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aere-docs/AERE-TLA-FORMAL-SPEC.md
Aere Network e4cead319d Initial public release 
Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live
chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network).

Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is
classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at
the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the
consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
2026-07-20 01:01:36 +03:00

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Spec 27: TLA+ specification of Aere QBFT consensus

Date: 2026-07-19 Deliverable location: aerenew/formal-tla/ (new directory)

What was built

A real, well-formed TLA+ model of Aere Network's QBFT / IBFT 2.0 consensus, with model-checkable safety and liveness properties and TLC configs. It complements (does not replace) the existing z3 / SMT proofs in aerenew/formal-consensus/, establishing the same properties by a second, independent method.

Files:

File Role
aerenew/formal-tla/QBFT.tla The specification (constants, vars, actions, properties). 66 definitions; single-height, bounded-round IBFT 2.0.
aerenew/formal-tla/MCsafety.tla Concrete N=4 and N=7 instances + message-pool bound.
aerenew/formal-tla/MCsafety.cfg Safety, N=4, F=1, Quorum=3, rounds {0,1,2}.
aerenew/formal-tla/MCsafety7.cfg Safety, live N=7, F=2, Quorum=5, rounds {0,1}.
aerenew/formal-tla/MCliveness.tla Liveness instance (N=4, round-0 proposer Byzantine).
aerenew/formal-tla/MCliveness.cfg EventualCommit under FairSpec fairness.
aerenew/formal-tla/README.md What it proves, how to run TLC, relation to z3, honest status.

Faithfulness to QBFT / IBFT 2.0

  • Constants pin the Besu formulas via ASSUME: Quorum = ceil(2N/3), F = floor((N-1)/3). N=7 gives quorum 5, f 2 (the live set).
  • Four message types (PRE-PREPARE / PREPARE / COMMIT / ROUND-CHANGE) in a uniform record pool; quorum accounting counts DISTINCT senders.
  • IBFT 2.0 locking: Justified(r,v) requires a quorum of valid round-change messages and the highest-prepared value among them, backed by a REAL prepare quorum (ValidRoundChange rejects a fabricated high-prepared certificate, because a genuine prepare quorum needs Q distinct senders and only F are Byzantine). Honest Prepare is guarded by Justified (acceptor-side lock); RoundChange carries the sender's prepare certificate.
  • Up to F Byzantine validators unconstrained via FaultyBroadcast (inject any message from their own identities; cannot forge honest signatures).
  • Proposer takes an explicit self-Prepare (mirrors the 2026-07-14 fixed Besu rule from qbft_prepare_counting_smt.py).

Properties

  • Safety invariants: Agreement (no two honest validators decide different blocks) and NoFork (committed set never holds two distinct blocks for one height). Mirror qbft_safety_smt.py L2/L3 and qbft_locking_smt.py.
  • Liveness: EventualCommit under FairSpec (WF on each honest action, none on Byzantine). MCliveness makes proposer(0) Byzantine so a commit requires a round change to an honest proposer, exercising qbft_liveness_smt.py's path.

Relationship to z3 models

Same properties, different method. z3 proves each property's negation UNSAT (including the UNBOUNDED all-N quorum-intersection lemma 2q-N >= f+1 and N-f >= quorum, which finite TLC cannot do). TLC gives an independent explicit-state check of the message-passing protocol at concrete sizes N in {4,7}. Cross-method agreement is the credibility gain. The all-N arithmetic stays the z3 models' job; TLC contributes the finite-state protocol exploration.

Honesty flags

  • [VERIFY] SANY parse not run. Structure self-checked by a heuristic script (module headers + ==== terminators present; parens/brackets/braces/block comments balanced; all referenced operators resolve to a definition / constant / variable / Integers,FiniteSets,Sequences builtin / bound var). This is NOT a real parser. A tla2sany.SANY QBFT.tla run on a box with the TLA+ tools jar should confirm no residual syntax issue.
  • [MEASURE] No TLC run executed. The TLA+ tools jar / Apalache are not installed in this environment (Java 21 IS present, but that alone is not a TLA+ tool, and downloading a jar was out of scope). No property is claimed model-checked. Run tlc MCsafety -config MCsafety.cfg, tlc MCsafety -config MCsafety7.cfg, tlc MCliveness -config MCliveness.cfg and record states-explored + no-violation / property-holds.
  • Bounded model check, not all-N. Fixed finite instances; message-pool cap is a knob. A decision procedure over the finite config, not a proof for all N.
  • Liveness is temporal, post-GST. Progress only after GST; asynchronous liveness impossible by FLP and not claimed. Bounded witness only; unbounded liveness not decidable by finite TLC.
  • Scope. Models agreement / progress design, not Besu Java bytecode. Chain 2800 consensus uses classical ECDSA seals (N=7, f=2, quorum 5). The agreement model is orthogonal to the seal scheme; nothing implies post-quantum consensus.

Status

Artifact written and structurally self-checked. Safety and liveness are specified and structurally validated, NOT yet model-checked (needs the TLC run above). Complements, does not replace, the z3 corpus.