// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// FalconQuorum.qnt
//
// FORMAL MODEL of the AERE post-fork Falcon quorum-certificate consensus rule.
//
// Models the DESIGN described in consensus-pqc/QUORUM-DESIGN.md and implemented
// by FalconSealValidationRule (besu-consensus-pqc-quorum.patch):
//
//   * There are N QBFT validators, each holding a Falcon-512 keypair.
//   * When a validator commits a block it ALSO Falcon-signs the same commit hash
//     and gossips the seal (validatorIndex, signature).
//   * A post-fork ("blocking") block is VALID iff its embedded certificate carries
//     >= quorum(N) DISTINCT valid Falcon seals from registered validators over the
//     correct commit hash.  (Java: calculateRequiredValidatorQuorum(N) = ceil(2N/3).)
//   * ECDSA committed seals still govern in parallel; this model isolates the
//     ADDED Falcon-quorum gate — the new safety/liveness surface.
//
// Adversary model (Falcon layer):
//   * An HONEST validator signs at most one block per height and only produces
//     seals that verify -> it can be counted toward at most ONE of two conflicting
//     blocks.
//   * A FALCON-FAULTY validator is one whose seal does NOT count toward an honest
//     quorum: either it emits a signature that fails verification (registry
//     mismatch / crash / correlated impl defect) OR it equivocates.  A faulty
//     node that equivocates CAN place a valid seal on BOTH conflicting blocks
//     (it holds its own key), so it counts toward both.
//
// This is a check of the DESIGN's combinatorics, NOT of the Besu Java code.
// It never asserts anything about mainnet consensus (chain 2800 consensus is
// classical ECDSA QBFT; the Falcon quorum is not activated there).
//
// Besu quorum:  quorum(N) = ceil(2N/3)   (fastDivCeiling(2N,3))
// BFT fault bound: f(N)   = floor((N-1)/3)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
module falcon_quorum {
  // -------- configuration --------
  const N: int   // number of validators (instantiated to 4, 5, 7 below)

  // Besu's quorum:  ceil(2N/3) = floor((2N+2)/3)  for the integers we use.
  pure def quorum(n: int): int = (2 * n + 2) / 3

  // Standard BFT fault bound f = floor((N-1)/3).
  pure def faultBound(n: int): int = (n - 1) / 3

  // Validator index set 0..N-1.
  pure def validators(n: int): Set[int] = 0.to(n - 1)

  // -------- state --------
  // signA / signB : the DISTINCT valid-seal index sets that end up embedded in
  //                 the certificate of two (possibly conflicting) candidate
  //                 blocks A and B at the SAME height.
  // faulty        : the Falcon-faulty validator set chosen by the adversary.
  var signA: Set[int]
  var signB: Set[int]
  var faulty: Set[int]

  val honest: Set[int] = validators(N).exclude(faulty)

  // A block's certificate meets the blocking rule iff it carries >= quorum seals.
  val certifiedA: bool = signA.size() >= quorum(N)
  val certifiedB: bool = signB.size() >= quorum(N)

  // Well-formedness of a certificate assignment under the adversary model:
  //  - every seal index is a real validator;
  //  - an HONEST validator never appears on both conflicting blocks (no equivocation)
  //    and never appears unless it actually signed (captured by membership);
  //  - FAULTY validators may appear on either/both (equivocation allowed).
  val wellFormed: bool =
    signA.subseteq(validators(N)) and
    signB.subseteq(validators(N)) and
    faulty.subseteq(validators(N)) and
    honest.forall(h => not(signA.contains(h) and signB.contains(h)))

  // Are A and B conflicting? Two distinct candidate blocks at one height.
  // We treat them as conflicting whenever both certificates are non-empty and
  // the seal sets differ in a way only possible for two different blocks.
  // For the safety theorem we conservatively assume A != B (distinct blocks).
  val conflicting: bool = true

  // -------- adversary: pick faulty, signA, signB nondeterministically --------
  action init = all {
    nondet fs = validators(N).powerset().oneOf()
    nondet sa = validators(N).powerset().oneOf()
    nondet sb = validators(N).powerset().oneOf()
    all {
      faulty' = fs,
      signA'  = sa,
      signB'  = sb,
    }
  }

  action step = all {
    faulty' = faulty,
    signA'  = signA,
    signB'  = signB,
  }

  // -------- SAFETY --------
  // Under the BFT assumption (<= f faulty), no two conflicting blocks can both
  // reach a Falcon quorum. Honest signers split disjointly; faulty (<= f) may
  // double-sign. So |signA| + |signB| <= |honest| + 2|faulty| = N + |faulty|.
  // Both >= quorum requires 2*quorum <= N + |faulty| <= N + f, which is false
  // for N in {4,5,7}. Hence the AND is impossible => safety.
  val bftAssumption: bool = faulty.size() <= faultBound(N)

  // The invariant to check (must hold in ALL reachable states):
  val safety: bool =
    (wellFormed and bftAssumption and conflicting)
      implies not(certifiedA and certifiedB)

  // Non-vacuity / assumption is load-bearing: DROP the <= f bound and safety CAN
  // break. Apalache REFUTES this and returns a state where > f equivocating
  // faulty validators put valid seals on BOTH conflicting blocks so each reaches
  // quorum. This proves the safety theorem genuinely depends on <= f faults.
  val safetyNoAssumption: bool =
    (wellFormed and conflicting) implies not(certifiedA and certifiedB)

  // -------- LIVENESS / no-halt boundary --------
  // With exactly f Falcon-faulty validators, the honest set (N - f) can still
  // form a quorum.  This is a CONFIG theorem (state-independent): N - f >= Q.
  val livenessAtF: bool = (N - faultBound(N)) >= quorum(N)

  // With f+1 Falcon-faulty validators, the honest set is BELOW quorum, so no
  // post-fork block can be certified -> the chain HALTS. This is exactly why
  // N >= 7 is needed to tolerate 2 faults.
  val haltAtFplus1: bool = (N - (faultBound(N) + 1)) < quorum(N)

  // Sanity invariant that always holds (used by `quint run` to confirm the
  // config theorems for this N):
  val configTheorems: bool = livenessAtF and haltAtFplus1

  // LIVENESS invariant (Apalache VERIFIES this holds): when at most f validators
  // are Falcon-faulty and every honest validator signs the single canonical
  // block A, the block IS certified -> the chain does NOT halt.
  val livenessInv: bool =
    (wellFormed and bftAssumption and signA == honest and signB == Set())
      implies certifiedA

  // HALT WITNESS (Apalache REFUTES this -> prints the counterexample state):
  // this predicate CLAIMS "an (f+1)-fault halt configuration never occurs".
  // Apalache finds it DOES occur: with f+1 faulty and every honest validator
  // signing block A, |honest| = N-(f+1) < quorum, so A is NOT certified.
  // That refuting state is exactly the f+1-fault halt.  This is the reason
  // N>=7 is required to tolerate 2 faults.
  val noHaltAtFplus1: bool =
    not(wellFormed
        and faulty.size() == faultBound(N) + 1
        and signA == honest
        and signB == Set()
        and not(certifiedA))
}

// Concrete instances -----------------------------------------------------------
module n4 { import falcon_quorum(N = 4).* }
module n5 { import falcon_quorum(N = 5).* }
module n7 { import falcon_quorum(N = 7).* }