Dated corrections (2026-10-28) from the tenth review round: AIP-7, AIP-10, AIP-13, AIP-15, AIP-16, AIP-20 and AIP-22 and seven research documents; each change states its date in the text (what the anchor certificate is bound by, the consensus note after AIP-22 stage 4, and the denial-of-service paragraph of AIP-20, which no longer claims per-peer limits on pool admission)
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@@ -255,8 +255,15 @@ early is safe.
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ML-DSA signing paths in the reference repository each build their own message and none signs a
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caller-supplied value.
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- **Denial of service.** ML-DSA verification is slower than ECDSA recovery. The cost is paid in gas
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before execution, the pool verifies before storing, and pool admission is subject to the existing
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per-peer limits; the verification cost is bounded and constant per `alg_id`.
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before execution and the pool verifies before storing; the verification cost is bounded and
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constant per `alg_id`. A transaction that fails verification pays no gas, so what bounds it is the
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network layer, and the two clients differ there (measured in their sources on 2026-10-28): the
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primary client bounds the number of transactions and the size of each transactions message, hands
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remote transactions to its pool without the peer that sent them and does not penalise a peer whose
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transactions fail validation, so a peer can make it run one verification per fresh transaction it
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sends; the second client disconnects a peer at the first transaction its validator refuses, which
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is where an invalid type-`0x50` signature is refused. (Corrected 2026-10-28, see Errata: this
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sentence said that pool admission is subject to the existing per-peer limits.)
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- **Transaction size.** Up to 7,219 bytes of authorization per transaction; pool and block size
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accounting count them like calldata (the gas charge above makes the economics explicit).
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- **Signature non-uniqueness.** Hedged ML-DSA signing yields different signatures for the same
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@@ -367,6 +374,12 @@ type-0x50 transaction proposed by the Nethermind-derived validator on chain 2800
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it on all four message types. The second client requires it on commits since block 18,131,633 and applies it to the other
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three message types from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800, as the note of 2026-10-05 under
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"Quantum threat model" states. Corrected in place, dated; nothing else changes.
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- **2026-10-28, Security Considerations, "Denial of service".** The sentence said that pool admission "is subject to the
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existing per-peer limits". Measured in the sources of both clients on that date, the primary client has no per-peer limit
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on transactions: its pool receives remote transactions without the peer that sent them, a peer whose transactions fail
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validation is not penalised, and what is bounded is each transactions message (count and size). The second client
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disconnects a peer at the first transaction its validator refuses. Corrected in place, dated; the transaction format, the
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signing hash and every vector are unchanged.
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## Post-Acceptance Outcome Record
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