identity: the Travel Rule and compliance-policy verifiers name their rules; a missing originator id or nonce is now a refusal in acceptBeneficiary; conformance: Travel Rule and compliance presentations enrolled (239 rules, 15 verifiers, 21 kinds, 619 vectors), nothing of identity left out
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@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
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## What is enrolled
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 213 rules of 13 verifiers, 17 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-18; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before the SD-JWT verifiers were enrolled). By level: 170 rules are reported at
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`integrity`, 40 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at `anchoring` or at `finality` by
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the place that refused).
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 239 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-18, when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
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verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 187 rules are reported at `integrity`, 49 at
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`authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at `anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
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| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
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|---|---|---|
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@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ the place that refused).
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| `device-bundle` (the chain of a device: the manufacturer's credential for the device key, a firmware release, the ownership transfers, the owner's authorization, the device's attestation and its AIP-23 envelope, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock, nonce and audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists, firmware policies and status records it read, its own reading of the notarized envelope) | `device-identity/device.mjs` | 47: `device.form`, `.manufacture-form`, `.manufacturer-id`, `.manufacture-holder`, `.manufacture-signature`, `.manufacturer-trusted`, `.manufacture-window`, `.manufacture-status-list`, `.manufacture-revoked`, `.device-key`, `.device-id`, `.firmware-form`, `.firmware-signer`, `.firmware-signature`, `.firmware-model`, `.firmware-retracted`, `.firmware-rollback`, `.firmware-software`, `.chain-length`, `.transfer-form`, `.transfer-device`, `.transfer-ids`, `.transfer-from`, `.transfer-prev`, `.transfer-signature`, `.transfer-time`, `.authorization-form`, `.authorization-device`, `.authorization-owner`, `.authorization-ownership`, `.authorization-signature`, `.authorization-window`, `.authorization-action`, `.status-retired`, `.status-suspended`, `.attestation-form`, `.attestation-key`, `.attestation-device`, `.attestation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.attestation-firmware`, `.attestation-ownership`, `.witness-envelope`, `.witness-time`, `.unreadable` |
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| `sdjwt-presentation` (an SD-JWT of IETF RFC 9901, as issued or with its Key Binding JWT, judged with what the verifier brings: the issuer key it chose, a public JWK, never one taken from the token; its clock; its audience and nonce; the issuer and the explicit type it expects; whether it requires key binding and `exp`) | `identity/sdjwt.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `sdjwt.form`, `.alg`, `.typ`, `.crit`, `.key`, `.signature`, `.issuer`, `.sd-alg`, `.disclosure-form`, `.disclosure-twice`, `.digest-twice`, `.disclosure-name`, `.claim-conflict`, `.unreferenced`, `.time`, `.kb-context`, `.kb-required`, `.kb-cnf`, `.kb-claims`, `.kb-audience`, `.kb-nonce`, `.kb-freshness`, `.kb-sd-hash` |
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| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 23 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
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| `travel-rule-binding`, `travel-rule-message`, `travel-rule-receipt` (the Travel Rule between VASPs: the beneficiary's KEM key binding with its VASP presentation, judged by the originator with its id, its nonce, its clock, the registries it trusts and their status lists; the sealed IVMS101 message, judged by the beneficiary with its id, its own KEM key pair, which decrypts, its clock, its registries and lists and its replay store; the signed receipt, judged by the originator with the message it sent and the beneficiary it accepted) | `identity/travel-rule.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `travelrule.binding-form`, `.binding-id`, `.binding-signature`, `.binding-window`, `.vasp-presentation`, `.vasp-status`, `.vasp-identity`, `.vasp-claim`, `.message-form`, `.message-id`, `.message-signature`, `.message-recipient`, `.message-kem-keys`, `.message-freshness`, `.replay-store`, `.replay`, `.kem-alg`, `.kem-open`, `.ciphertext`, `.receipt-form`, `.receipt-from`, `.receipt-signature`, `.receipt-message` |
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| `compliance-presentation` (a presentation of a credential judged against the verifier's compliance policy: the issuers it believes and the claims it requires, with the verifier's audience, nonce and clock, all required, and the status lists and revocations it holds) | `identity/conformitate.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 3: `compliance.presentation`, `.status`, `.rule` |
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A module verifier exports the list of rules it can name (`REGULI`; its helper throws on any other) and marks its rules in one of two
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ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (nine modules), or the rule named at every call of the
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@@ -97,15 +99,26 @@ leaves the authenticity level `NOT_MEASURED` (`not-reached`), an authenticity re
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status list was not read. The profile imports `sdjwt.mjs` from its real file, so a planted copy of `sdjwt.mjs` is reached only through
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the artifact `sdjwt-presentation`: no `sdjwt-vc-presentation` vector expects a rule of `sdjwt` (they all exercise them).
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**Not enrolled**, counted in the same file: two verifiers of the identity component that sit on top of the enrolled ones: Travel Rule
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(20 places that add a reason) and compliance (3). Their refusals are texts, not rule ids. Their own probes and negative controls stay
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what checks them.
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The Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier (enrolled 2026-10-18, the last two of the identity component; the file counts
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nothing as not enrolled since) run the identity verifier on the VASP or KYC presentation inside and name its whole verdict as one rule
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(`travelrule.vasp-presentation`, `compliance.presentation`); the identity rules themselves are enrolled under `identity-presentation`.
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Both make every check they can reach and name every rule that refused, like the identity verifier; the Travel Rule verifier does not open
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a message whose header it refused for any reason, so with only its authenticity refused (the originator's signature or id, the VASP
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presentation) the integrity of the message is `NOT_MEASURED` (`not-reached`), and a binding or a receipt that cannot be read at all
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(`binding-form`, `receipt-form`, `message-form` before the signature) leaves authenticity so. Their verdicts are the verifier's: a
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Travel Rule party brings its registries, its clock, the lists it holds and (the beneficiary) its replay store and its KEM keys; a
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compliance verifier brings its policy, its audience, its nonce and its clock. A compliance judgement under a policy that waives the
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credential status (`requireStatus: false`), with no list read, is `PARTIAL` (`claim-not-checked`); a Travel Rule verdict is never
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`PARTIAL`, since a VASP status that was not judged is a refusal there (`vasp-status`). An invalid presentation establishes no claim, so
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the compliance verifier reports every rule of its policy not met as well (the verifier's reasons list said so before the enrolment, and
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the vectors expect both); a credential from an issuer or a registry whose status list the verifier does not hold is refused for its
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issuer and for its status at once.
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## The vectors
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`vectori/` holds 553 vectors (544 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 20 MB, since every device and identity vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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`vectori/` holds 619 vectors (610 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32. By expected verdict: 81 `VALID`, 68 `PARTIAL`, 404 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 85 `VALID`, 69 `PARTIAL`, 465 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
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- the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit
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@@ -131,32 +144,47 @@ envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22
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stranger: three hybrid key pairs each, made and discarded), presented to one verifier, the VC's Status List Tokens (clean, revoked,
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suspended, 8 bits, for another uri, expired, by a stranger, typed JWT, without `iat`, too short, ML-DSA-65) and the forged siblings
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only a key holder can make (a key binding JWT by a stranger or without its nonce, a digest signed twice, a nested `_sd_alg`, a
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disclosure named `_sd`, a claim named `__proto__`, an algorithm confusion, a `status` behind a disclosure, and so on);
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disclosure named `_sd`, a claim named `__proto__`, an algorithm confusion, a `status` behind a disclosure, and so on); since the same
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day also one Travel Rule exchange (a registry, another registry, the paying VASP, the receiving VASP, a third VASP and a stranger: six
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hybrid key pairs made and discarded; two hybrid KEM key pairs, X25519 + ML-KEM-768, of which the receiving VASP's is **kept whole in
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the vectors, private half included**, since the beneficiary's private KEM keys are what opens a message: it was made for these vectors
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and opens nothing else, and it is declared test material at the scene, in the form the secret gate of this repository reads, so that
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the gate reports it as seen and would still block a private key without that declaration), with the forged siblings only a key holder
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can make, each checked at generation to be refused for exactly the rule it was made for (a stranger's keys under a VASP's id, a binding
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that expired or whose ML-KEM key is an X25519 key, a header addressed to another VASP, dated 400 s earlier, with another encapsulation
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name, a truncated ML-KEM ciphertext, a flipped ciphertext byte or another amount, each signed again by the originator, a receipt by
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another VASP); and one compliance exchange (an issuer, a holder, another issuer: three hybrid key pairs made and discarded; a KYC
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credential with six disclosable claims, the issuer's status list, a policy of four rules, and the holder's presentations: enough
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claims, too few, claims that break every rule, a credential from the other issuer, a revoked one);
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- the SD-JWT vectors have two more sources that are fixed text: the example of RFC 9901 Section 5 with the key of its Appendix A.5
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(`identity/fixturi-rfc9901.json`), and the tokens of `@sd-jwt/core` 0.23.0 and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` 0.23.0 with the status lists of
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`@owf/token-status-list` 0.5.0 (`identity/interop/fixturi-interop-*.json`), which the identity component derived from those
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libraries' real output on 2026-10-18, with their public test keys.
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An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 249 of the
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404 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 300 of the
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465 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
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the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner; a digest repeated in an SD-JWT must still be
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signed by its issuer, a key binding JWT for another audience by its holder): the other 155 are made at
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signed by its issuer, a key binding JWT for another audience by its holder; a Travel Rule header addressed to another VASP, or with a
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cut ML-KEM ciphertext, must still be signed by the originator): the other 165 are made at
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the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
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(`mutation.changed`). Eleven vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
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(`mutation.changed`). Twenty-four vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
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under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
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ledger links; a delegation chain cut after it was signed for is also not presented by its last delegate; a manufacture credential
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whose signature is changed is also no longer the link the first transfer names; a clone that claims the device's id with another
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key breaks both the id derivation and the match with the manufacturer's credential).
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key breaks both the id derivation and the match with the manufacturer's credential; a revoked VASP credential, or one from a registry
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whose list the verifier does not hold, fails the VASP presentation and the VASP status at once; a message opened by another VASP is
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not addressed to it and its originator's presentation was not made for it; a compliance presentation that is invalid for any reason
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also establishes no claim, so its policy's rules are not met either).
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## Run it
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```
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AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 544 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 610 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 491 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 557 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
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node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one artifact { artifact, input }: its verdict
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```
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@@ -168,8 +196,16 @@ chain, `{ presentation, now, audience?, nonce?, trustedIssuers?, statusLists?, r
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credential, `{ bundle, now, nonce?, audience?, trustedManufacturers?, statusLists?, firmwarePolicies?, statusRecords?,
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softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? }` for a device bundle, `{ sdJwt, issuerKey, issuerAlg?, now, audience?, nonce?,
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expectedIssuer?, expectedTyp?, requireKeyBinding?, requireExp?, maxAgeS? }` for an SD-JWT presentation and the same plus
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`{ expectedVct, statusListJwt?, statusListKey?, statusListAlg?, requireStatus? }` for an SD-JWT VC: `now`, the verifier's clock, is
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required for all of them, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not reproduce).
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`{ expectedVct, statusListJwt?, statusListKey?, statusListAlg?, requireStatus? }` for an SD-JWT VC, `{ binding, presentation,
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registries, originatorId, nonce, now, statusLists?, maxAgeS? }` for a Travel Rule binding (`originatorId` and `nonce` are the
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originator's own; without them the identity verifier would leave the audience or the nonce of the VASP presentation unjudged, and the
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Travel Rule verifier refuses instead of accepting on trust: a defect this suite's malformed-input row found on 2026-10-18, fixed the
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same day), `{ message, me, kem, registries, now,
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statusLists?, seen?, maxAgeS? }` for a Travel Rule message (`kem` is the beneficiary's key file, `aere-travel-rule-kem-keys`, with
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its private half; `seen` is the list of message ids already received, the replay store; without it nothing is opened), `{ receipt,
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message, beneficiaryId }` for a Travel Rule receipt, and `{ presentation, policy, audience, nonce, now, statusLists?, revocations? }` for
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a compliance presentation (`audience` and `nonce` required, as the module requires them): `now`, the verifier's clock, is required for
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all of them but the receipt, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not reproduce).
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An implementation is a command that answers three calls with JSON on stdout: `--capabilities` (`{ artifacts, rules, online, batch }`:
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what it claims to judge), `<vector.json> [--online]` (the verdict above for the file's `{ artifact, input }`), and, if it says
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@@ -179,15 +215,41 @@ exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expec
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refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
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`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 213 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 239 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 491 vectors, among them every vector of
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the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations, the device bundles and the SD-JWT presentations. For
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those eight verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours (for SD-JWT, the identity component measured our verifier against
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`@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` outside this suite; those libraries are not implementations of this suite's contract).
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 557 vectors, among them every vector of
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the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations, the device bundles, the SD-JWT presentations, the
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Travel Rule artifacts and the compliance presentations. For those ten verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours (for SD-JWT,
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the identity component measured our verifier against `@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` outside this suite; those libraries are
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not implementations of this suite's contract).
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## How the suite itself is checked
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Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), after the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier were enrolled, the last two of the identity
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component (Node.js 24.14.1; the reference verifier of the development repository; testnet 28001 read, nothing sent; the run is the one
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on the final code, after the three fixes below):
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: 12 rows green, 0 red. The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now: 239 rules of
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15 verifiers, 619 vectors (19 of the kind `travel-rule-binding`, 26 of `travel-rule-message`, 9 of `travel-rule-receipt`, 12 of
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`compliance-presentation`). Every rule has a vector that expects it (239 of 239); every artifact kind has a valid vector (21); every
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invalid vector is its base with one operation (300) or one declared producer change (165); the published verifiers pass 619/619; the
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independent implementation passes all 62 it claims and the other 557 are reported not covered; 100,825 malformed inputs given to the
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module verifiers each got a verdict and none threw (4,766 still accepted, at 255 distinct paths; of the four new kinds only
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`travel-rule-receipt` accepts damage, at 62 paths, all of them the originator's presentation and signature inside the message handed
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with the receipt, which the receipt names by the hash of the signed header and the ciphertext and does not read; the binding, the
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message and the compliance presentation accept none); 183 malformed envelope files given to the reference verifier each got a verdict.
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 321 rows green, 0 red: 239 of 239 rules (each of the 23 rules of the Travel
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Rule verifier and the 3 of the compliance verifier planted out in turn fails exactly the vectors that expect it), 76 of 76 conditions
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of the device verifier, six controls of the instruments (an implementation that calls everything valid fails 578 of the 610 offline
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vectors).
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- While the enrolment was being made, the measurement found three things, each fixed before this run: the malformed-input row showed
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that `acceptBeneficiary` called without `originatorId` or without `nonce` accepted the beneficiary (the identity verifier leaves the
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audience or the nonce of the VASP presentation unjudged, and the Travel Rule verifier did not require them judged: it refuses now; a
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test of the identity component, a planting of its negative control and two vectors here); and the control showed, with a `*-form`
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rule planted out, the vector whose artifact is the JSON value `null` **breaking** instead of failing, twice in the adapter (its
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not-reached reason read the name of a stopping rule that was not there) and once in `verifyReceipt` (it read `accepted` from a
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statement that was not there). A crash is not a refusal, and the control counted each as broken, not as a fail.
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Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), when the SD-JWT verifier and the SD-JWT VC profile were enrolled (Node.js 24.14.1; the reference
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verifier of the development repository; testnet 28001 read, nothing sent):
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@@ -306,11 +368,11 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
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## What it is not, and what is not measured
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- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
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553 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
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619 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
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- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
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The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 213; the other
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207 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
|
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verifier and the SD-JWT verifiers, are judged here by one implementation.
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The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 239; the other
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233 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
|
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verifier, the SD-JWT verifiers, the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier, are judged here by one implementation.
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- **Finality is the chain's.** The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the
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artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.
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- **Five of the six finality refusals have no vector.** The reference verifier can refuse at its finality level in six places; the
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@@ -348,7 +410,7 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
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survive a sale: after a transfer it is named and not applied (the manufacturer's is final). A retirement by an owner that holds
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across a sale needs a witness of when it and the transfer were signed, which is not built; every time in a transfer, an
|
||||
authorization and a status record of these vectors is the statement of the key holder that signed it.
|
||||
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 96,757 malformed inputs (measured 2026-10-14), 4,280 were still accepted, at 187 distinct paths (76 of them in device bundles; the kinds that follow were listed on 2026-10-05, when the count was 81 and the device verifier had not had its third review: a status record that decided nothing, such as a suspension already lifted, a stranger's record, a record not in effect yet or one of a previous owner; a recall list or a firmware policy that could not be read and stood beside a clean one, which damaged is no longer signed by the manufacturer and counts like one that was not handed; the envelope and its notarization claim, which are optional; and the signature of a Proof of Software attestation, which the device verifier does not read): parts a
|
||||
- **What a damaged artifact can still pass.** Of the 100,825 malformed inputs (measured 2026-10-18), 4,766 were still accepted, at 255 distinct paths (76 of them in device bundles, 62 in Travel Rule receipts: the originator's presentation and signature inside the message handed with a receipt, which the receipt does not read; on 2026-10-14 the count was 96,757 inputs, 4,280 accepted at 187 paths; the kinds that follow were listed on 2026-10-05, when the count was 81 and the device verifier had not had its third review: a status record that decided nothing, such as a suspension already lifted, a stranger's record, a record not in effect yet or one of a previous owner; a recall list or a firmware policy that could not be read and stood beside a clean one, which damaged is no longer signed by the manufacturer and counts like one that was not handed; the envelope and its notarization claim, which are optional; and the signature of a Proof of Software attestation, which the device verifier does not read): parts a
|
||||
verifier treats as optional (the transaction facts of a receipt, the envelope of a timeline, the head of an audit log), a policy
|
||||
field removed that falls back to its default, a log or a ledger without its last entry (still a valid shorter one), a revocation that was not in effect (damaged, it is
|
||||
ignored as before), and fields no rule reads
|
||||
@@ -359,8 +421,21 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
|
||||
not read them; the statement carries its own `kind`, which is under the hash. (This file used to quote 526 malformed envelopes,
|
||||
a figure of 2026-10-03 from a run whose script was not kept; the row above replaces it.)
|
||||
- **Not part of AIP-23.** The rule ids, the four levels and the verdict form are this suite's reading of the published verifiers;
|
||||
AIP-23 defines the envelope. The device verifier is enrolled. Of the identity verifiers published beside these, the presentation
|
||||
verifier, the SD-JWT verifier and the SD-JWT VC profile are enrolled; Travel Rule and compliance are not.
|
||||
AIP-23 defines the envelope. The device verifier is enrolled, and so are all five identity verifiers published beside these: the
|
||||
presentation verifier, the SD-JWT verifier and the SD-JWT VC profile, the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier (the last
|
||||
two since 2026-10-18).
|
||||
- **A Travel Rule verdict is the receiving party's, and the vectors carry one test decryption key.** A binding, a message or a receipt
|
||||
is judged with what the originator or the beneficiary brings: the registries it trusts, the status lists it holds, its clock, its
|
||||
nonce, its replay store, its KEM keys. `VALID` for a message says that it opened for this beneficiary, with these keys, on this
|
||||
clock, that it was not in the replay store handed, and that the originator's VASP status was judged on the lists handed; it does not
|
||||
say who a registry is in the world, nor that the IVMS101 inside is true or complete (the module does not validate the schema). The
|
||||
beneficiary's KEM key pair in the message vectors is test material made at generation, declared so at the scene, and opens only the
|
||||
messages of these vectors; nothing else in this suite holds a private key. The record of an exchange (an AIP-23 `compliance` envelope
|
||||
without personal data) is judged as the artifact `envelope`, not here.
|
||||
- **A compliance verdict is the verifier's policy applied to one presentation.** It says that the presentation was valid for that
|
||||
verifier and that the claims it established satisfy the policy's rules, with the status judged on the lists handed when the policy
|
||||
requires it. It is not a zero-knowledge proof (a shown claim is shown whole), not an AML or sanctions screening, and not legal
|
||||
compliance with anything; a policy that cannot be defined is the verifier's error (the module throws, by design), not a verdict.
|
||||
- **The SD-JWT vectors say what two libraries agree on, on these inputs.** The tokens of `@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` in
|
||||
the SD-JWT vectors are the fixtures the identity component derived from those libraries' real output on 2026-10-18 (their versions
|
||||
are in the vector sources); the expected verdicts are those of our verifiers on them, which the identity component measured against
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user