AIP-22 stage 5 live on chain 2800 since block 25,080,000 (2026-10-30): prose, AIPs and dated notes
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> **Note added 2026-10-25.** Stage 4 is active on chain 2800 since block 24,300,000: from it every validator, on both clients, takes the author of a consensus message from its verified post-quantum seal, and the second client's proposal, prepare and round-change layers, named in the notes above as taking effect at stage 4, are in force. Rule 4 of section 4 (the provisional tail and its rollback) is not part of the stage-4 binaries on chain 2800: neither client implements it at this date, a block is final on import as before, and its post-quantum proof is the anchor that covers it; the bound of rule 1 holds because every anchor height must carry a valid certificate. Headers keep their ECDSA commit seals until stage 5.
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> **Note added 2026-10-30.** Stage 5 is active on chain 2800 since block 25,080,000: from it every header, anchors included, is admitted only with an empty ECDSA committed-seals element and a valid Falcon-512 proposer seal in element 6 (section 5), so no header carries an ECDSA signature. Below it every header carried the ECDSA commit quorum, which both clients required on import exactly as upstream does: rule 2 of section 4 was not implemented separately. Since stage 4 a vote counts only with its author's verified post-quantum seal, and a commit still carries the validator's ECDSA commit seal as an additional check (the correction of 2026-10-25 under section 5), so the classical uses that remain are that commit seal, the ECDSA envelope that every consensus message still carries on the wire (no longer naming its author) and the RLPx transport between nodes; the ten validators are run by one operator, and no third party has audited the stages. A node that does not take part in consensus admits a header between anchors on the Falcon-512 seal of its proposer alone, so the post-quantum key of one validator can serve such a node a branch up to the block before the next anchor (below block 25,080,000 that took the ECDSA keys of a quorum), and the next anchor ends it for a node that requires the seals of a quorum in its certificate (the published follower, with its seal ceiling at 1, is not such a node: for it one leaked or misused post-quantum key of a validator makes the rewrite depth unbounded, section 6.4 of the aere-node SPEC). Where the notes above, Motivation item 1 and the "Today" of the per-height bullet in Security Considerations say that headers carry ECDSA commit seals, they describe chain 2800 below that block. Item (4) of the Abstract describes the design; on chain 2800 the ECDSA commit seal of a commit remains a validity criterion, as rule 3 of section 4 and the correction of 2026-10-25 under section 5 say.
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## Preamble
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| Field | Value |
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@@ -58,7 +60,7 @@ What remains classical is exactly what a node that is NOT online, one that syncs
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1. Between two anchors, the header of a block carries only ECDSA commit seals. A syncing node checks those and nothing post-quantum for up to 127 blocks (about 72 seconds at the measured block period). Its post-quantum assurance for those blocks arrives only with the next anchor, and the anchor's certificate is bound to the parent hash, so the assurance is real but delayed, and it is not stated as a rule anywhere.
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2. The certificate threshold is six of ten (schedule step `14961456:6`), which is f + 3 at N = 10 and below the QBFT quorum of seven (recorded in the repository's findings register on 2026-09-11). A hostile reader is right to say: the certificate proves that six validators signed, it does not prove that consensus was reached.
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3. Validator identity is an ECDSA address: the validator list in `extraData`, the proposer rotation, the `coinbase`, the vote recipient, the registry's `claim`, and the peer-forwarding predicate of the Besu-derived client (it forwards Istanbul messages only to peers whose node-key address is in the set, measured 2026-09-02) all name secp256k1 keys. The Falcon registry binds an index to that address; the address itself is classical.
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4. The ECDSA signature of every consensus message and the ECDSA commit seals in every header are still validity criteria. The live security is therefore "ECDSA AND Falcon" for an online node, which is stronger than either alone, and "ECDSA, then Falcon at the next anchor" for a syncing one. (Corrected 2026-10-09: on the second client "ECDSA AND Falcon" holds for commits; it counts proposal, prepare and round-change messages by their ECDSA author until stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800. See Errata.)
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4. The ECDSA signature of every consensus message named its author until stage 4 below (its form is still judged by both clients, though not its author: the note of 2026-10-27 under section 5), and the ECDSA commit seals in every header were a validity criterion until stage 5; until then the live security was "ECDSA AND Falcon" for an online node, which is stronger than either alone, and "ECDSA, then Falcon at the next anchor" for a syncing one. (On chain 2800 the ECDSA signature of a consensus message stopped naming its author at stage 4 below, block 24,300,000, from which a vote counts only with its author's verified post-quantum seal; a commit still needs both its ECDSA commit seal and that post-quantum seal, so for commits the live security is still "ECDSA AND post-quantum". The ECDSA commit quorum in the header stayed a validity criterion, applied by both clients exactly as before, until stage 5, block 25,080,000, 2026-10-30, from which no header carries an ECDSA signature; rule 2 of section 4 was not implemented separately.) (Corrected 2026-10-09: on the second client "ECDSA AND Falcon" holds for commits; it counts proposal, prepare and round-change messages by their ECDSA author until stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800. See Errata.)
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The Foundation's stated goal, restated on 2026-09-22, is a consensus whose safety and finality do not depend on ECDSA at all. This AIP is the path from the measured state above to that goal, with the cost of each step in bytes, disk, bandwidth and latency, and with the founder decisions it needs named.
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@@ -194,7 +196,7 @@ From `H_fin` (a height at or above `H_id`), on every node that validates or read
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### 5. ECDSA out of the header
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From `H_hdr` (at or above `H_fin`), `extraData` gains element 6, `proposerSeal = [index, signature]`, a Falcon-512 seal by the proposer over the message the proposal already signs, `keccak256(RLP["AERE-PQ-PROPOSAL-1", chainId, height, round, proposalDigest])`, where `proposalDigest` is the QBFT proposal digest recomputable from the stored header (the round is element 3 of the stored `extraData`; the digest is the `EXCLUDE_COMMIT_SEALS` encoding hash, SPEC 2.3). Element 6 is outside both hashes (like the commit seals and the certificate) and subject to the strict codec; when it is present, element 5 is present too, an empty list where the header carries no certificate, so position alone says which element is which (a six-element header whose element 5 is an empty list is not canonical and is refused). From `H_hdr` every header, anchors included, is admitted iff its ECDSA committed seals element is empty and the proposer seal verifies, over the round in element 3, for the `coinbase` `id` at that height or, when that round is above zero, for the `id` of the proposer of that round (the proposer rotation computed from the parent's `coinbase` and the header's validator list); the round in element 3 is at most 1024 (no honest round gets near it, the round timer doubling each round), and, the parent being known, the `coinbase` is the proposer of some round from 0 to the round in element 3, that is, the block's builder; an anchor is judged by the anchor rule as well. The second case is the block prepared in one round and re-proposed unchanged in a later one: QBFT keeps the locked block, so its `coinbase` stays its builder's, and the accepted proposal, whose seal every node writes, is the later round's proposer's. (Corrected 2026-09-25: the text until then named the `coinbase` only, both clients implemented it so, and on testnet 28001 block 3,314,873, prepared at round 0 under load, was re-proposed at rounds 1 to 4 and refused by every node each time, 128 s, until round 5 was its builder's turn again; at N = 10 that wait is ten rounds, and with the builder down after the prepare it does not end.) Cost: +663 B and -455 B (7 x 65) per block at N = 10, net +208 B, that is **+11.6 GB per node per year** (208 x 55,854,159 / 10^9). After `H_hdr` no ECDSA signature appears in any header or is examined in any consensus message; the last classical use is the RLPx transport.
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From `H_hdr` (at or above `H_fin`), `extraData` gains element 6, `proposerSeal = [index, signature]`, a Falcon-512 seal by the proposer over the message the proposal already signs, `keccak256(RLP["AERE-PQ-PROPOSAL-1", chainId, height, round, proposalDigest])`, where `proposalDigest` is the QBFT proposal digest recomputable from the stored header (the round is element 3 of the stored `extraData`; the digest is the `EXCLUDE_COMMIT_SEALS` encoding hash, SPEC 2.3). Element 6 is outside both hashes (like the commit seals and the certificate) and subject to the strict codec; when it is present, element 5 is present too, an empty list where the header carries no certificate, so position alone says which element is which (a six-element header whose element 5 is an empty list is not canonical and is refused). From `H_hdr` every header, anchors included, is admitted iff its ECDSA committed seals element is empty and the proposer seal verifies, over the round in element 3, for the `coinbase` `id` at that height or, when that round is above zero, for the `id` of the proposer of that round (the proposer rotation computed from the parent's `coinbase` and the header's validator list); the round in element 3 is at most 1024 (no honest round gets near it, the round timer doubling each round), and, the parent being known, the `coinbase` is the proposer of some round from 0 to the round in element 3, that is, the block's builder; an anchor is judged by the anchor rule as well. The second case is the block prepared in one round and re-proposed unchanged in a later one: QBFT keeps the locked block, so its `coinbase` stays its builder's, and the accepted proposal, whose seal every node writes, is the later round's proposer's. (Corrected 2026-09-25: the text until then named the `coinbase` only, both clients implemented it so, and on testnet 28001 block 3,314,873, prepared at round 0 under load, was re-proposed at rounds 1 to 4 and refused by every node each time, 128 s, until round 5 was its builder's turn again; at N = 10 that wait is ten rounds, and with the builder down after the prepare it does not end.) Cost: +663 B and -455 B (7 x 65) per block at N = 10, net +208 B, that is **+11.6 GB per node per year** (208 x 55,854,159 / 10^9). After `H_hdr` no ECDSA signature appears in any header, and none decides who authored a consensus vote (that holds from `H_fin`); ECDSA remains on the envelope of every consensus message, whose form both clients still judge (note of 2026-10-27 under this section), and in the commit seal that a commit message still carries as an additional check, until stage E (section 10) replaces it; the RLPx transport stays classical. (Sentence corrected on 2026-10-31: until that day it also excluded ECDSA from the consensus messages, which is the work of stage E, not of this stage.)
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**Correction added 2026-10-25 (to the last sentence of the paragraph above).** After `H_hdr` no header carries an ECDSA signature, but one consensus message still does: a commit carries the validator's ECDSA commit seal, and both clients refuse a commit whose commit seal does not recover to its author, at every height, `H_hdr` included (the Besu-derived client in `AereVoteCounts.java`, the Nethermind-derived client in `AereVoteCounts.cs`), as rule 3 of section 4 says ("a commit's author is its index's `id` only when that `id` is the commit seal signer's"). A vote counts only with its author's verified post-quantum seal, and a commit still carries the validator's ECDSA commit seal as an additional check: forging a vote needs the post-quantum key, and the ECDSA key alone does not make a vote count. The classical uses after `H_hdr` are therefore that commit seal, as an additional check, and the RLPx transport. The sentence above is kept as it was written.
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