aere-network/aere-docs
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
main
aere-docs/AERE-PQ-AGGREGATE-SUMMARY.md
Aere Network e4cead319d Initial public release 
Aere Network public source. Everything here can be checked against the live
chain (chain id 2800, https://rpc.aere.network).

Scope note, stated up front rather than buried: consensus on chain 2800 is
classical secp256k1 ECDSA QBFT. The post-quantum work in this repository is at
the signature, precompile, account and transport layers. Nothing here makes the
consensus post-quantum, and no document in it should be read as claiming so.
2026-07-20 01:01:36 +03:00

4.0 KiB
Raw Permalink Blame History

Spec 6: AerePQAggregate build summary

What was built

Constant-cost on-chain verification of a t-of-n POST-QUANTUM committee authorization via ONE succinct SP1 proof, exposed as an ERC-4337 path and a portable ERC-7579 validator module.

Files (new, no deployed contracts modified)

  • aerenew/contracts/contracts/mpc/AerePQAggregateVerifier.sol
    • registerCommittee(root, t, n, scheme) — stores committee (root = commitment to n PQC keys; keys NOT stored on-chain, so cost stays O(1) in n). Permissionless, no admin, no funds.
    • verifyAggregate(committeeId, messageDigest, publicValues, proofBytes) view — strict fail-closed: binds committeeRoot / t / n / scheme / messageDigest / validCount>=t, then ONE SP1_GATEWAY.verifyProof(pinnedVKey, publicValues, proofBytes). Reverts on any mismatch or bad proof.
    • tryVerifyAggregate(...) view — non-reverting bool (try/catch wrap) for 4337/7579 SHOULD-not-revert.
    • recordAggregate(...) — strict verify + provenance attestation event.
    • Immutable SP1_GATEWAY (chain 2800 canonical Succinct gateway 0x9ca479C8…70628) and AGGREGATE_PROGRAM_VKEY (pinned circuit; registrant cannot swap circuits).
    • Public-values layout (fixed 192 bytes / 6 words): abi.encode(bytes32 committeeRoot, uint256 t, uint256 n, uint256 scheme, bytes32 msgDigest, uint256 validCount).
  • aerenew/contracts/contracts/modular/AerePQAggregateModule.sol
    • ERC-7579 type-1 validator (matches OZ draft-IERC7579 IERC7579Validator): onInstall/onUninstall/ isModuleType, validateUserOp(PackedUserOperation, bytes32)->uint256 (0/1), and isValidSignatureWithSender(address,bytes32,bytes)->bytes4 (0x1626ba7e / 0xffffffff).
    • Singleton, per-account committee binding keyed by msg.sender (AereSessionKeyValidator pattern).
    • Signature layout: abi.encode(bytes publicValues, bytes proofBytes); malformed => FAILED, no revert.
    • Local PackedUserOperation struct (self-contained, portable to any EVM chain).
  • aerenew/contracts/test/AerePQAggregate.test.js — 17 tests.
  • aerenew/docs/AERE-PQ-AGGREGATE.md — scheme, gas argument, 4337/7579 portability, Bank28 use case, honest [MEASURE] status.

REAL test result

npx hardhat test test/AerePQAggregate.test.js => 17 passing (2s). Ran from aerenew/contracts. Test double = MockSp1Verifier (verifyProof REVERTS on invalid proof, exact production gateway semantics), same double as AereComputeMarketV3 / zk light clients.

Coverage: valid proof authorizes (view+recorded); invalid proof rejects fail-closed; wrong message digest rejects; wrong committee root rejects; below-threshold rejects; t/n/scheme mismatch + malformed public values reject; unknown committee rejects; module returns 4337 code + ERC-1271 magic correctly and fails closed without reverting on invalid/malformed.

Gas independence (the headline)

recordAggregate: n=5 => 61,799 gas; n=1,000,000 => 61,823 gas; diff 24 gas (calldata encoding of the larger integer, O(log n) not O(n)). Concretely proves constant on-chain cost regardless of committee size.

Flags

  • [MEASURE] OFF-CHAIN SP1 aggregation guest circuit NOT implemented (research zkVM work). Verifying Falcon FFT/float sampling in a zkVM is hard => ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, integer arithmetic) is the tractable first target (SCHEME_MLDSA65 = 5). On-chain side is built + tested vs a MOCK gateway only. Do NOT claim end-to-end aggregation works.
  • [MEASURE] real-gateway on-chain verify gas + real proving cost/latency (mock numbers above).
  • [VERIFY] ERC-7579 module assumes account stripped the validator-routing prefix before calling (matches OZ AccountERC7579); PackedUserOperation field layout to reconcile vs Safe7579 / Kernel / Nexus.
  • [VERIFY] isValidSignatureWithSender intentionally does NOT scope by sender (committee is sole authority).

Scope boundary kept

Account/authorization aggregation only. Consensus stays classical ECDSA QBFT. No new token. No funds, no admin. solc 0.8.23, viaIR, matches repo style. No em-dashes in prose.