Before, it was the digest of the whole presentation object, so an unsigned top-level field added by anyone changed it without
changing anything signed, and the digest did not name one presentation. The binding names, by hash, the whole credential, the
disclosures, the delegation chain, the audience, the nonce and the time; the signature is left out (ML-DSA signs with randomness,
so one binding can carry many valid signatures).
Tests: compliance 15/15, negative control 14/14.
A credential issued on a machine whose clock was one second ahead was "not yet valid" at a verifier synchronized by NTP: measured on
2026-09-30 through the Aere Cloud identity route, the first time a credential was issued on one machine and judged on another.
Starts (a credential's and a status list's validFrom, a delegation's notBefore) are now accepted up to 60 s in the verifier's future
(verifyPresentation clockSkewS, 0..600); a revocation dated up to 60 s ahead already applies; ends (validUntil, notAfter) get no
allowance, since that would extend a validity.
Tests: identity 44/44, negative control 49/49.
- verify: --at <RFC 3339 UTC> judges on that clock (the verifier's clock in any case), so a verdict given at one moment can be checked
again later with the same result; a broken --trust-issuer or --max-age exits 2 with the reason instead of failing without a verdict;
the JSON result names the subject (type, credential, issuer, holder, presenter, delegations) when no check failed
- comply: --json [--with-record] prints the result and the record in one object; with --at the record's time is the same, so the same
command gives the same record byte for byte; a refused policy exits 2 with its reason
- Aere Cloud runs this command line unmodified behind POST /v1/identity/verify and POST /v1/compliance/check
Tests: identity 43/43, negative control 46/46.
- verify-consistency without --signer now says whether each head is signed and by which key, and that no expected signer was
checked (verify-inclusion already did; the README said the output does)
- openMessage opens nothing without a replay store (seen: an object with has/add that keeps the ids for at least maxAgeS);
before, the same signed and sealed message could be opened any number of times when no store was given
Tests: verify-layer tree 20/20, negative control 14/14; sidecar 44/44, 9/9; travel rule 19/19, negative control 19/19.
