sentence, and keeping the public
version of AERE-CROSS-CLIENT-DETERMINISM.md entirely.

Carried: LICENSE/LICENSING corrections, VERIFY-POLICY.md,
CITATIONS-UNRESOLVED.md remeasured 2026-08-11, the 'audited' adjective removed
from next to Bouncy Castle, citation paths rewritten to published form, AIP-8,
the QA consolidation report, the second EIP validation pass, fork-height
corrections, the AereSink / threshold-factory correction, the forge test
floor, and the architecture-map updates.
2026-08-15 13:54:42 +03:00

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Spec 6: AerePQAggregate build summary

What was built

Constant-cost on-chain verification of a t-of-n POST-QUANTUM committee authorization via ONE succinct SP1 proof, exposed as an ERC-4337 path and a portable ERC-7579 validator module.

Files (new, no deployed contracts modified)

  • aere-contracts/contracts/mpc/AerePQAggregateVerifier.sol
    • registerCommittee(root, t, n, scheme), stores committee (root = commitment to n PQC keys; keys NOT stored on-chain, so cost stays O(1) in n). Permissionless, no admin, no funds.
    • verifyAggregate(committeeId, messageDigest, publicValues, proofBytes) view, strict fail-closed: binds committeeRoot / t / n / scheme / messageDigest / validCount>=t, then ONE SP1_GATEWAY.verifyProof(pinnedVKey, publicValues, proofBytes). Reverts on any mismatch or bad proof.
    • tryVerifyAggregate(...) view, non-reverting bool (try/catch wrap) for 4337/7579 SHOULD-not-revert.
    • recordAggregate(...), strict verify + provenance attestation event.
    • Immutable SP1_GATEWAY (chain 2800 canonical Succinct gateway 0x9ca479C8…70628) and AGGREGATE_PROGRAM_VKEY (pinned circuit; registrant cannot swap circuits).
    • Public-values layout (fixed 192 bytes / 6 words): abi.encode(bytes32 committeeRoot, uint256 t, uint256 n, uint256 scheme, bytes32 msgDigest, uint256 validCount).
  • aere-contracts/contracts/modular/AerePQAggregateModule.sol
    • ERC-7579 type-1 validator (matches OZ draft-IERC7579 IERC7579Validator): onInstall/onUninstall/ isModuleType, validateUserOp(PackedUserOperation, bytes32)->uint256 (0/1), and isValidSignatureWithSender(address,bytes32,bytes)->bytes4 (0x1626ba7e / 0xffffffff).
    • Singleton, per-account committee binding keyed by msg.sender (AereSessionKeyValidator pattern).
    • Signature layout: abi.encode(bytes publicValues, bytes proofBytes); malformed => FAILED, no revert.
    • Local PackedUserOperation struct (self-contained, portable to any EVM chain).
  • aere-contracts/test/AerePQAggregate.test.js, 17 tests.
  • aerenew/docs/AERE-PQ-AGGREGATE.md, scheme, gas argument, 4337/7579 portability, Bank28 use case, honest [MEASURE] status.

REAL test result

npx hardhat test test/AerePQAggregate.test.js => 17 passing (2s). Ran from aerenew/contracts. Test double = MockSp1Verifier (verifyProof REVERTS on invalid proof, exact production gateway semantics), same double as AereComputeMarketV3 / zk light clients.

Coverage: valid proof authorizes (view+recorded); invalid proof rejects fail-closed; wrong message digest rejects; wrong committee root rejects; below-threshold rejects; t/n/scheme mismatch + malformed public values reject; unknown committee rejects; module returns 4337 code + ERC-1271 magic correctly and fails closed without reverting on invalid/malformed.

Gas independence (the headline)

recordAggregate: n=5 => 61,799 gas; n=1,000,000 => 61,823 gas; diff 24 gas (calldata encoding of the larger integer, O(log n) not O(n)). Concretely proves constant on-chain cost regardless of committee size.

Flags

  • [MEASURE] OFF-CHAIN SP1 aggregation guest circuit NOT implemented (research zkVM work). Verifying Falcon FFT/float sampling in a zkVM is hard => ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, integer arithmetic) is the tractable first target (SCHEME_MLDSA65 = 5). On-chain side is built + tested vs a MOCK gateway only. Do NOT claim end-to-end aggregation works.
  • [MEASURE] real-gateway on-chain verify gas + real proving cost/latency (mock numbers above).
  • [VERIFY] ERC-7579 module assumes account stripped the validator-routing prefix before calling (matches OZ AccountERC7579); PackedUserOperation field layout to reconcile vs Safe7579 / Kernel / Nexus.
  • [VERIFY] isValidSignatureWithSender intentionally does NOT scope by sender (committee is sole authority).

Scope boundary kept

Account/authorization aggregation only. Consensus stays classical ECDSA QBFT. No new token. No funds, no admin. solc 0.8.23, viaIR, matches repo style. No em-dashes in prose.