6f13c671f1
Ten clients (RaaS, Sink, Agent and x402 settlement, state channels, compliance,
lending, the compliant pool) carried hand-written function selectors that matched
neither the compiled ABI nor the signature written next to them, so every call
through them reverted. Every selector is now the keccak of a signature in the
compiled ABI. Functions the contracts never had are replaced by the real ones:
AereSanctionsRegistry (latestEpoch, isSanctioned with epoch, isSanctionedLatest,
currentRoot via snapshotStatus), ChainalysisOracleWrapper (upstreamOracle),
AereTravelRuleHashRegistry (status by commitment id), AereInsuranceFund (two-step
proposeMarket + registerMarket). AereRaaSFactoryClient.registerRollup targets the
canonical AereRaaSFactoryV2 (11 parameters, optional defenseGrace).
Proof: the gate aerenew/scripts/deschise/sdk-selectori-corecti.cjs reads 330 of
330 selectors correct and fails on a planted one; src/test/selectors-live.ts reads
18 values from the deployed contracts through the shipped clients, and the old
rollupCount selector still reverts (its negative control).
Also: state-window-live records that both public endpoints now refuse state
outside the 512-block window ("World state unavailable") instead of returning a
false 0x0, and proves the guard against an endpoint that still lies; npm test
runs the offline suite through scripts/run-tests.mjs (61/61), live proofs stay
separate. README network facts brought to 2026-10-15.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
53 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
53 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* RWATransferAdapterClient — permissioned RWA → USDC.e redemption.
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* Contract: aerenew/contracts/contracts/lending/RWATransferAdapter.sol
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*/
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export interface RpcProvider {
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request(args: { method: string; params: unknown[] }): Promise<unknown>;
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}
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const pad32 = (h: string) => h.toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '').padStart(64, '0');
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const encUint = (n: bigint) => pad32(n.toString(16));
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const encAddr = (a: string) => pad32(a.replace(/^0x/, ''));
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async function ethCall(p: RpcProvider, to: string, data: string): Promise<string> {
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return await p.request({ method: 'eth_call', params: [{ to, data }, 'latest'] }) as string;
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}
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async function ethSend(p: RpcProvider, from: string, to: string, data: string): Promise<string> {
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return await p.request({ method: 'eth_sendTransaction', params: [{ from, to, data, value: '0x0' }] }) as string;
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}
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const SEL = {
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PAYOUT_TOKEN: '0xe2f6f511', // PAYOUT_TOKEN()
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ORACLE: '0x38013f02', // ORACLE()
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FOUNDATION: '0x65df2e51', // FOUNDATION()
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configs: '0xfce89878', // configs(address)
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states: '0x02a22337', // states(address)
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periodRemaining: '0x0a41950f', // periodRemaining(address)
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payoutLiquidity: '0x875d90e6', // payoutLiquidity()
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redeem: '0x1e9a6950', // redeem(address,uint256)
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} as const;
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export class RWATransferAdapterClient {
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constructor(public readonly provider: RpcProvider, public readonly address: string) {}
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async getPayoutToken(): Promise<string> {
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return '0x' + (await ethCall(this.provider, this.address, SEL.PAYOUT_TOKEN)).slice(-40);
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}
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async getFoundation(): Promise<string> {
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return '0x' + (await ethCall(this.provider, this.address, SEL.FOUNDATION)).slice(-40);
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}
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async periodRemaining(asset: string): Promise<bigint> {
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return BigInt(await ethCall(this.provider, this.address, SEL.periodRemaining + encAddr(asset)));
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}
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async payoutLiquidity(): Promise<bigint> {
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return BigInt(await ethCall(this.provider, this.address, SEL.payoutLiquidity));
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}
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/** Permissionless redeem. Caller must approve `asset` for `rwaAmount` on this contract first. */
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async redeem(from: string, asset: string, rwaAmount: bigint): Promise<string> {
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return ethSend(this.provider, from, this.address, SEL.redeem + encAddr(asset) + encUint(rwaAmount));
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}
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}
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