aere-docs/AERE-SECURITY-FIXES.md

Aere Network: adversarial-review fixes (pre-deploy hardening)

Source review: aerenew/docs/AERE-SECURITY-REVIEW-NEW-CONTRACTS.md Repo: aerenew/contracts (solc 0.8.23, OpenZeppelin v4.9.x). All contracts founder-gated, not deployed. Guard pattern for L1 copied from contracts/pqfinality/AereFinalityCertificateVerifier.sol (gateway.code.length == 0 revert).

Per-finding status

M1 (MEDIUM) FIXED, with proof

File: contracts/erc8004/AereReputationRegistry8004.sol

• Made the adapter Ownable (OZ v4, @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol, matching the repo).
• Added mapping(address => bool) public isAuthorizedFeedbackAuthor, owner functions addFeedbackAuthor / removeFeedbackAuthor (with FeedbackAuthorSet event and a zero-address guard on add), and a new error NotAuthorizedFeedbackAuthor(address).
• Gated giveFeedback: first line now reverts NotAuthorizedFeedbackAuthor unless isAuthorizedFeedbackAuthor[msg.sender]. The rest of the flow (agent-registered, delta clamp, adapter-is-attestor) is unchanged.
• Design choice (documented in NatSpec): owner-curated author allowlist, mirroring the live AereAIReputation curated-attestor model. Scope is authorization-only: the owner cannot set a reputation value, cannot exceed the {-1,0,+1} delta clamp every author is held to, and moves no funds. No re-entrancy, no fund/reputation-value backdoor. Read path (getScore, getStats, liveKeyOf, canWriteThrough) untouched.

L1 (LOW) FIXED (x3), with proof

Added the sibling's codeless-gateway guard to each verify path. New error VerifierHasNoCode() in each.

• contracts/mpc/AerePQAggregateVerifier.sol constructor: reverts if gateway.code.length == 0 (after the existing ZeroGateway check).
• contracts/depin/AereComputeMarketV3.sol constructor: reverts if zkVerifier.code.length == 0 (after the existing ZeroAddress check).
• contracts/compliance/AereBitstringStatusList.sol constructor: reverts if nonRevocationVerifier_ != address(0) && nonRevocationVerifier_.code.length == 0. The zero address is still allowed (keeps the zk non-revocation path fail-closed OFF until configured), which preserves existing behavior. Verifier is immutable, so the constructor is the correct place.

L2 (LOW) FIXED, with proof

File: contracts/agentic/AereVectorStore.sol

• Bound each paid-query receipt to an intended provider. Added address provider to the QueryReceipt struct.
• paidQuery now takes address provider (validated non-zero via existing ZeroAddress) and records it in the receipt. Signature is now paidQuery(storeId, queryHash, provider, agentId, amount, nonce, deadline, authSig). The settlement/forwarding flow (AERE402 rail, fee to sink, delta-measured forward to recipient) is unchanged; receiptId formula unchanged.
• attestRetrieval priced branch now reverts new error NotReceiptProvider() unless msg.sender == receipt.provider, so a third party (or the payer) cannot front-run the honest provider and burn the receipt with a junk resultRoot. getReceipt view extended to also return provider.

L3 (LOW) DOCUMENTED (accepted risk), not code-changed

File: contracts/erc8004/AereAP2MandateVerifier.sol

• Chose DOCUMENT over CODE-CHANGE, per the task's guidance, because the two candidate code fixes are unsuitable: (a) a per-authorization nonce would break the intended standing-mandate ("sign once, spend repeatedly up to the cap") semantics that the design and tests rely on; (b) "bind consumption to the executor" is already the built-in SETTLEMENT_EXECUTOR gate.
• Strengthened the contract-level and authorizeSpend NatSpec: the open accounting path (SETTLEMENT_EXECUTOR == address(0)) is verification/test-only and MUST NOT be used in production; production MUST set SETTLEMENT_EXECUTOR to the AERE402 facilitator so a mandate's cap is only ever consumed alongside a real settlement. No funds at risk (this contract holds none); the vector is cap-exhaustion griefing only.
• The existing test "enforces the settlement-executor gate when one is configured" already proves the mitigation works (a non-executor is rejected, the configured executor succeeds). No new test needed.

Tests added / changed

• test/erc8004-adapters.test.js: deployRep now authorizes other as a feedback author (both branches). Two pre-existing tests that relied on the ungated giveFeedback were updated to call as the authorized other (legitimate behavior change from the M1 gate). Added new test "gates giveFeedback to owner-authorized feedback authors (M1)": unauthorized caller reverts NotAuthorizedFeedbackAuthor and writes nothing, owner authorizes -> same call succeeds and moves the live score to 10, owner revokes -> re-blocked, and only the owner may manage the allowlist.
• test/AerePQAggregate.test.js: added "rejects a code-less SP1 gateway at construction (L1 fail-open guard)" (EOA gateway reverts VerifierHasNoCode, zero reverts ZeroGateway, real mock deploys).
• test/AereComputeMarketV3.test.js: added "construction guards" > "rejects a code-less ZK verifier at construction (L1)" (EOA reverts VerifierHasNoCode, zero reverts ZeroAddress, real mock deploys).
• test/aere-pq-screen.test.js: added "rejects a non-zero code-less non-revocation verifier at construction, but allows zero (L1)" (EOA reverts VerifierHasNoCode; zero deploys and nonRevocationConfigured()==false; real mock deploys).
• test/aere-vector-store.test.js: the two paidQuery calls updated to pass provider.address; the paid-query test extended to assert the receipt is bound to the provider and that a third party (operator) and even the payer (consumer) are rejected NotReceiptProvider with the receipt left unconsumed, then the bound provider consumes it successfully (L2 proof).

Real re-run results (npx hardhat test , from aerenew/contracts)

• test/erc8004-adapters.test.js .... 19 passing
• test/aere-vector-store.test.js ... 8 passing
• test/AerePQAggregate.test.js ..... 18 passing
• test/AereComputeMarketV3.test.js . 14 passing
• test/aere-pq-screen.test.js ...... 13 passing

npx hardhat compile: green (compiled successfully, then "Nothing to compile" on re-run).

Notes

• No contracts outside the findings were touched. No existing guard was weakened. The L1 zero-address behavior for AereBitstringStatusList was intentionally preserved. Prose contains no em-dashes or "--".