// Hybrid-auth surface for the seedless PQC wallet: the Falcon-512 root produces
// (a) a one-tap "upgrade to post-quantum" ATTESTATION binding the quantum-durable
// root to the passkey account, recordable via AerePQCAttestation, and (b) the
// USEROP signature the Falcon-owned AerePQCAccount consumes. Both end in a REAL
// Falcon-512 signature the chain verifies on-chain via the live precompile.
//
// HONEST SCOPE. The everyday spend path is the passkey daily factor: hot,
// classical secp256k1-routed, fast. The Falcon root is the QUANTUM-DURABLE
// authority for the high-assurance actions (the upgrade itself, recovery,
// high-value / co-signed ops). Only the ROOT is post-quantum; the hot session is
// not, by design. The AERE chain's own consensus is QBFT whose headers are still
// admitted on classical ECDSA commit seals until AIP-22 stage 5 (post-quantum layers
// on top of it are dated in AIP-22; comment corrected 2026-10-28: it said consensus
// remains classical QBFT/ECDSA): this is application-layer PQC, not post-quantum
// consensus.

import {
  keccak256, AbiCoder, getBytes, hexlify, toUtf8Bytes, concat,
  type BytesLike,
} from 'ethers';
import { falcon512 } from '@noble/post-quantum/falcon.js';
import {
  SCHEME, signInternal, verifyLocal, falconDetachedToEnvelope, FALCON_NONCE_LEN,
  type AerePQCClient,
} from '../pqc/index.js';
import { computeUserOpHash } from '../account/abi.js';
import type { PackedUserOp } from '../account/types.js';
import type { SeedlessAccountDescriptor } from './types.js';

/** keccak256("AereSeedlessPQCWallet.v1.upgrade") — the upgrade-attestation domain. */
export const UPGRADE_ATTESTATION_DOMAIN = keccak256(
  toUtf8Bytes('AereSeedlessPQCWallet.v1.upgrade'),
);

function bytes32(v: BytesLike): string {
  const b = getBytes(v);
  if (b.length !== 32) throw new Error(`hybridAuth: expected 32-byte value, got ${b.length}`);
  return hexlify(b);
}

/**
 * keccak256("AerePQCAccount.validateUserOp.v1") — the userOp signing DOMAIN. The
 * AerePQCAccount verifies validateUserOp over abi.encodePacked(domain, userOpHash)
 * (64 bytes), domain-separated from the raw 32-byte EIP-1271 login surface so a
 * signature phished through a dapp "login" can never be replayed as a spend. This
 * MUST match the AerePQCAccount.USEROP_DOMAIN constant. (Adversarial-review HIGH.)
 */
export const PQC_ACCOUNT_USEROP_DOMAIN = keccak256(
  toUtf8Bytes('AerePQCAccount.validateUserOp.v1'),
);

/** The exact 64-byte message the AerePQCAccount Falcon-verifies for a userOp. */
export function pqcAccountUserOpMessage(userOpHash: BytesLike): string {
  return concat([PQC_ACCOUNT_USEROP_DOMAIN, bytes32(userOpHash)]);
}

/**
 * The message hash committing an "upgrade to post-quantum" of a specific seedless
 * account. Binds the Falcon root to the everyday passkey authority AND to the
 * Falcon-owned PQC account, so an attestation over it cannot be replayed onto a
 * different account or a different daily factor:
 *
 *   keccak256(abi.encode(
 *     UPGRADE_ATTESTATION_DOMAIN, chainId,
 *     passkeyAuthority, keccak256(falconPubKey), pqcAccount))
 */
export function upgradeMessageHash(descriptor: SeedlessAccountDescriptor): string {
  if (!descriptor.root) {
    throw new Error('hybridAuth: descriptor has no Falcon root (call upgradeToPostQuantum first)');
  }
  const enc = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder().encode(
    ['bytes32', 'uint256', 'address', 'bytes32', 'address'],
    [
      UPGRADE_ATTESTATION_DOMAIN,
      descriptor.chainId,
      descriptor.daily.authorityAddress,
      keccak256(descriptor.root.publicKey),
      descriptor.root.pqcAccount,
    ],
  );
  return keccak256(enc);
}

export interface UpgradeAttestation {
  /** The account-binding message hash (see {@link upgradeMessageHash}). */
  messageHash: string;
  /** The AerePQCAttestation per-key challenge the Falcon signature covers. */
  challenge: string;
  /** keyId used in the challenge derivation. */
  keyId: bigint;
  /** per-key nonce used in the challenge derivation. */
  nonce: bigint;
  /** The Falcon-512 signature envelope (AerePQCAttestation wire format). */
  signature: Uint8Array;
}

/**
 * Build the one-tap upgrade attestation: derive the account-binding message hash,
 * derive the AerePQCAttestation challenge for (keyId, nonce, messageHash), and
 * sign that challenge with the Falcon-512 ROOT secret key. The resulting envelope
 * is exactly what AerePQCAttestation.attest()/verifySignature() consumes, and its
 * validity rests on a real Falcon-512 signature the live precompile verifies.
 *
 * `client` supplies the challenge derivation (chainId + attestation address);
 * it is used purely for the pure/local deriveChallenge — no network call here.
 * `secretKey` never leaves this process.
 */
export function buildUpgradeAttestation(
  client: AerePQCClient,
  descriptor: SeedlessAccountDescriptor,
  secretKey: Uint8Array,
  params: { keyId: bigint | number; nonce: bigint | number },
): UpgradeAttestation {
  const messageHash = upgradeMessageHash(descriptor);
  const keyId = BigInt(params.keyId);
  const nonce = BigInt(params.nonce);
  const challenge = client.deriveChallenge(keyId, nonce, messageHash);
  const signature = signInternal(SCHEME.FALCON512, getBytes(challenge), secretKey);
  return { messageHash, challenge, keyId, nonce, signature };
}

/**
 * READ-ONLY on-chain verification of an upgrade attestation: re-derives the
 * challenge on-chain, then asks the live Falcon-512 precompile (via
 * AerePQCAttestation.verifySignature, a free eth_call) whether the envelope is a
 * valid Falcon signature over that challenge. No transaction; no state change.
 */
export async function verifyUpgradeAttestationLive(
  client: AerePQCClient,
  descriptor: SeedlessAccountDescriptor,
  att: UpgradeAttestation,
): Promise<boolean> {
  if (!descriptor.root) throw new Error('hybridAuth: descriptor has no Falcon root');
  const onChainChallenge = await client.attestChallenge(att.keyId, att.nonce, att.messageHash);
  if (onChainChallenge.toLowerCase() !== att.challenge.toLowerCase()) return false;
  return client.verifySignature(
    SCHEME.FALCON512,
    getBytes(descriptor.root.publicKey),
    onChainChallenge,
    att.signature,
  );
}

export interface PqcUserOpSignature {
  /** The ERC-4337 userOpHash (mirrors AereEntryPointV2.getUserOpHash). */
  userOpHash: string;
  /**
   * The AerePQCAccount signature bytes: abi.encode(bytes nonce, bytes compSig),
   * where compSig is the Falcon compressed body WITHOUT the 0x29 esig header.
   * Set this as userOp.signature for handleOps.
   */
  accountSignature: string;
  /**
   * The SAME Falcon signature re-cast into the AerePQCAttestation wire envelope
   * (nonce(40) || 0x29 || compSig), for verifying the Falcon leg via the live
   * precompile (verifySignature) read-only.
   */
  attestationEnvelope: Uint8Array;
  /** The raw noble detached signature (0x39 || nonce(40) || compSig). */
  detached: Uint8Array;
}

/**
 * Sign an ERC-4337 UserOperation for the Falcon-owned AerePQCAccount with the
 * quantum-durable ROOT key. Produces both the account-consumable signature
 * (abi.encode(nonce, compSig)) and the AerePQCAttestation-format envelope for a
 * free on-chain verification of the Falcon leg.
 *
 * The account verifies validateUserOp over the DOMAIN-SEPARATED message
 * abi.encodePacked(USEROP_DOMAIN, userOpHash) via the SAME live AereFalcon512Verifier
 * the precompile wraps, so a `true` from {@link verifyUserOpFalconLegLive} is exactly
 * the check the account performs. (isValidSignature stays raw-hash for EIP-1271
 * integrators; the domain separation is what stops a login sig authorizing a spend.)
 */
export function signPqcAccountUserOp(
  op: PackedUserOp,
  entryPoint: string,
  chainId: bigint | number,
  secretKey: Uint8Array,
): PqcUserOpSignature {
  const userOpHash = computeUserOpHash(op, entryPoint, chainId);
  const msg = getBytes(pqcAccountUserOpMessage(userOpHash));
  const detached = falcon512.sign(msg, secretKey);
  const expectedHdr = 0x30 | 9; // 0x39
  if (detached[0] !== expectedHdr || detached.length <= 1 + FALCON_NONCE_LEN) {
    throw new Error('hybridAuth: unexpected Falcon detached signature shape');
  }
  const nonce = detached.subarray(1, 1 + FALCON_NONCE_LEN);
  const compSig = detached.subarray(1 + FALCON_NONCE_LEN);
  const accountSignature = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder().encode(
    ['bytes', 'bytes'],
    [hexlify(nonce), hexlify(compSig)],
  );
  const attestationEnvelope = falconDetachedToEnvelope(detached, SCHEME.FALCON512);
  return { userOpHash, accountSignature, attestationEnvelope, detached };
}

/** Off-chain mirror of the AerePQCAccount Falcon check (fast pre-flight).
 *  Uses the raw noble verify over the 64-byte domain-separated message (the SDK's
 *  verifyLocal helper is locked to 32-byte messages); mirrors falcon512.sign in the
 *  signer, and matches the on-chain AereFalcon512Verifier the account calls. */
export function verifyPqcAccountUserOpLocal(
  sig: PqcUserOpSignature,
  falconPubKey: BytesLike,
): boolean {
  try {
    return falcon512.verify(
      getBytes(sig.detached),
      getBytes(pqcAccountUserOpMessage(sig.userOpHash)),
      getBytes(falconPubKey),
    );
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

/**
 * READ-ONLY on-chain verification of a UserOp's Falcon leg via the live precompile
 * (AerePQCAttestation.verifySignature). This is the exact lattice check the
 * AerePQCAccount runs in validateUserOp / isValidSignature — proven without
 * deploying the account or sending a transaction.
 */
export async function verifyUserOpFalconLegLive(
  client: AerePQCClient,
  sig: PqcUserOpSignature,
  falconPubKey: BytesLike,
): Promise<boolean> {
  // The spend message is domain-separated (64 bytes), so it cannot go through the
  // 32-byte AerePQCAttestation path; verify it directly via the raw Falcon verifier,
  // exactly as AerePQCAccount.validateUserOp does.
  const [nonce, compSig] = AbiCoder.defaultAbiCoder().decode(['bytes', 'bytes'], sig.accountSignature);
  return client.verifyFalconRaw(
    falconPubKey,
    pqcAccountUserOpMessage(sig.userOpHash),
    nonce,
    compSig,
  );
}