AIP-20: key reuse with the empty ML-DSA context, and a dated correction on consensus enforcement; AIP-22 and README: seals stated as many as the quorum, proving signing, not decision (erratum of 2026-10-01)
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@@ -226,8 +226,23 @@ early is safe.
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## Security Considerations
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- **Quantum threat model.** An account authorized only by ML-DSA has no key recoverable by Shor's
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algorithm. Consensus messages are post-quantum enforced (SPEC 2.6). Node-to-node transport (RLPx)
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remains classical; it authenticates peers, not funds, and is out of scope here.
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algorithm. This protects the account's authorization, not the chain: consensus is outside this AIP.
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Corrected 2026-10-01: an earlier text said here that consensus messages are post-quantum enforced.
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On chain 2800 they are not: blocks are decided by classical ECDSA commit quorums, anchor blocks
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carry post-quantum certificates (AIP-22 stages 1 to 3), and per-commit post-quantum enforcement
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(AIP-22 stage 4) is not active as of that date. Node-to-node transport (RLPx) remains classical; it
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authenticates peers, not funds, and is out of scope here.
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- **Key reuse and the empty context.** The signature covers the 32-byte `signing_hash` with the
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empty FIPS 204 context. A key that authorizes a type-`0x50` account MUST NOT be used by a signer
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that signs caller-supplied 32-byte values with the empty context (a generic "sign this hash"
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interface): such a signer signs, for whoever supplies the value, a type-`0x50` transaction of that
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supplier's choosing. A signer for any other purpose uses a different key, or a non-empty context,
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or signs a message that is itself domain-separated (`@aere/pq-sign` signs the SHA-256 of a fixed
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domain string, the algorithm and the message digest, which cannot equal a `signing_hash` without a
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hash collision). Moving type `0x50` to a non-empty context would change the signing hash of every
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transaction and is a separate, coordinated fork. Added 2026-10-01; measured on that date, the four
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ML-DSA signing paths in the reference repository each build their own message and none signs a
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caller-supplied value.
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- **Denial of service.** ML-DSA verification is slower than ECDSA recovery. The cost is paid in gas
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before execution, the pool verifies before storing, and pool admission is subject to the existing
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per-peer limits; the verification cost is bounded and constant per `alg_id`.
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@@ -332,7 +347,10 @@ type-0x50 transaction proposed by the Nethermind-derived validator on chain 2800
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## Errata
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None.
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- **2026-10-01, Security Considerations.** The sentence "Consensus messages are post-quantum enforced (SPEC 2.6)" was
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false for chain 2800 and is replaced by the corrected text under "Quantum threat model". Added under "Key reuse and the
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empty context": a key that authorizes a type-`0x50` account must not be used by a signer that signs caller-supplied
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32-byte values with the empty context. The transaction format, the signing hash and every vector are unchanged.
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## Post-Acceptance Outcome Record
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