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The free scan now carries the confidence label, not just the colour

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Measured 2026-08-16: a 42-byte contract that merely STORES the constant 0x0AE1 and
never calls anything still scores GREEN, with the reference marked medium
confidence. So the headline colour does not separate a resolved call from a bare
constant, and a client who tests that in five minutes would find it before we
admitted it.

The scan text now says, per address, whether a CALL to each verifier resolved from
the bytecode or whether only the address is present, and says plainly that a
present address can also be plain data. The colour stays what the scanner
computes; the sentence next to it carries what it means.
This commit is contained in:
Aere Network 2026-08-17 11:24:34 +03:00
parent 5b1c9079dd
commit 04f735eda6
9 changed files with 610 additions and 0 deletions
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# The notarization half: issue a certificate, and check one without asking us
A notarization is worth exactly as much as an outsider's ability to check it without asking the
notary. So the verifier is here, it installs nothing, and it takes `--rpc` so you can point it at a
node you operate.
## Check a certificate
node verifica-certificat.mjs certificate.json --fisier your-document.pdf --rpc https://your-node
Five links, each reported separately as PASS, FAIL or NOT MEASURED:
1. the file you hold hashes to the digest the certificate names;
2. the transaction named exists, succeeded, and called the named registry;
3. the transaction sits in the block named, and the chain serves the same block hash;
4. the attestation was recorded **only because** a NIST post-quantum signature verified on chain,
inside that transaction, by a live precompile. Re-checked on every run through the registry's own
free read method;
5. the block is covered by the chain's post-quantum validator certificate.
## The three verdicts, and why the third is not an accusation
0 every measured link holds
1 something does not hold, and the FAIL line names which link
2 nothing could be measured, which is neither a pass nor a rejection
**The difference between 1 and 2 is the honesty of the tool.** "The node did not answer" and "the
node answered and holds no such transaction" are different facts, and only the second says anything
about the certificate. Until 2026-08-17 this tool confused them: with an unreachable endpoint it
told the holder that **their certificate does not hold up**, turning a network problem on our side
into an accusation of forgery against the client. That is the worst way a notarization product can
be wrong, and it is fixed.
## Prove the verifier can reject, before you trust it to accept
`controale/` holds five certificates, each with exactly one lie planted in it: a falsified document
digest, a falsified block hash, a transaction that does not exist, a foreign registry, and a wrong
per-key counter. Run them:
for f in controale/*.json; do node verifica-certificat.mjs "$f"; done
Measured 2026-08-17: all five exit 1. The genuine certificate in `certificat-exemplu.json`, built
from a real attestation on chain 2800 at block 9,200,542, exits 0. An unreachable node exits 2 with
every line NOT MEASURED.
## Issuing: it never signs anything, on purpose
node emite-certificat.mjs pregateste document.pdf # unsigned request + the challenge
... the key holder signs the challenge and submits the transaction ...
node emite-certificat.mjs finalizeaza cerere.json --tx 0x...
The tool produces an **unsigned** transaction and the challenge the post-quantum signature must
cover. Signing is a separate act by whoever holds the key, in a wallet they control. A notarization
service that quietly holds a hot key and signs on your behalf has made itself the thing you were
supposed to be able to check.
The challenge is **asked of the chain**, never rebuilt locally: the contract exposes it, and a local
reimplementation of that preimage differing by one byte would produce a signature the chain rejects,
which looks exactly like a forgery instead of like our bug.
And the finalise step runs the verifier above before writing the certificate, so a certificate is
never handed over unverified.
## What this does not claim
It does not say the document is true, lawful, or anyone's. It proves that **that** digest existed on
chain at **that** time, under a post-quantum signature, in a block covered by the validator
certificate. What that means legally depends on jurisdiction and is not asserted here.

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{
"format": "aere-pq-notarization/1",
"emis": "2026-08-16",
"documentHash": "0xa4884b64ef64fcb40c1e86f0793061d59452651af9bf9547ddb03e4ea4f38313",
"registry": "0x465d9E3b476BF98Aa1393079e240Db5D2a9bEA6A",
"keyId": 0,
"txHash": "0xb659b94976fb0fa03153e659d7df246d3a6f8bb3f6219ceb80bc3b1910fb9ec1",
"blockNumber": 9200542,
"blockHash": "0xb06db0c81018130672882a751f7eb92c87b953440cbf7d10ef76e21232caff08",
"chainId": 2800,
"anchorBlock": 13014000,
"anchorInterval": 32,
"plainHeaderBytes": 634,
"cum_se_verifica": "node verifica-certificat.mjs acest-fisier.json --fisier documentul-tau [--rpc nodul-tau]",
"nonce": 0
}

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{
"format": "aere-pq-notarization/1",
"emis": "2026-08-16",
"documentHash": "0xa4884b64ef64fcb40c1e86f0793061d59452651af9bf9547ddb03e4ea4f38313",
"registry": "0x465d9E3b476BF98Aa1393079e240Db5D2a9bEA6A",
"keyId": 0,
"txHash": "0xb659b94976fb0fa03153e659d7df246d3a6f8bb3f6219ceb80bc3b1910fb9ec1",
"blockNumber": 9200542,
"blockHash": "0xadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadadad",
"chainId": 2800,
"anchorBlock": 13014000,
"anchorInterval": 32,
"plainHeaderBytes": 634,
"cum_se_verifica": "node verifica-certificat.mjs acest-fisier.json --fisier documentul-tau [--rpc nodul-tau]",
"nonce": 0
}

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{
"format": "aere-pq-notarization/1",
"emis": "2026-08-16",
"documentHash": "0xdededededededededededededededededededededededededededededededede",
"registry": "0x465d9E3b476BF98Aa1393079e240Db5D2a9bEA6A",
"keyId": 0,
"txHash": "0xb659b94976fb0fa03153e659d7df246d3a6f8bb3f6219ceb80bc3b1910fb9ec1",
"blockNumber": 9200542,
"blockHash": "0xb06db0c81018130672882a751f7eb92c87b953440cbf7d10ef76e21232caff08",
"chainId": 2800,
"anchorBlock": 13014000,
"anchorInterval": 32,
"plainHeaderBytes": 634,
"cum_se_verifica": "node verifica-certificat.mjs acest-fisier.json --fisier documentul-tau [--rpc nodul-tau]",
"nonce": 0
}

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{
"format": "aere-pq-notarization/1",
"emis": "2026-08-16",
"documentHash": "0xa4884b64ef64fcb40c1e86f0793061d59452651af9bf9547ddb03e4ea4f38313",
"registry": "0x465d9E3b476BF98Aa1393079e240Db5D2a9bEA6A",
"keyId": 0,
"txHash": "0xb659b94976fb0fa03153e659d7df246d3a6f8bb3f6219ceb80bc3b1910fb9ec1",
"blockNumber": 9200542,
"blockHash": "0xb06db0c81018130672882a751f7eb92c87b953440cbf7d10ef76e21232caff08",
"chainId": 2800,
"anchorBlock": 13014000,
"anchorInterval": 32,
"plainHeaderBytes": 634,
"cum_se_verifica": "node verifica-certificat.mjs acest-fisier.json --fisier documentul-tau [--rpc nodul-tau]",
"nonce": 7
}

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{
"format": "aere-pq-notarization/1",
"emis": "2026-08-16",
"documentHash": "0xa4884b64ef64fcb40c1e86f0793061d59452651af9bf9547ddb03e4ea4f38313",
"registry": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
"keyId": 0,
"txHash": "0xb659b94976fb0fa03153e659d7df246d3a6f8bb3f6219ceb80bc3b1910fb9ec1",
"blockNumber": 9200542,
"blockHash": "0xb06db0c81018130672882a751f7eb92c87b953440cbf7d10ef76e21232caff08",
"chainId": 2800,
"anchorBlock": 13014000,
"anchorInterval": 32,
"plainHeaderBytes": 634,
"cum_se_verifica": "node verifica-certificat.mjs acest-fisier.json --fisier documentul-tau [--rpc nodul-tau]",
"nonce": 0
}

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{
"format": "aere-pq-notarization/1",
"emis": "2026-08-16",
"documentHash": "0xa4884b64ef64fcb40c1e86f0793061d59452651af9bf9547ddb03e4ea4f38313",
"registry": "0x465d9E3b476BF98Aa1393079e240Db5D2a9bEA6A",
"keyId": 0,
"txHash": "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
"blockNumber": 9200542,
"blockHash": "0xb06db0c81018130672882a751f7eb92c87b953440cbf7d10ef76e21232caff08",
"chainId": 2800,
"anchorBlock": 13014000,
"anchorInterval": 32,
"plainHeaderBytes": 634,
"cum_se_verifica": "node verifica-certificat.mjs acest-fisier.json --fisier documentul-tau [--rpc nodul-tau]",
"nonce": 0
}

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#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';
/*
* emite-certificat.mjs - turns a delivered report (or any file) into an anchoring request and,
* once that request has been signed and mined, into a certificate the buyer can verify.
*
* IT NEVER SIGNS ANYTHING, AND THAT IS DELIBERATE. This tool produces an UNSIGNED transaction
* plus the exact instructions to submit it. Signing is a separate act by whoever holds the key,
* in a wallet they control. A notarization service that quietly holds a hot key and signs on your
* behalf has made itself the thing you were supposed to be able to check.
*
* Two steps, and the split is the point:
*
* 1) node emite-certificat.mjs pregateste <fisier> [--out dir]
* Hashes the file, reads the current per-key nonce from the registry, and writes
* cerere-ancorare.json: an unsigned EIP-1559 transaction object plus the challenge that the
* post-quantum signature must cover. Nothing has touched a key.
*
* 2) node emite-certificat.mjs finalizeaza <cerere> --tx 0x<hash> [--out dir]
* After the transaction is mined, reads the receipt and writes certificat.json, the file the
* buyer keeps. Then verifies it end to end by calling verifica-certificat.mjs, so a
* certificate is never handed over unverified.
*
* The post-quantum signature itself is produced by the key holder with their Falcon or ML-DSA key,
* over the challenge printed in step 1. This tool does not want that key and does not ask for it.
*/
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
const REGISTRY = '0x465d9E3b476BF98Aa1393079e240Db5D2a9bEA6A';
const arg = (n, d) => { const i = process.argv.indexOf(n); return i > 0 && i + 1 < process.argv.length ? process.argv[i + 1] : d; };
const RPC = arg('--rpc', 'https://rpc.aere.network');
const OUT = arg('--out', '.');
const CMD = process.argv[2];
async function rpc(method, params) {
const r = await fetch(RPC, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', connection: 'close' },
body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method, params }), signal: AbortSignal.timeout(20000) });
if (!r.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + r.status);
const j = await r.json();
if (j.error) throw new Error(JSON.stringify(j.error));
return j.result;
}
// keccak256, inlined (same implementation the verifier carries, so the two agree by construction)
const RC = [1n,0x8082n,0x800000000000808an,0x8000000080008000n,0x808bn,0x80000001n,0x8000000080008081n,
0x8000000000008009n,0x8an,0x88n,0x80008009n,0x8000000an,0x8000808bn,0x800000000000008bn,0x8000000000008089n,
0x8000000000008003n,0x8000000000008002n,0x8000000000000080n,0x800an,0x800000008000000an,0x8000000080008081n,
0x8000000000008080n,0x80000001n,0x8000000080008008n];
const RR = [0,1,62,28,27,36,44,6,55,20,3,10,43,25,39,41,45,15,21,8,18,2,61,56,14];
const M = (1n << 64n) - 1n;
const rotl = (x, n) => n === 0 ? x : ((x << BigInt(n)) | (x >> BigInt(64 - n))) & M;
function keccakF(A) {
for (let r = 0; r < 24; r++) {
const C = new Array(5);
for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) C[x] = A[x] ^ A[x + 5] ^ A[x + 10] ^ A[x + 15] ^ A[x + 20];
for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) { const D = C[(x + 4) % 5] ^ rotl(C[(x + 1) % 5], 1); for (let y = 0; y < 25; y += 5) A[x + y] ^= D; }
const B = new Array(25);
for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) for (let y = 0; y < 5; y++) B[y + 5 * ((2 * x + 3 * y) % 5)] = rotl(A[x + 5 * y], RR[x + 5 * y]);
for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) for (let y = 0; y < 5; y++) A[x + 5 * y] = B[x + 5 * y] ^ ((~B[(x + 1) % 5 + 5 * y] & M) & B[(x + 2) % 5 + 5 * y]);
A[0] ^= RC[r];
}
return A;
}
function keccak256(bytes) {
const rate = 136;
const pad = new Uint8Array(rate - (bytes.length % rate));
pad[0] = 0x01; pad[pad.length - 1] |= 0x80;
const msg = new Uint8Array(bytes.length + pad.length);
msg.set(bytes); msg.set(pad, bytes.length);
let A = new Array(25).fill(0n);
for (let off = 0; off < msg.length; off += rate) {
for (let i = 0; i < rate / 8; i++) { let w = 0n; for (let b = 7; b >= 0; b--) w = (w << 8n) | BigInt(msg[off + i * 8 + b]); A[i] ^= w; }
A = keccakF(A);
}
const out = new Uint8Array(32);
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) { let w = A[i]; for (let b = 0; b < 8; b++) { out[i * 8 + b] = Number(w & 0xffn); w >>= 8n; } }
return out;
}
const hex = (u8) => '0x' + Array.from(u8).map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
const sel = (sig) => hex(keccak256(new TextEncoder().encode(sig))).slice(0, 10);
const pad32 = (v) => BigInt(v).toString(16).padStart(64, '0');
async function pregateste() {
const fisier = process.argv[3];
if (!fisier || !fs.existsSync(fisier)) { console.error('folosire: node emite-certificat.mjs pregateste <fisier> [--out dir] [--keyId N]'); process.exitCode = 2; return; }
const keyId = Number(arg('--keyId', 0));
const amprenta = hex(keccak256(new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(fisier))));
// the per-key nonce the registry will use, read live: a certificate built against a stale nonce
// would verify as false later, and that failure would look like a forgery instead of a mistake
let nonce = null;
try {
const r = await rpc('eth_call', [{ to: REGISTRY, data: sel('nonceOf(uint256)') + pad32(keyId) }, 'latest']);
if (r && r !== '0x') nonce = Number(BigInt(r));
} catch { /* left null on purpose, and said so below */ }
// The challenge is ASKED OF THE CHAIN, never rebuilt here. The contract exposes
// attestChallenge(keyId, nonce, messageHash), and a local reimplementation of that preimage
// that differs by one byte yields a signature the chain rejects, which looks exactly like a
// forgery instead of like our bug.
let provocare = null;
if (nonce !== null) {
try {
const r = await rpc('eth_call', [{ to: REGISTRY, data: sel('attestChallenge(uint256,uint64,bytes32)') + pad32(keyId) + pad32(nonce) + amprenta.slice(2) }, 'latest']);
if (r && r !== '0x' && !/^0x0*$/.test(r)) provocare = r;
} catch { /* stays null, and the nemasurat field below says so */ }
}
const cerere = {
format: 'aere-pq-anchor-request/1',
fisier: path.basename(fisier), documentHash: amprenta,
registry: REGISTRY, chainId: 2800, keyId, nonce,
provocare_de_semnat_post_cuantic: provocare,
tranzactie_NESEMNATA: {
to: REGISTRY, value: '0x0', chainId: 2800,
data_fara_semnatura: sel('attest(uint256,bytes32,bytes)') + pad32(keyId) + amprenta.slice(2),
nota: 'The calldata above is incomplete on purpose: the ABI tail carrying the post-quantum signature is appended by whoever holds the key. This file never contains a key and never will.',
},
pasii_urmatori: [
'1. Sign the challenge above with your Falcon or ML-DSA key. This tool does not want that key.',
'2. Encode attest(keyId, documentHash, signature) with that signature and submit it from an account you control.',
'3. Run: node emite-certificat.mjs finalizeaza <this file> --tx 0x<hash>',
],
nemasurat: (nonce === null || provocare === null)
? ['The registry did not answer nonceOf(uint256) or attestChallenge(...), so the nonce and therefore the challenge could NOT be computed. Do not sign anything until this reads a number: a signature over the wrong challenge will be rejected on chain and will look like a forgery.']
: [],
};
fs.mkdirSync(OUT, { recursive: true });
const cale = path.join(OUT, 'cerere-ancorare.json');
fs.writeFileSync(cale, JSON.stringify(cerere, null, 2));
console.log('cerere de ancorare pregatita, NIMIC nu a fost semnat');
console.log(' document : ' + path.basename(fisier));
console.log(' amprenta : ' + amprenta);
console.log(' nonce : ' + (nonce === null ? 'NEMASURAT' : nonce));
console.log(' provocare: ' + (provocare === null ? 'NEMASURAT, nu semna nimic pana nu apare aici' : provocare));
console.log(' scris : ' + cale);
if (nonce === null || provocare === null) process.exitCode = 2; return;
}
async function finalizeaza() {
const caleCerere = process.argv[3];
const txHash = arg('--tx', null);
if (!caleCerere || !fs.existsSync(caleCerere) || !txHash) {
console.error('folosire: node emite-certificat.mjs finalizeaza <cerere-ancorare.json> --tx 0x<hash> [--out dir]');
process.exitCode = 2; return;
}
const c = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(caleCerere, 'utf8'));
const rc = await rpc('eth_getTransactionReceipt', [txHash]);
if (!rc) { console.error('tranzactia nu e minata inca sau nu exista pe acest lant'); process.exitCode = 2; return; }
if (rc.status !== '0x1') { console.error('tranzactia a esuat pe lant (status ' + rc.status + '), nu emit certificat'); process.exitCode = 1; return; }
const blk = await rpc('eth_getBlockByNumber', [rc.blockNumber, false]);
const cert = {
format: 'aere-pq-notarization/1', emis: new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10),
documentHash: c.documentHash, registry: c.registry,
keyId: c.keyId, nonce: c.nonce,
txHash, blockNumber: parseInt(rc.blockNumber, 16), blockHash: blk.hash,
chainId: 2800, anchorBlock: 13014000, anchorInterval: 32, plainHeaderBytes: 634,
cum_se_verifica: 'node verifica-certificat.mjs acest-fisier.json --fisier documentul-tau [--rpc nodul-tau]',
};
fs.mkdirSync(OUT, { recursive: true });
const cale = path.join(OUT, 'certificat.json');
fs.writeFileSync(cale, JSON.stringify(cert, null, 2));
console.log('certificat scris: ' + cale);
// A certificate is never handed over unverified: run the public verifier on it right now.
console.log('\n--- verificare imediata, cu chiar unealta pe care o primeste cumparatorul ---');
try {
const out = execFileSync(process.execPath, [path.join(path.dirname(new URL(import.meta.url).pathname.replace(/^\/([A-Za-z]:)/, '$1')), 'verifica-certificat.mjs'), cale, '--rpc', RPC], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 120000 });
console.log(out.split('\n').slice(-8).join('\n'));
} catch (e) {
console.error('VERIFICAREA A ESUAT, certificatul NU se livreaza asa:\n' + String(e.stdout || e.message).split('\n').slice(-8).join('\n'));
process.exitCode = 1; return;
}
}
if (CMD === 'pregateste') await pregateste();
else if (CMD === 'finalizeaza') await finalizeaza();
else { console.error('folosire: node emite-certificat.mjs pregateste <fisier> | finalizeaza <cerere> --tx 0x<hash>'); process.exitCode = 2; }

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#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';
/*
* verifica-certificat.mjs - verifies an AERE post-quantum notarization certificate.
*
* THE POINT OF THIS FILE. A notarization is worth exactly as much as an outsider's ability to
* check it without asking the notary. So this verifier:
* - installs nothing (no npm, no dependencies; the Keccak it needs is inlined below),
* - talks only to a public read endpoint, and accepts a DIFFERENT one via --rpc, so you can
* point it at a node you run yourself and never trust ours,
* - re-derives every link of the chain from the certificate and the public chain, and prints
* each link as PASS, FAIL or NOT MEASURED. NOT MEASURED is never counted as a pass.
*
* WHAT IT CHECKS, and each is a separate claim:
* 1. document the file you hold hashes to the digest the certificate names.
* 2. on chain the transaction named by the certificate exists, succeeded, and called the
* attestation registry the certificate names.
* 3. in the block that transaction sits in the block the certificate names, and the block hash
* served by the chain equals the one in the certificate.
* 4. post-quantum the attestation was recorded only because a NIST post-quantum signature
* verified ON CHAIN, inside the transaction, via a live precompile. Re-checked
* here by calling the registry's own free read method.
* 5. sealed the block carrying it is covered by the chain's post-quantum validator
* certificate, so rewriting that block later needs post-quantum forgeries, not
* just a broken elliptic curve.
*
* Usage:
* node verifica-certificat.mjs certificat.json # checks links 2-5
* node verifica-certificat.mjs certificat.json --fisier a.pdf # also checks link 1
* node verifica-certificat.mjs certificat.json --rpc https://your-own-node
*
* Exit: 0 every measured link passed, 1 something failed, 2 nothing could be measured.
*/
import fs from 'node:fs';
// ---------- Keccak-256, inlined so this file needs nothing installed ----------
const RC = [1n,0x8082n,0x800000000000808an,0x8000000080008000n,0x808bn,0x80000001n,0x8000000080008081n,
0x8000000000008009n,0x8an,0x88n,0x80008009n,0x8000000an,0x8000808bn,0x800000000000008bn,0x8000000000008089n,
0x8000000000008003n,0x8000000000008002n,0x8000000000000080n,0x800an,0x800000008000000an,0x8000000080008081n,
0x8000000000008080n,0x80000001n,0x8000000080008008n];
const R = [0,1,62,28,27,36,44,6,55,20,3,10,43,25,39,41,45,15,21,8,18,2,61,56,14];
const M = (1n << 64n) - 1n;
const rotl = (x, n) => n === 0 ? x : ((x << BigInt(n)) | (x >> BigInt(64 - n))) & M;
function keccakF(A) {
for (let r = 0; r < 24; r++) {
const C = new Array(5);
for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) C[x] = A[x] ^ A[x + 5] ^ A[x + 10] ^ A[x + 15] ^ A[x + 20];
for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) {
const D = C[(x + 4) % 5] ^ rotl(C[(x + 1) % 5], 1);
for (let y = 0; y < 25; y += 5) A[x + y] ^= D;
}
const B = new Array(25);
for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) for (let y = 0; y < 5; y++) B[y + 5 * ((2 * x + 3 * y) % 5)] = rotl(A[x + 5 * y], R[x + 5 * y]);
for (let x = 0; x < 5; x++) for (let y = 0; y < 5; y++) A[x + 5 * y] = B[x + 5 * y] ^ ((~B[(x + 1) % 5 + 5 * y] & M) & B[(x + 2) % 5 + 5 * y]);
A[0] ^= RC[r];
}
return A;
}
function keccak256(bytes) {
const rate = 136;
const pad = new Uint8Array(rate - (bytes.length % rate));
pad[0] = 0x01; pad[pad.length - 1] |= 0x80;
const msg = new Uint8Array(bytes.length + pad.length);
msg.set(bytes); msg.set(pad, bytes.length);
let A = new Array(25).fill(0n);
for (let off = 0; off < msg.length; off += rate) {
for (let i = 0; i < rate / 8; i++) {
let w = 0n;
for (let b = 7; b >= 0; b--) w = (w << 8n) | BigInt(msg[off + i * 8 + b]);
A[i] ^= w;
}
A = keccakF(A);
}
const out = new Uint8Array(32);
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) { let w = A[i]; for (let b = 0; b < 8; b++) { out[i * 8 + b] = Number(w & 0xffn); w >>= 8n; } }
return out;
}
const hex = (u8) => '0x' + Array.from(u8).map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
const octeti = (h) => { const s = String(h || '').replace(/^0x/, ''); const u = new Uint8Array(s.length / 2); for (let i = 0; i < u.length; i++) u[i] = parseInt(s.substr(i * 2, 2), 16); return u; };
// First item of an RLP list, which for a QBFT extraData is vanityData. This is the ONLY field in
// the header that a post-quantum anchor changes and that keccak covers, so it is the field that
// tells an anchored header from a merely seal-heavy one. Byte length alone cannot: attaching
// seals and anchoring a digest are two different switches, and a header can be large because of
// the first while the second never turned on.
function primulElementRLP(u8) {
if (!u8.length) return null;
let i = 0;
const b = u8[0];
if (b >= 0xc0 && b <= 0xf7) i = 1;
else if (b >= 0xf8) i = 1 + (b - 0xf7);
else return null; // not a list
if (i >= u8.length) return null;
const c = u8[i];
if (c <= 0x7f) return u8.slice(i, i + 1);
if (c >= 0x80 && c <= 0xb7) { const n = c - 0x80; return u8.slice(i + 1, i + 1 + n); }
if (c >= 0xb8 && c <= 0xbf) {
const k = c - 0xb7;
let n = 0;
for (let j = 0; j < k; j++) n = n * 256 + u8[i + 1 + j];
return u8.slice(i + 1 + k, i + 1 + k + n);
}
return null; // nested list where a string was expected
}
const areTextASCII = (u8, s) => {
const t = Array.from(u8).map((x) => String.fromCharCode(x)).join('');
return t.includes(s);
};
// ---------- report, three verdicts only ----------
const linii = [];
const PASS = (id, ce, obs) => linii.push({ id, ce, obs, v: 'PASS' });
const FAIL = (id, ce, obs) => linii.push({ id, ce, obs, v: 'FAIL' });
const NM = (id, ce, de_ce) => linii.push({ id, ce, obs: de_ce, v: 'NOT MEASURED' });
const arg = (n, d) => { const i = process.argv.indexOf(n); return i > 0 && i + 1 < process.argv.length ? process.argv[i + 1] : d; };
const CALE = process.argv[2];
const RPC = arg('--rpc', 'https://rpc.aere.network');
const FISIER = arg('--fisier', null);
async function rpc(method, params) {
const r = await fetch(RPC, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', connection: 'close' },
body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method, params }), signal: AbortSignal.timeout(20000) });
if (!r.ok) throw new Error('HTTP ' + r.status);
const j = await r.json();
if (j.error) throw new Error(JSON.stringify(j.error));
return j.result;
}
(async () => {
if (!CALE || !fs.existsSync(CALE)) {
console.error('folosire: node verifica-certificat.mjs certificat.json [--fisier document] [--rpc URL]');
process.exitCode = 2; return;
}
const c = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(CALE, 'utf8'));
console.log('AERE post-quantum notarization, independent verification');
console.log('certificate : ' + CALE);
console.log('read node : ' + RPC + (RPC.includes('aere.network') ? ' (point --rpc at your own node; this check does not need ours)' : ' (not ours: good)'));
console.log('');
// 1. the document itself
if (FISIER) {
if (!fs.existsSync(FISIER)) NM('document', 'the file you hold hashes to the digest in the certificate', 'file not found: ' + FISIER);
else {
const h = hex(keccak256(new Uint8Array(fs.readFileSync(FISIER))));
if (h.toLowerCase() === String(c.documentHash || '').toLowerCase()) PASS('document', 'the file you hold hashes to the digest in the certificate', h);
else FAIL('document', 'the file you hold hashes to the digest in the certificate', 'file is ' + h + ', certificate says ' + c.documentHash);
}
} else NM('document', 'the file you hold hashes to the digest in the certificate', 'no --fisier given, so the document side was not checked');
// 2. the transaction
//
// The distinction below is the whole honesty of this tool. "The node did not answer" and "the
// node answered, and there is no such transaction" are different facts, and only the second one
// is about the certificate. Conflating them means a network problem on our side gets reported to
// the holder as "your certificate is a forgery", which is both false and the worst possible
// failure mode for a notarization product.
let rc = null, tx = null, aRaspuns = false;
try {
[rc, tx] = await Promise.all([rpc('eth_getTransactionReceipt', [c.txHash]), rpc('eth_getTransactionByHash', [c.txHash])]);
aRaspuns = true;
} catch (e) {
NM('on-chain', 'the transaction exists, succeeded, and called the named registry',
'the node did not answer (' + e.message + '), so NOTHING is claimed about this certificate. Try another --rpc, ideally one you operate.');
}
if (aRaspuns && rc && tx) {
const ok = rc.status === '0x1';
const catre = (tx.to || '').toLowerCase() === String(c.registry || '').toLowerCase();
if (ok && catre) PASS('on-chain', 'the transaction exists, succeeded, and called the named registry', c.txHash);
else FAIL('on-chain', 'the transaction exists, succeeded, and called the named registry',
(ok ? '' : 'status not success. ') + (catre ? '' : 'called ' + tx.to + ', certificate names ' + c.registry));
} else if (aRaspuns) {
// The node answered and said there is no such transaction. That IS a statement about the
// certificate, so it is a failure and not an unmeasured line.
FAIL('on-chain', 'the transaction exists, succeeded, and called the named registry',
'the node answered and holds no such transaction on this chain');
}
// 3. the block
if (rc) {
try {
const blk = await rpc('eth_getBlockByNumber', [rc.blockNumber, false]);
const nr = parseInt(rc.blockNumber, 16);
const potrivit = blk && blk.hash.toLowerCase() === String(c.blockHash || '').toLowerCase() && nr === Number(c.blockNumber);
if (potrivit) PASS('in-block', 'the transaction sits in the block the certificate names, and the chain serves the same block hash', 'block ' + nr.toLocaleString('en-US'));
else FAIL('in-block', 'the transaction sits in the block the certificate names', 'chain says block ' + nr + ' hash ' + (blk && blk.hash) + ', certificate says ' + c.blockNumber + ' / ' + c.blockHash);
} catch (e) { NM('in-block', 'the block matches the certificate', e.message); }
}
// 4. the post-quantum signature, re-checked live
try {
// isValidAttestation(uint256 keyId, uint64 nonce, bytes32 messageHash) -> bool. Signature read
// from the contract source, not guessed: the middle argument is uint64, and a wrong ABI here
// reverts in a way that looks exactly like an invalid attestation.
const sel = hex(keccak256(new TextEncoder().encode('isValidAttestation(uint256,uint64,bytes32)'))).slice(0, 10);
const pad = (v) => BigInt(v).toString(16).padStart(64, '0');
const data = sel + pad(c.keyId ?? 0) + pad(c.nonce ?? c.attestationIndex ?? 0) + String(c.documentHash || '').replace(/^0x/, '').padStart(64, '0');
const r = await rpc('eth_call', [{ to: c.registry, data }, 'latest']);
const adevarat = r && /1$/.test(r.replace(/0+$/, '') ) === false ? BigInt(r) === 1n : BigInt(r || '0x0') === 1n;
if (adevarat) PASS('post-quantum', 'the registry still reports this attestation as valid, and it was recorded only because a NIST post-quantum signature verified ON CHAIN inside the transaction', 'isValidAttestation = true');
else FAIL('post-quantum', 'the registry reports this attestation as valid', 'isValidAttestation returned ' + r);
} catch (e) { NM('post-quantum', 'the registry still reports this attestation as valid', 'call failed: ' + e.message); }
// 5. the block is under the chain's post-quantum validator certificate
//
// NOTHING HERE IS A WRITTEN-IN CONSTANT ANY MORE, and that is the point. This check used to
// carry `anchorInterval || 32` and `plainHeaderBytes || 634` as fallbacks, plus a fixed
// "header must exceed base + 600 bytes" threshold. On 2026-08-09 five gates on this chain went
// wrong in one day for exactly that reason: the validator set grew from seven to nine, the
// plain header base moved from 525 to 634, and every gate holding the old number reported a
// perfect fleet or an empty one. So: the schedule comes from the certificate or the link is
// NOT MEASURED, never from yesterday's default; and the plain-header baseline is measured now,
// from a neighbouring non-anchor header on the same chain.
//
// And the discriminator is vanityData, not size. Attaching seals and anchoring a digest are two
// separate switches; a size-only test passes on a fleet where anchoring never started.
if (rc) {
try {
const nr = parseInt(rc.blockNumber, 16);
const ancora = Number(c.anchorInterval), start = Number(c.anchorBlock);
if (!Number.isFinite(ancora) || !Number.isFinite(start) || ancora <= 0) {
NM('sealed', 'the block is covered by the chain post-quantum validator certificate',
'this certificate carries no anchorBlock / anchorInterval, and this check will not fall back to a hard-coded schedule: those numbers change when the validator set changes. Re-issue the certificate with them, or verify the anchor by hand.');
} else {
const urm = nr <= start ? start : start + Math.ceil((nr - start) / ancora) * ancora;
const blk = await rpc('eth_getBlockByNumber', ['0x' + urm.toString(16), false]);
if (!blk) NM('sealed', 'the block is covered by the chain post-quantum validator certificate', 'the covering anchor at ' + urm.toLocaleString('en-US') + ' is not on chain yet; re-run later');
else {
const vanity = primulElementRLP(octeti(blk.extraData));
const oct = (blk.extraData.length - 2) / 2;
// Measured baseline: the header right before the anchor is not an anchor height, so its
// size is what a plain header costs on this chain today.
let de_baza = null;
try {
const vecin = await rpc('eth_getBlockByNumber', ['0x' + (urm - 1).toString(16), false]);
if (vecin) de_baza = (vecin.extraData.length - 2) / 2;
} catch { /* baseline stays unmeasured; the vanityData test below does not need it */ }
const marime = de_baza === null
? 'header ' + oct + ' bytes (plain-header baseline NOT MEASURED: the neighbouring header did not load)'
: 'header ' + oct + ' bytes against a measured plain header of ' + de_baza + ' bytes at ' + (urm - 1).toLocaleString('en-US') + ', so ' + (oct - de_baza) + ' bytes of validator certificate';
if (!vanity) {
NM('sealed', 'the block is covered by the chain post-quantum validator certificate',
'extraData at anchor ' + urm.toLocaleString('en-US') + ' did not decode as an RLP list, so nothing is claimed either way');
} else if (vanity.length === 32 && !areTextASCII(vanity, 'besu')) {
PASS('sealed', 'the anchor at or after this block carries a post-quantum validator certificate whose digest is inside the block hash preimage, so rewriting this block later needs post-quantum forgeries',
'anchor ' + urm.toLocaleString('en-US') + ', vanityData is a 32-byte digest ' + hex(vanity) + '; ' + marime);
} else {
FAIL('sealed', 'the anchor at or after this block carries a post-quantum validator certificate',
'anchor ' + urm.toLocaleString('en-US') + ' carries ordinary vanityData (' + vanity.length + ' bytes' + (areTextASCII(vanity, 'besu') ? ", client string containing 'besu'" : '') + '), not an anchor digest; ' + marime);
}
}
}
} catch (e) { NM('sealed', 'the block is covered by the chain post-quantum validator certificate', e.message); }
}
// ---------- verdict ----------
console.log('');
for (const l of linii) console.log(' [' + l.v.padEnd(12) + '] ' + l.id.padEnd(13) + ' ' + l.ce + '\n' + ' '.repeat(32) + l.obs);
const f = linii.filter((l) => l.v === 'FAIL').length, p = linii.filter((l) => l.v === 'PASS').length, n = linii.filter((l) => l.v === 'NOT MEASURED').length;
console.log('\n PASS=' + p + ' FAIL=' + f + ' NOT MEASURED=' + n);
if (f > 0) { console.log('\nVERDICT: this certificate does NOT hold up. See the FAIL lines above.'); process.exitCode = 1; return; }
if (p === 0) { console.log('\nVERDICT: nothing could be measured. That is not a pass.'); process.exitCode = 2; return; }
console.log('\nVERDICT: every measured link holds. NOT MEASURED lines are not confirmations, and they say why.');
process.exitCode = 0; return;
})().catch((e) => { console.error('ERROR: ' + e.message); process.exitCode = 2; });