crypto-inventory 0.3.0: glob imports resolved, libcrux and spqr, libsignal KEM key pairs; control-plane: a key agreement or client-side TLS called by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway (planner 35/35, B1 negative control 4/4)
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@@ -15,6 +15,15 @@ documentation are in English (the data format was translated on 2026-09-29, vers
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Runs the inventory on a code directory and, optionally, takes a scan of a hostname (the JSON of the readiness scanner), and writes a
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prioritized plan. Every quantum-vulnerable asset becomes an action:
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Since 2026-10-18 (first run on a code base that is not ours, a Rust messenger): a key agreement that the
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application calls itself (X25519 in a ratchet, a PQXDH handshake, a Tor `ntor` handshake, `createECDH` in
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Node) is **not** routed to the PQ Gateway, because a TLS edge cannot see it; its action is `manual`, in
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code, with the hybrid target written out (X25519 + ML-KEM-768 in the same handshake and key schedule). A
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signature or public-key encryption that the application performs itself keeps its PKI/KMS action (the
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product issues the hybrid key, for real), and `how` says that the call site must then be changed to use it.
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Only a finding with no call context (no `api`, no language) keeps the old routing: its context is not
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known, so it is not guessed. The inventory's TLS configuration findings still go to the gateway.
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{ ref, asset, problem, current, target, method: "auto-aere" | "manual" | "blocked", product: "gateway" | "kms" | "pki" | null,
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how, cn?, primitive?, urgency: "CRITICAL" | "HIGH" | "MEDIUM" | "LOW", blocker, location, source }
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