AIP-22 conformance corpus complete: the ninth kind (classical-only fork, from rehearsal network 28099), all nine kinds judged conformingly by both clients; the options and files each harness judged with, per chain (config-28001/, config-28099/)
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@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ Per block: the hash chain (one keccak of the header, already done), the proposer
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### 9. Cross-client determinism and conformance
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Both clients of chain 2800 MUST: compute the same `id` from the same key; load, hash and refuse the same v3 registries; translate the set identically at `H_id`; order the validator list identically; accept and refuse the same anchors under the same scheme-interval schedule and thresholds; roll back the same provisional tail on the same anchor; verify the same equivocation objects. Conformance vectors are to be published with the reference implementation (none was published at 2026-09-24; from 2026-09-27 the corpus is in `aere-research/aips/aip22-conformance/`, every vector with both clients' verdict, and it holds eight of the nine kinds below, the classical-only fork not yet as a static vector): a v3 registry with rotation, a set translation at a fixed height, a Falcon-only anchor, a hybrid anchor, a short certificate, a certificate with a surplus scheme, a proposer seal, an equivocation pair, a classical-only fork of 31 blocks; each invalid vector is refused by both clients for its stated reason (the lesson of AIP-20: a negative vector differs from the valid one in exactly one field, and the refusal names the field).
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Both clients of chain 2800 MUST: compute the same `id` from the same key; load, hash and refuse the same v3 registries; translate the set identically at `H_id`; order the validator list identically; accept and refuse the same anchors under the same scheme-interval schedule and thresholds; roll back the same provisional tail on the same anchor; verify the same equivocation objects. Conformance vectors are to be published with the reference implementation (none was published at 2026-09-24; from 2026-09-27 the corpus is in `aere-research/aips/aip22-conformance/`: all nine kinds below, every vector with both clients' verdict and the configuration it was judged with, the classical-only fork from the rehearsal network, whose keys alone could make its blocks): a v3 registry with rotation, a set translation at a fixed height, a Falcon-only anchor, a hybrid anchor, a short certificate, a certificate with a surplus scheme, a proposer seal, an equivocation pair, a classical-only fork of 31 blocks; each invalid vector is refused by both clients for its stated reason (the lesson of AIP-20: a negative vector differs from the valid one in exactly one field, and the refusal names the field).
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## Rationale
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@@ -287,6 +287,8 @@ Two refinements to the text above, recorded rather than silently applied: the Me
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**2026-09-27, later the same day, the public verifier's early refusals.** The record above says they still called `process.exit(1)`. They no longer do: measured before the change, an early refusal after a network request exited 127 on Windows in eight of eight runs, so the caller saw neither the chain's verdict nor the tool's; after it, 1 in three of three. Any other uncaught error still ends the run as a failure at once. The published file changed; on it the 21 offline cases pass again, the planted defects of the general negative control and of the proposer-seal proof are each refused, and the stranger runs on both chains are as above.
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**2026-09-27, later the same day, the ninth kind.** The classical-only fork is now a static vector, from the rehearsal network 28099 (the attack of 2026-09-24 recorded above, fork point 2,691, 28 classical-only blocks): the honest anchor at 2,720 (valid); the fork's own block at 2,720, which carries no certificate (invalid, refused because an anchor height carries none); and that block carrying the honest anchor's certificate with the digest re-bound (invalid, refused because the certificate's seal signs `M` of the honest parent and does not verify over the fork's). Both clients admit the first and refuse the other two for the reasons named. Negative controls, each in its own run: with the anchor rule disarmed in the Besu-derived client, both fork blocks are admitted; with the threshold set to zero in the Nethermind-derived client, the fork's block is refused for another reason (its vanity binds no certificate), so the vector no longer conforms. The corpus also carries, per chain, the options and files the harnesses judged with. A header of the fork between anchors is not a vector: the anchor rule does not judge it, and the Nethermind-derived harness refuses to count "not judged" as admitted.
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## Errata
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- 2026-09-24, Backwards Compatibility: the text said that ECDSA-quorum light clients need another path "after `H_fin`". Read in their guest program (`verify_finality` in the QBFT finality crate of the ZK light client), they stop earlier, at `H_id`, because the set they match seals against becomes a list of `id`s there. Corrected in place; nothing else in the section changes.
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