Dated corrections (2026-10-28) from the tenth review round: AIP-7, AIP-10, AIP-13, AIP-15, AIP-16, AIP-20 and AIP-22 and seven research documents; each change states its date in the text (what the anchor certificate is bound by, the consensus note after AIP-22 stage 4, and the denial-of-service paragraph of AIP-20, which no longer claims per-peer limits on pool admission)

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Aere Network committed 2026-10-28 12:47:00 +02:00
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@@ -255,8 +255,15 @@ early is safe.
ML-DSA signing paths in the reference repository each build their own message and none signs a
caller-supplied value.
- **Denial of service.** ML-DSA verification is slower than ECDSA recovery. The cost is paid in gas
before execution, the pool verifies before storing, and pool admission is subject to the existing
per-peer limits; the verification cost is bounded and constant per `alg_id`.
before execution and the pool verifies before storing; the verification cost is bounded and
constant per `alg_id`. A transaction that fails verification pays no gas, so what bounds it is the
network layer, and the two clients differ there (measured in their sources on 2026-10-28): the
primary client bounds the number of transactions and the size of each transactions message, hands
remote transactions to its pool without the peer that sent them and does not penalise a peer whose
transactions fail validation, so a peer can make it run one verification per fresh transaction it
sends; the second client disconnects a peer at the first transaction its validator refuses, which
is where an invalid type-`0x50` signature is refused. (Corrected 2026-10-28, see Errata: this
sentence said that pool admission is subject to the existing per-peer limits.)
- **Transaction size.** Up to 7,219 bytes of authorization per transaction; pool and block size
accounting count them like calldata (the gas charge above makes the economics explicit).
- **Signature non-uniqueness.** Hedged ML-DSA signing yields different signatures for the same
@@ -367,6 +374,12 @@ type-0x50 transaction proposed by the Nethermind-derived validator on chain 2800
it on all four message types. The second client requires it on commits since block 18,131,633 and applies it to the other
three message types from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800, as the note of 2026-10-05 under
"Quantum threat model" states. Corrected in place, dated; nothing else changes.
- **2026-10-28, Security Considerations, "Denial of service".** The sentence said that pool admission "is subject to the
existing per-peer limits". Measured in the sources of both clients on that date, the primary client has no per-peer limit
on transactions: its pool receives remote transactions without the peer that sent them, a peer whose transactions fail
validation is not penalised, and what is bounded is each transactions message (count and size). The second client
disconnects a peer at the first transaction its validator refuses. Corrected in place, dated; the transaction format, the
signing hash and every vector are unchanged.
## Post-Acceptance Outcome Record