Dated correction 2026-11-04 to 'since block 24,300,000 (AIP-22 stage 4) every vote counts only with the verified post-quantum seal of its author' and its variants: one path of the second client until 2026-10-31 12:27Z (AIP-22 rule 3, correction of 2026-11-01); dated notes at the top of AIP-4, 7, 9, 13, 22
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> **Note added 2026-10-30.** Stage 5 is active on chain 2800 since block 25,080,000: from it every header, anchors included, is admitted only with an empty ECDSA committed-seals element and a valid Falcon-512 proposer seal in element 6 (section 5), so no header carries an ECDSA signature. Below it every header carried the ECDSA commit quorum, which both clients required on import exactly as upstream does: rule 2 of section 4 was not implemented separately. Since stage 4 a vote counts only with its author's verified post-quantum seal, and a commit still carries the validator's ECDSA commit seal as an additional check (the correction of 2026-10-25 under section 5), so the classical uses that remain are that commit seal, the ECDSA envelope that every consensus message still carries on the wire (no longer naming its author) and the RLPx transport between nodes; the ten validators are run by one operator, and no third party has audited the stages. A node that does not take part in consensus admits a header between anchors on the Falcon-512 seal of its proposer alone, so the post-quantum key of one validator can serve such a node a branch up to the block before the next anchor (below block 25,080,000 that took the ECDSA keys of a quorum), and the next anchor ends it for a node that requires the seals of a quorum in its certificate (the published follower, with its seal ceiling at 1, is not such a node: for it one leaked or misused post-quantum key of a validator makes the rewrite depth unbounded, section 6.4 of the aere-node SPEC). Where the notes above, Motivation item 1 and the "Today" of the per-height bullet in Security Considerations say that headers carry ECDSA commit seals, they describe chain 2800 below that block. Item (4) of the Abstract describes the design; on chain 2800 the ECDSA commit seal of a commit remains a validity criterion, as rule 3 of section 4 and the correction of 2026-10-25 under section 5 say.
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> **Note added 2026-11-04 (to the notes of 2026-10-25 and 2026-10-30 above, and to point 4 of the Motivation).** Their statements that from stage 4, block 24,300,000, every validator on both clients takes the author of a consensus message from its verified post-quantum seal, and that a vote counts only with that seal, had one exception until 2026-10-31 12:27Z: on one path of the second client (the Nethermind-derived one) the author of a proposal was taken at the height named in its payload, so for a payload height below 24,300,000 it was the signer of the ECDSA envelope. Since 2026-10-31 12:27Z that client refuses at decoding a proposal whose block number differs from its payload height. See the correction of 2026-11-01 to rule 3 in section 4. The notes and the Motivation are kept as they were written.
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## Preamble
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| Field | Value |
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@@ -436,6 +438,8 @@ Two refinements to the text above, recorded rather than silently applied: the Me
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- 2026-11-01, the Security Considerations erratum of 2026-10-27, the note of 2026-10-25 at the top of this document, the correction of 2026-10-26 to rule 2 of section 4, and the field `ecdsa` of table 3.2: four dated notes. Two items of that erratum's list of what bounds a peer are withdrawn (deduplication on bytes, and the parenthesis on the future-message buffer, which holds for the Nethermind-derived client only); for a commit, the author is taken in the form of rule 3 of section 4, not only from the post-quantum seal; and the field `ecdsa`, optional in the loader after the switch epoch, is required in fact by both clients. Nothing else changes.
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- 2026-11-04, the notes of 2026-10-25 and 2026-10-30 at the top of this document and point 4 of the Motivation: a dated note says that their statement on vote attribution from stage 4 had one exception on the second client until 2026-10-31 12:27Z, as the correction of 2026-11-01 to rule 3 of section 4 says.
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## Post-Acceptance Outcome Record
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Not accepted; nothing to record.
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