e4cead319d
Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network). Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
57 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Spec 4: Aere Network Post-Quantum Finality Certificate
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Built the flagship ADDITIVE post-quantum finality feature: one succinct proof that a quorum of
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Aere validators attested to a finalized block with HASH-BASED (post-quantum) keys, verifiable
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on-chain in ONE call, WITHOUT changing QBFT consensus and WITHOUT a re-genesis.
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## Deliverables (all new, no deployed contract modified)
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1. `aerenew/contracts/contracts/pqfinality/AerePQAttestationKeyRegistry.sol`
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- Per-validator hash-based attestation public key (XMSS / WOTS+ / leanSig / SLH-DSA / XMSS^MT),
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SEPARATE from the ECDSA consensus key. This is the PQ finality key.
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- Maps validator -> current key + monotonic keyEpoch. One-time/few-time keys rotate: registering
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again appends a new record, marks predecessor superseded, bumps epoch. Append-only history,
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fail-closed, no silent rewrite.
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- Governed membership (Ownable enrollValidator = the N=7 set + root ordering), self-custodied
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keys (validator registers its OWN key; owner cannot forge it).
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- Deterministic `validatorSetRoot()` = keccak over (validator, keyEpoch, keyHash) leaves in
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enrollment order. Any rotation changes the root.
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2. `aerenew/contracts/contracts/pqfinality/AereFinalityCertificateVerifier.sol`
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- Verifies ONE SP1 proof via the live gateway (0x9ca479C8...70628), pinned PROGRAM_VKEY.
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- Public values (192 bytes): blockHash, blockHeight, validatorSetRoot, validatorSetSize,
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quorumCount, attestationDomain.
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- Fail-closed: binds root+size to the LIVE registry, binds attestationDomain (chainId+registry),
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requires quorumCount >= ceil(2N/3) = 5 of 7, rejects zero block, then one verifyProof (reverts
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on bad proof). Cost independent of N.
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- `isFinalPQ(blockHash)` consumer gate + `recordCertificate` + `assertFinalizes(claimedBlock)`
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for bridges confirming a specific block.
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3. `aerenew/contracts/test/AerePQFinalityCertificate.test.js` - 12 passing (MockSp1Verifier).
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Covers all required cases: 7-validator set registers (threshold 5); valid quorum-5 cert records +
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isFinalPQ true; below-quorum rejects; wrong root rejects; wrong block/height/zero-block rejects;
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invalid proof fail-closed; key rotation changes root and old-root cert no longer matches; empty
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set fails closed; append-only + owner-gated enroll + self-register.
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4. `aerenew/docs/AERE-PQ-FINALITY-CERTIFICATE.md` - architecture (dual-sign ECDSA+hash-based,
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off-chain zkVM aggregates into one STARK/SP1 proof, on-chain one verify), why additive (no flip,
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no re-genesis), quantum-safety argument (hash-based sigs + hash-based FRI STARK are Shor-
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resistant vs classical ECDSA seals + BN254 Groth16), consumer use cases (light client/bridge/
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L2/AI agent), live-first framing (ships ahead of Ethereum Lean Consensus ~2027 because N small),
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honest [MEASURE] status.
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## REAL test result
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`npx hardhat test test/AerePQFinalityCertificate.test.js` from aerenew/contracts: 12 passing (2s),
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0 failing. Contracts compile under solc 0.8.23 (repo config).
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## Honesty flags
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- [MEASURE] / NOT implemented: the off-chain XMSS/leanSig aggregation zkVM guest circuit (verify N
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hash-based sigs against the root inside the zkVM, emit public values). Novel research. leanSig or
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XMSS-in-zkVM is the target; ML-DSA-in-zkVM is a lattice alternative (loses the hash-only argument).
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- On-chain verifier + registry are REAL and tested against a MOCK SP1 gateway. NOT proven end-to-end.
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Do NOT claim PQ finality is live.
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- [VERIFY]/design-only: the Shor-resistant end-to-end claim holds for a NATIVE hash-based STARK proof;
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a Groth16 wrap would reintroduce a BN254 leg. Stated in the doc.
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- Scope boundary kept: base QBFT consensus is STILL classical ECDSA. This is additive attestation ON
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TOP; it never flips or gates consensus and is not live.
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