aere-network/aere-docs
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
main
aere-docs/AERE-PQ-FINALITY-CERTIFICATE-SUMMARY.md
Aere Network e4cead319d Initial public release 
Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live
chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network).

Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is
classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at
the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the
consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
2026-07-20 01:01:36 +03:00

3.7 KiB
Raw Permalink Blame History

Spec 4: Aere Network Post-Quantum Finality Certificate

Built the flagship ADDITIVE post-quantum finality feature: one succinct proof that a quorum of Aere validators attested to a finalized block with HASH-BASED (post-quantum) keys, verifiable on-chain in ONE call, WITHOUT changing QBFT consensus and WITHOUT a re-genesis.

Deliverables (all new, no deployed contract modified)

  1. aerenew/contracts/contracts/pqfinality/AerePQAttestationKeyRegistry.sol

    • Per-validator hash-based attestation public key (XMSS / WOTS+ / leanSig / SLH-DSA / XMSS^MT), SEPARATE from the ECDSA consensus key. This is the PQ finality key.
    • Maps validator -> current key + monotonic keyEpoch. One-time/few-time keys rotate: registering again appends a new record, marks predecessor superseded, bumps epoch. Append-only history, fail-closed, no silent rewrite.
    • Governed membership (Ownable enrollValidator = the N=7 set + root ordering), self-custodied keys (validator registers its OWN key; owner cannot forge it).
    • Deterministic validatorSetRoot() = keccak over (validator, keyEpoch, keyHash) leaves in enrollment order. Any rotation changes the root.

  2. aerenew/contracts/contracts/pqfinality/AereFinalityCertificateVerifier.sol

    • Verifies ONE SP1 proof via the live gateway (0x9ca479C8...70628), pinned PROGRAM_VKEY.
    • Public values (192 bytes): blockHash, blockHeight, validatorSetRoot, validatorSetSize, quorumCount, attestationDomain.
    • Fail-closed: binds root+size to the LIVE registry, binds attestationDomain (chainId+registry), requires quorumCount >= ceil(2N/3) = 5 of 7, rejects zero block, then one verifyProof (reverts on bad proof). Cost independent of N.
    • isFinalPQ(blockHash) consumer gate + recordCertificate + assertFinalizes(claimedBlock) for bridges confirming a specific block.

  3. aerenew/contracts/test/AerePQFinalityCertificate.test.js - 12 passing (MockSp1Verifier). Covers all required cases: 7-validator set registers (threshold 5); valid quorum-5 cert records + isFinalPQ true; below-quorum rejects; wrong root rejects; wrong block/height/zero-block rejects; invalid proof fail-closed; key rotation changes root and old-root cert no longer matches; empty set fails closed; append-only + owner-gated enroll + self-register.

  4. aerenew/docs/AERE-PQ-FINALITY-CERTIFICATE.md - architecture (dual-sign ECDSA+hash-based, off-chain zkVM aggregates into one STARK/SP1 proof, on-chain one verify), why additive (no flip, no re-genesis), quantum-safety argument (hash-based sigs + hash-based FRI STARK are Shor- resistant vs classical ECDSA seals + BN254 Groth16), consumer use cases (light client/bridge/ L2/AI agent), live-first framing (ships ahead of Ethereum Lean Consensus ~2027 because N small), honest [MEASURE] status.

REAL test result

npx hardhat test test/AerePQFinalityCertificate.test.js from aerenew/contracts: 12 passing (2s), 0 failing. Contracts compile under solc 0.8.23 (repo config).

Honesty flags

  • [MEASURE] / NOT implemented: the off-chain XMSS/leanSig aggregation zkVM guest circuit (verify N hash-based sigs against the root inside the zkVM, emit public values). Novel research. leanSig or XMSS-in-zkVM is the target; ML-DSA-in-zkVM is a lattice alternative (loses the hash-only argument).
  • On-chain verifier + registry are REAL and tested against a MOCK SP1 gateway. NOT proven end-to-end. Do NOT claim PQ finality is live.
  • [VERIFY]/design-only: the Shor-resistant end-to-end claim holds for a NATIVE hash-based STARK proof; a Groth16 wrap would reintroduce a BN254 leg. Stated in the doc.
  • Scope boundary kept: base QBFT consensus is STILL classical ECDSA. This is additive attestation ON TOP; it never flips or gates consensus and is not live.