# Check us, do not trust us This toolkit exists so that nothing we say about quantum exposure has to be taken on faith, including what we say about our own chain. ## Run it against a node we do not control node scan.js
--rpc https://your-own-node Every command here takes `--rpc`. None of them requires our endpoint, our API, or an account with us. If your number differs from ours, that difference is the interesting part and we want to hear about it. ## Run it against us, and expect it to be unkind The same scanner that produces a client report produces our own findings, and it returns RED about our own contracts. Measured 2026-08-16 on three of our live addresses: two GREEN, one RED. A vendor whose tool has never returned a red verdict about the vendor is selling a brochure. ## Prove that the tool can fail Two self-checks ship with it, and both are meant to be run by you, not just by us: node selftest.js the analysis fixtures, including cases the scanner used to get wrong node proba-vocabular.mjs every verdict survives the whole path from scanner to client wording The second one exists because of a real defect. The scanner emits RED / YELLOW / GREEN, and two downstream files each wrote their own list of those words, and both wrote AMBER. So a hybrid contract, which is exactly a client who has already started migrating, was being reported as "we could not measure this address". Both sides were self-consistent, so no test we had could see it. The fix was to give the vocabulary one exported source that the consumers call. That test carries a negative control on purpose: an input with no verdict must still come out as NOT MEASURED. Without it, the test would pass even if the reader returned a constant, and would prove nothing. You can verify that claim yourself: change `VERDICTE` in `lib/bytecode.js` to contain AMBER instead of YELLOW, run `node proba-vocabular.mjs`, and watch it exit non-zero. ## What the tool does not do It reads bytecode and what that bytecode can reach. It does not read your repositories, your TLS configuration, your dependencies, your key custody or your HSMs. When it cannot settle a question from bytecode alone, it says so in the output with a `[VERIFY]` or `[MEASURE]` marker, and every report that uses it carries those markers through word for word instead of smoothing them away. A live post-quantum verifier reachable from a contract does **not** make that contract quantum-safe. If the transaction that calls it is authorised with ECDSA, an adversary forges the outer transaction and the verifier is irrelevant. Anyone selling you the opposite can be taken apart in five minutes.