AIP-20, AIP-22, README: message-layer enforcement stated per client (corrected 2026-10-09): every validator refuses a commit without a post-quantum seal, the nine primary-client validators any consensus message since block 17,700,000; the second client enforces commits since 18,131,633 and the other three types from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800; dated notes and an Errata entry, nothing removed
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@@ -36,9 +36,14 @@ chain 2800 only through a founder-signed acceptance of this AIP (AIP-19 process)
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Every externally owned account on chain 2800 is authorized today by a secp256k1 ECDSA signature,
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whose security rests on the discrete logarithm problem, broken by Shor's algorithm. The chain's
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consensus already requires post-quantum seals on every QBFT message (SPEC section 2.6, in force
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since block 17,700,000) and binds every 128th block under a hybrid Falcon-512 + SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s
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certificate; the accounts of users are the remaining classical layer.
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consensus already requires a post-quantum seal beside the classical signature on every commit at
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every validator (at the tenth since block 18,131,633), and on every QBFT message at the nine
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validators that run the primary, Besu-derived client (SPEC section 2.6, since block 17,700,000); the
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second, Nethermind-derived client applies the rule to proposal, prepare and round-change messages
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from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800. Consensus also binds every 128th
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block under a hybrid Falcon-512 + SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s certificate; the accounts of users are the
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remaining classical layer. (Corrected 2026-10-09: until that date this paragraph said that consensus
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requires "post-quantum seals on every QBFT message", without naming the second client.)
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Post-quantum contract accounts exist on 2800 (`AerePQCTxAccount`, `HybridAuthorizer`, the ERC-4337
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threshold account), but they are second-class: the transaction that carries the post-quantum
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@@ -357,6 +362,11 @@ type-0x50 transaction proposed by the Nethermind-derived validator on chain 2800
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false for chain 2800 and is replaced by the corrected text under "Quantum threat model". Added under "Key reuse and the
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empty context": a key that authorizes a type-`0x50` account must not be used by a signer that signs caller-supplied
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32-byte values with the empty context. The transaction format, the signing hash and every vector are unchanged.
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- **2026-10-09, Motivation.** The sentence said that consensus requires post-quantum seals "on every QBFT message" since
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block 17,700,000. Every validator requires the seal on commits, and the nine validators that run the primary client require
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it on all four message types. The second client requires it on commits since block 18,131,633 and applies it to the other
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three message types from AIP-22 stage 4, whose height is not yet set on chain 2800, as the note of 2026-10-05 under
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"Quantum threat model" states. Corrected in place, dated; nothing else changes.
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## Post-Acceptance Outcome Record
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