exposure-report: the quantum exposure report for Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses (three declared modes, two labels, named evidence, AIP-23 compliance envelope); README: the dependency exception and the measured test rows

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# Aere Quantum
Self-hosted post-quantum infrastructure from Aere Network. Each component is a few files with **no dependencies**: Node.js 24
and the OpenSSL 3.5 it ships with (`node:crypto`), nothing from a package registry. The two exceptions need `ethers`: the
notarization command of the verification layer, and the agents' x402 wallet (EIP-712 and secp256k1).
and the OpenSSL 3.5 it ships with (`node:crypto`), nothing from a package registry. The exceptions: `ethers` for the
notarization command of the verification layer and for the agents' x402 wallet (EIP-712 and secp256k1); `@noble/hashes` and
`@noble/curves` 1.x for the exposure report (keccak-256, RIPEMD-160, secp256k1 public-key recovery).
| component | what it does |
|---|---|
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ notarization command of the verification layer, and the agents' x402 wallet (EIP
| [`conformance/`](conformance/) | a conformance suite for the AIP-23 proof kinds: one verdict form over the verifiers published here (four levels: integrity, authenticity, anchoring, finality; each passed, failed or not measured, with the named rule), 181 rules of eleven verifiers read from their code (the presentation verifier of identity/ and the device verifier of device-identity/ among them since 2026-10-05), 422 vectors derived from the producers and from evidence recorded on testnet 28001 (each invalid one is one operation away from one that is not, or one change at its producer, and must be refused for exactly its named rules), and a runner that scores any implementation given as a command, in any language; a second implementation in Python covers 6 of the 181 rules. Not a certification and not an audit |
| [`identity/`](identity/) | post-quantum credentials: an issuer signs claims (hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both required), the holder shows only the claims it picks (selective disclosure in the manner of SD-JWT, RFC 9901, in a format of its own), bound to the verifier's audience and nonce; delegation to a phone, an agent or a ten-minute session key that can only narrow; revocation and an issuer status list in the manner of W3C Bitstring Status List; all checked offline from the files; and compliance without surveillance: a verifier's policy (issuers, required claims) judged on a presentation, recorded as an AIP-23 envelope that carries no personal data; and the Travel Rule between VASPs, the IVMS101 data sealed for the receiving VASP with a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation, signed, bound to the transfer and acknowledged; and the same credentials as standard SD-JWT (IETF RFC 9901): issued with the issuer's Ed25519 key (EdDSA) or its ML-DSA-65 key, presented with a key binding JWT, and verified against the RFC's own example vectors (`identity-cli.mjs verify-sdjwt`, behind Aere Cloud's POST /v1/identity/sd-jwt/verify) |
| [`device-identity/`](device-identity/) | what a machine is, as a chain of signed statements checked offline: the manufacturer's credential for the device key (the manufacturer and the owners sign hybrid, Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both required; the device key is ML-DSA-65), a firmware release with a floor and retractions (a rolled-back or retracted firmware is refused), ownership by transfers each signed by the owner before, the current owner's authorization, a status registry in which the manufacturer's retirement is final and an owner's lasts as long as its ownership (after a sale the records of the previous owner are named and not applied: a seller could date one before the sale after it; a retirement by an owner that survives a sale needs a witness of time that is not built), and the device's fresh attestation to the verifier's nonce, with an AIP-23 envelope that can be notarized and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; one verifier makes every check it can reach, names every rule that refused and says VALID, PARTIAL (what it was not handed, or could not read) or INVALID. The device key is a software key: no TPM, secure element or TEE is used or checked, and the README says what that leaves open |
| [`exposure-report/`](exposure-report/) | classifies Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses by whether their public key is already readable from chain data, in three declared modes (offline, by address or script type only; through your own Electrum server, Esplora index, Bitcoin Core or Ethereum JSON-RPC, one declared target; through a third-party provider only with written consent, recorded in the report), with exactly two labels ("exposed (on-chain evidence)", "no on-chain evidence of exposure") and "unmeasured" when the reading did not happen, the evidence named for each address, and a dated report (JSON, Markdown, an AIP-23 `compliance` envelope that binds the JSON). It records what was readable on the date of the report: it does not protect, move or recover any coins, it does not change what a spend reveals, and it says nothing about the future. The one component with npm dependencies (`@noble/hashes`, `@noble/curves` 1.x: `npm install --ignore-scripts` in its directory) |
Each component's README says what it is **not** and what is **not measured**. No third party has reviewed any of them.
@@ -51,6 +53,7 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
| ai-trust | 16/16 with the AIP-23 verifier, measured 2026-10-05 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs`: the whole chain on a committed fixture, then thirteen bundles broken on purpose, each refused for its named reason, among them an agent with a classical key and an audit head signed with one); without the verifier it exits 2 | 11/11 (`node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs --control-negativ`) |
| conformance | 11/11 on 2026-10-05 with the AIP-23 verifier, Python 3 and testnet 28001 read (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: the rules and the vectors are what the code derives, every rule has a vector, every invalid vector is one operation from its base or one declared change at its producer, the published verifiers pass 422/422, an independent Python implementation passes the 62 it claims and the other 360 are reported not covered, 70,358 malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each get a verdict); without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2 | 181/181 rules (`node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: each rule planted out of its verifier in a copy; the vectors that expect it, and only they, must fail), then 76/76 conditions of the device verifier's compound checks, each planted out alone (exactly the vectors written for it must fail), then six controls of the instruments |
| device-identity | 175/175 with the AIP-23 verifier, measured 2026-10-05 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-device.mjs`: twenty-two bundles that must be VALID; thirty-three with something not brought, not read or not readable, each PARTIAL for its named causes; one hundred and six attack rows, each refused for exactly its named rules, among them a clone with another key, a rolled-back firmware, a previous owner that still signs, an owner's retirement written under no ownership head, a replayed attestation, an attestation dated ahead of the verifier's clock, a manufacturer the verifier does not trust, a retirement, a classical key under the ML-DSA-65 name, a signature in another base64 text; 804 damaged bundles each given a verdict; the command line through files only; the evidence recorded on testnet 28001 judged again offline); without the verifier 174 run, one is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2; the chain as witness 10/10 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-05, before the repairs of that day (`proba-device-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier; not run again since: the bundles and readings it recorded give the same verdicts under the verifier of now) | 139/139 (`node control-negativ-device.mjs`: the untouched copy green; each of the 47 rules taken out of a copy, the rows that expect it, and only they, go red; 91 more plantings, most of them one condition of a compound check taken out alone, each with its rows) |
| exposure-report | 164 passed and 1 `NEMASURAT` of 165 rows in the AERE development tree on 2026-10-14 (`node proba-expunere.mjs`: codec checks with real public vectors, mode 1 and mode 2 through four mock targets that serve recorded responses, the network guard's proof that in modes 1 and 2 nothing leaves the machine, the language gate, the AIP-23 `compliance` envelopes judged by the reference verifier; the `NEMASURAT` row is mode 3 against a real provider, which would send addresses to a third party); in this copy, after `npm install --ignore-scripts` in its directory: 153 passed, 0 red, 0 broken, 12 `NEMASURAT` with the reason (the rows compared with the AIP-23 verifier, the anchor verifier's RLP encoder and MPT walker and the shield's header pins, none of which is in this repository: with `AERE_PROOF_PROTOCOL_VERIFY`, `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF` and `AERE_EXPUNERE_PINI` naming them the rows run, 162 passed and 3 `NEMASURAT`; the scan of the directory for names from the AERE host inventory; the git-ignore row outside a git tree); the exit code is 0 unless a row is red or broken | inside the test, 2026-10-14: each rule has its reverse planting in a copy of the tool (a foreign provider planted on each network path is caught, a label planted in the language gate is refused, each classification rule taken out turns its row red, a `@noble/curves` 2.x planted first is passed over and alone is named as missing), and the recorded fixtures are judged against their declared date |
Code comments, most function and variable names (also many exported between the files of a component), test names and control
messages are in Romanian, and so are the two command words of the KMS HSM tool (explained in its README). Error codes, error
@@ -59,4 +62,4 @@ interface, command line and data (`definePolicy`, `verifyLedger`, `approve`, ...
## Licence
MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 682 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 42, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 19, agents 39, identity 15, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 479, device-identity 11, readiness 4).
MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 700 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 42, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 19, agents 39, identity 15, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 479, device-identity 11, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).