AIP-22 stage R and stage 4 in force on chain 2800 (2026-10-24, 2026-10-25): dated corrections to the README, pq-stark README and AIP index (votes attributed only through verified post-quantum seals since block 24,300,000; headers still admitted on ECDSA commit seals until stage 5), AIP-1 and CONTRIBUTING editorial rules corrected with their date, AIP-22 dated correction to rule 2 of section 4, AIP-3 interval dated
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@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ From `H_fin` (a height at or above `H_id`), on every node that validates or read
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5. **Weak subjectivity, named.** A node that syncs from genesis with no other knowledge can be served, by an eclipsing peer, a fork that ends before the first enforced anchor (block 13,034,000, where the certificate schedule first required a seal); such a fork can never carry a later certificate and so can never reach the height of the honest chain, but an eclipsed node does not know that height. A syncing node therefore SHOULD be given a recent anchor (height and hash) out of band, from the published registry epoch or from the operator, and MUST refuse to consider a chain canonical that does not reach it with valid certificates. This is the same requirement every finality-gadget chain has, and it is the honest replacement for the statement "history below H is protected by ECDSA only": with the checkpoint, a rewrite at any height, including below 13,014,000, would have to reproduce every certificate above it, and the strongest of those requires Q post-quantum keys.
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6. **Fallback and crypto-agility.** The schemes required at an anchor are named by the scheme-interval schedule, by height; the keys are bound by the registry epoch, by height; the on-chain scheme registry (`CryptoRegistry`, AIP-4 and AIP-7) names what verifiers exist. Retiring a scheme, adding one (ML-DSA-65 keys would be a founder ceremony: new keys), or changing an interval is a schedule step at a future height on every node that judges headers, the procedure the fleet has executed for the base-fee floor, the seal threshold, the hybrid, the interval and the four message layers. Because the hybrid rule is a conjunction, a scheme that is *broken* does not weaken the certificate (the adversary still needs the other); a scheme whose *implementation* stops producing seals halts anchors, and the answer is a uniform schedule step or the existing uniform emergency options, never a single node's setting.
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**Correction added 2026-10-26 (to rule 2 above).** On chain 2800 since block 24,300,000 both clients still apply the upstream rule to every header below `H_hdr`: it must carry at least Q ECDSA committed seals of one round of the parent's set, and a header that does not is refused (the Besu-derived client through `PqHeaderSealRule`, which below `H_hdr` is the upstream `BftCommitSealsValidationRule`; the Nethermind-derived client in `QbftHeaderValidator`). This is the admission filter that the second sentence of rule 2 allows until section 5, and its failure is a refusal, so in effect it is still a validity criterion: the first sentence of rule 2 ("is no longer applied to headers at or above `H_fin`") does not describe the stage-4 binaries. Because rule 4 is not implemented either (note of 2026-10-25 at the top of this document), a header admitted on those seals is final on import, as before; its post-quantum proof is the anchor that covers it. What `H_fin` changed is rule 3: the author of every consensus message is taken only from its verified post-quantum seal, on both clients and all four message types. Rule 2 above is kept as it was written.
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### 5. ECDSA out of the header
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From `H_hdr` (at or above `H_fin`), `extraData` gains element 6, `proposerSeal = [index, signature]`, a Falcon-512 seal by the proposer over the message the proposal already signs, `keccak256(RLP["AERE-PQ-PROPOSAL-1", chainId, height, round, proposalDigest])`, where `proposalDigest` is the QBFT proposal digest recomputable from the stored header (the round is element 3 of the stored `extraData`; the digest is the `EXCLUDE_COMMIT_SEALS` encoding hash, SPEC 2.3). Element 6 is outside both hashes (like the commit seals and the certificate) and subject to the strict codec; when it is present, element 5 is present too, an empty list where the header carries no certificate, so position alone says which element is which (a six-element header whose element 5 is an empty list is not canonical and is refused). From `H_hdr` every header, anchors included, is admitted iff its ECDSA committed seals element is empty and the proposer seal verifies, over the round in element 3, for the `coinbase` `id` at that height or, when that round is above zero, for the `id` of the proposer of that round (the proposer rotation computed from the parent's `coinbase` and the header's validator list); the round in element 3 is at most 1024 (no honest round gets near it, the round timer doubling each round), and, the parent being known, the `coinbase` is the proposer of some round from 0 to the round in element 3, that is, the block's builder; an anchor is judged by the anchor rule as well. The second case is the block prepared in one round and re-proposed unchanged in a later one: QBFT keeps the locked block, so its `coinbase` stays its builder's, and the accepted proposal, whose seal every node writes, is the later round's proposer's. (Corrected 2026-09-25: the text until then named the `coinbase` only, both clients implemented it so, and on testnet 28001 block 3,314,873, prepared at round 0 under load, was re-proposed at rounds 1 to 4 and refused by every node each time, 128 s, until round 5 was its builder's turn again; at N = 10 that wait is ten rounds, and with the builder down after the prepare it does not end.) Cost: +663 B and -455 B (7 x 65) per block at N = 10, net +208 B, that is **+11.6 GB per node per year** (208 x 55,854,159 / 10^9). After `H_hdr` no ECDSA signature appears in any header or is examined in any consensus message; the last classical use is the RLPx transport.
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