AIP-20, AIP-22, README: message-layer enforcement stated per client (corrected 2026-10-09): every validator refuses a commit without a post-quantum seal, the nine primary-client validators any consensus message since block 17,700,000; the second client enforces commits since 18,131,633 and the other three types from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800; dated notes and an Errata entry, nothing removed

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@@ -36,9 +36,14 @@ chain 2800 only through a founder-signed acceptance of this AIP (AIP-19 process)
Every externally owned account on chain 2800 is authorized today by a secp256k1 ECDSA signature,
whose security rests on the discrete logarithm problem, broken by Shor's algorithm. The chain's
consensus already requires post-quantum seals on every QBFT message (SPEC section 2.6, in force
since block 17,700,000) and binds every 128th block under a hybrid Falcon-512 + SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s
certificate; the accounts of users are the remaining classical layer.
consensus already requires a post-quantum seal beside the classical signature on every commit at
every validator (at the tenth since block 18,131,633), and on every QBFT message at the nine
validators that run the primary, Besu-derived client (SPEC section 2.6, since block 17,700,000); the
second, Nethermind-derived client applies the rule to proposal, prepare and round-change messages
from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800. Consensus also binds every 128th
block under a hybrid Falcon-512 + SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s certificate; the accounts of users are the
remaining classical layer. (Corrected 2026-10-09: until that date this paragraph said that consensus
requires "post-quantum seals on every QBFT message", without naming the second client.)
Post-quantum contract accounts exist on 2800 (`AerePQCTxAccount`, `HybridAuthorizer`, the ERC-4337
threshold account), but they are second-class: the transaction that carries the post-quantum
@@ -357,6 +362,11 @@ type-0x50 transaction proposed by the Nethermind-derived validator on chain 2800
false for chain 2800 and is replaced by the corrected text under "Quantum threat model". Added under "Key reuse and the
empty context": a key that authorizes a type-`0x50` account must not be used by a signer that signs caller-supplied
32-byte values with the empty context. The transaction format, the signing hash and every vector are unchanged.
- **2026-10-09, Motivation.** The sentence said that consensus requires post-quantum seals "on every QBFT message" since
block 17,700,000. Every validator requires the seal on commits, and the nine validators that run the primary client require
it on all four message types. The second client requires it on commits since block 18,131,633 and applies it to the other
three message types from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800, as the note of 2026-10-05 under
"Quantum threat model" states. Corrected in place, dated; nothing else changes.
## Post-Acceptance Outcome Record