identity: the Travel Rule and compliance-policy verifiers name their rules; a missing originator id or nonce is now a refusal in acceptBeneficiary; conformance: Travel Rule and compliance presentations enrolled (239 rules, 15 verifiers, 21 kinds, 619 vectors), nothing of identity left out

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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ notarization command of the verification layer and for the agents' x402 wallet (
| [`market-settlement/`](market-settlement/) | the dispute and settlement rail of a verifiable infrastructure market, measured end to end on testnet 28001: an order with its reward in escrow and a provider bond, the result committed on chain with its execution envelope notarized under a post-quantum certified anchor, a challenge window in which anyone disputes with a recomputed result and a bond, an arbiter that can only route the escrow (with a permissionless 14-day timeout), deadline reclaims, and an AIP-23 settlement receipt; a pure judge over the job's timeline that checks deadlines, the window, who resolved, the payout, the replay and the proof |
| [`verifiable-data/`](verifiable-data/) | a dataset whose every answer is checkable against a short commitment without the data: RFC 9162 commitments per version (append-only, consistency proofs), equality and range queries proven correct AND complete (contiguous run of a sorted index plus its two neighbours), hash-based selective disclosure of fields, availability sampling against the serving endpoint, and the version's AIP-23 envelope notarized and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; not zero knowledge, and says so |
| [`ai-trust/`](ai-trust/) | the trust chain of an AI result: the agent's identity (agents/), the model artifact's attestation, the host's runtime record (verify-layer/), the policy and signed ledger, the Proof of AI envelope and the chain as witness, joined in one bundle whose verifier checks only the links between them |
| [`conformance/`](conformance/) | a conformance suite for the AIP-23 proof kinds: one verdict form over the verifiers published here (four levels: integrity, authenticity, anchoring, finality; each passed, failed or not measured, with the named rule), 213 rules of thirteen verifiers read from their code (the presentation verifier of identity/ and the device verifier of device-identity/ among them since 2026-10-05, the SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC verifiers since 2026-10-18), 553 vectors derived from the producers and from evidence recorded on testnet 28001 (each invalid one is one operation away from one that is not, or one change at its producer, and must be refused for exactly its named rules), and a runner that scores any implementation given as a command, in any language; a second implementation in Python covers 6 of the 213 rules. Not a certification and not an audit |
| [`conformance/`](conformance/) | a conformance suite for the AIP-23 proof kinds: one verdict form over the verifiers published here (four levels: integrity, authenticity, anchoring, finality; each passed, failed or not measured, with the named rule), 239 rules of fifteen verifiers read from their code (the presentation verifier of identity/ and the device verifier of device-identity/ among them since 2026-10-05; the SD-JWT, SD-JWT VC, Travel Rule and compliance-policy verifiers since 2026-10-18, so nothing of identity/ is left out), 619 vectors derived from the producers and from evidence recorded on testnet 28001 (each invalid one is one operation away from one that is not, or one change at its producer, and must be refused for exactly its named rules), and a runner that scores any implementation given as a command, in any language; a second implementation in Python covers 6 of the 239 rules. Not a certification and not an audit |
| [`identity/`](identity/) | post-quantum credentials: an issuer signs claims (hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both required), the holder shows only the claims it picks (selective disclosure in the manner of SD-JWT, RFC 9901, in a format of its own), bound to the verifier's audience and nonce; delegation to a phone, an agent or a ten-minute session key that can only narrow; revocation and an issuer status list in the manner of W3C Bitstring Status List; all checked offline from the files; and compliance without surveillance: a verifier's policy (issuers, required claims) judged on a presentation, recorded as an AIP-23 envelope that carries no personal data; and the Travel Rule between VASPs, the IVMS101 data sealed for the receiving VASP with a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation, signed, bound to the transfer and acknowledged; and the same credentials as standard SD-JWT (IETF RFC 9901): issued with the issuer's Ed25519 key (EdDSA) or its ML-DSA-65 key, presented with a key binding JWT, and verified against the RFC's own example vectors and, since 2026-10-18, interoperable in both directions with a foreign library (@sd-jwt/core 0.23.0 with jose 6.2.12, ML-DSA-65 included; `interop/`), plus the SD-JWT VC profile (draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19, `dc+sd-jwt`, `vct`, a Token Status List judged offline) (`identity-cli.mjs verify-sdjwt`, behind Aere Cloud's POST /v1/identity/sd-jwt/verify, and `verify-sdjwt-vc`) |
| [`device-identity/`](device-identity/) | what a machine is, as a chain of signed statements checked offline: the manufacturer's credential for the device key (the manufacturer and the owners sign hybrid, Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both required; the device key is ML-DSA-65), a firmware release with a floor and retractions (a rolled-back or retracted firmware is refused), ownership by transfers each signed by the owner before, the current owner's authorization, a status registry in which the manufacturer's retirement is final and an owner's lasts as long as its ownership (after a sale the records of the previous owner are named and not applied: a seller could date one before the sale after it; a retirement by an owner that survives a sale needs a witness of time that is not built), and the device's fresh attestation to the verifier's nonce, with an AIP-23 envelope that can be notarized and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; one verifier makes every check it can reach, names every rule that refused and says VALID, PARTIAL (what it was not handed, or could not read) or INVALID. The device key is a software key: no TPM, secure element or TEE is used or checked, and the README says what that leaves open |
| [`exposure-report/`](exposure-report/) | classifies Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses by whether their public key is already readable from chain data, in three declared modes (offline, by address or script type only; through your own Electrum server, Esplora index, Bitcoin Core or Ethereum JSON-RPC, one declared target; through a third-party provider only with written consent, recorded in the report), with exactly two labels ("exposed (on-chain evidence)", "no on-chain evidence of exposure") and "unmeasured" when the reading did not happen, the evidence named for each address, and a dated report (JSON, Markdown, an AIP-23 `compliance` envelope that binds the JSON). It records what was readable on the date of the report: it does not protect, move or recover any coins, it does not change what a spend reveals, and it says nothing about the future. The one component with npm dependencies (`@noble/hashes`, `@noble/curves` 1.x: `npm install --ignore-scripts` in its directory) |
@@ -44,14 +44,14 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
| proof-kinds | 24/24 with the same verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-kinds.mjs`) | six negative controls inside the test |
| readiness | 6/6 (`node proba-adrese-private.mjs`: the private-address rules, and a local listener no scan may touch) | the rate limit and the queue bound are tested where the service runs, not here (its README says so) |
| control-plane | planner 44/44 (2026-10-18: a key agreement or a client-side TLS configured by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway; a self-signed trust anchor is blocked, not "automatic through PKI"; test code is LOW with its own scope), command line 10/10, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers (all five server profiles measured end to end on 2026-10-18: nginx, Apache, HAProxy, Node, Go), compliance report 30/30 (with the AIP-23 verifier; test-code findings are counted apart and are not "exposed today"), console 8/8; the console viewer in a real Chromium, phone and desktop, 26/26 (`node proba-consola-web.mjs`, measured 2026-09-30; needs `playwright-core` and a Chromium, otherwise it exits 2) | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository; viewer 8/8 (`node control-negativ-consola-web.mjs`) |
| identity | 46/46 (`node proba-identity.mjs`, with the AIP-23 verifier for its envelope test; without it that test is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), compliance 15/15 (`node proba-conformitate.mjs`), Travel Rule 19/19 (`node proba-travel-rule.mjs`), SD-JWT 25/25 (`node proba-sdjwt.mjs`, the RFC 9901 vectors and fixtures derived from @sd-jwt/core 0.23.0 included), SD-JWT VC 10/10 (`node proba-sdjwt-vc.mjs`); interoperability with @sd-jwt/core and jose in both directions 26/26 and 28/28 (`interop/`, with those libraries installed in a folder you name; otherwise reported unmeasured), measured 2026-10-18 | 53/53 (`node control-negativ-identity.mjs`); compliance 14/14 (`node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs`); Travel Rule 19/19 (`node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs`); SD-JWT 31/31 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt.mjs`); SD-JWT VC 16/16 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt-vc.mjs`) |
| identity | 46/46 (`node proba-identity.mjs`, with the AIP-23 verifier for its envelope test; without it that test is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), compliance 15/15 (`node proba-conformitate.mjs`), Travel Rule 20/20 (`node proba-travel-rule.mjs`; 2026-10-18: a missing originator id or nonce is a refusal, found when the verifier was enrolled in the conformance suite), SD-JWT 25/25 (`node proba-sdjwt.mjs`, the RFC 9901 vectors and fixtures derived from @sd-jwt/core 0.23.0 included), SD-JWT VC 10/10 (`node proba-sdjwt-vc.mjs`); interoperability with @sd-jwt/core and jose in both directions 26/26 and 28/28 (`interop/`, with those libraries installed in a folder you name; otherwise reported unmeasured), measured 2026-10-18 | 53/53 (`node control-negativ-identity.mjs`); compliance 14/14 (`node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs`); Travel Rule 20/20 (`node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs`); SD-JWT 31/31 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt.mjs`); SD-JWT VC 16/16 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt-vc.mjs`) |
| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 54/54 on 2026-10-05, approval and revocation 39/39, the chain as witness 26/26 without a network and 7/7 on testnet 28001 on 2026-09-30 (`proba-agent-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier), command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); x402 wallet 25/25, 2-of-2 co-signing 16/16 and payment verifier 14/14 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 with the wallet key and 13/13 with the 2-of-2 contract wallet (`agents/x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, `agents/x402/proba-cosign-testnet.mjs`, each needs a funded testnet key); the contract's artifact recompiles byte for byte with solc 0.8.23 (`node x402/recompileaza-contract.mjs --solc <solc>`) | 26/26 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); the chain as witness 11/11 (`node control-negativ-ancora.mjs`); x402 30/30 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`); the contract's own tests (7) and their negative control (4/4) run in the Aere Network contracts project, not in this repository |
| proof-of-ai | 6/6 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-of-ai.mjs`); without it the probe reports NEMASURAT and exits 2 | one negative control inside the test (an envelope touched after its hash: INVALID) |
| payments | 23/23 without a chain (`node proba-risc.mjs`: the verdicts under a policy, the reproducible verdict hash, a receipt verified, nine forged ones refused by name, a malformed payment refused by name); 9/9 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-plata-28001.mjs`: a payment allowed, paid, its receipt notarized and read back with finality PASSED, the public reader VALID; a payment above the limit refused with nothing sent; the fourth in the window refused; a forged receipt and a loosened policy INVALID) | 10/10 (`node proba-risc.mjs --control-negativ`: form, asset, counterparty, rate, per-payment limit, window, linkage, USD arithmetic, verdict reproduction, chain facts, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| market-settlement | 20/20 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-piata-28001.mjs`: five scenarios on AereComputeMarketV3 deployed from the committed artifact, every refusal by its named custom error, the provider's notarized envelope read back under a post-quantum certified anchor); the judge on the recorded timelines 26/26 without a chain (`node proba-judecata.mjs`: seven honest readings VALID, eighteen forged or malformed ones INVALID for their named reason, the settlement receipt) | 10/10 (`node proba-judecata.mjs --control-negativ`: form, completeness of the timeline, posting, deadline, window, arbiter, payout, result bytes, replay, proof, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| verifiable-data | 23/23 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-verifiable-data.mjs`: honest answers VALID, ten forged or malformed ones INVALID for their named reason, availability sampling on a local server; the envelope row is NEMASURAT without the verifier, exit 2); the two chain rows of `--viu` measured on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (a version notarized with a test key and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; evidence in `dovezi/`) | 5/5 (`node proba-verifiable-data.mjs --control-negativ`: field commitment, index order, completeness, consistency, sampling, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| ai-trust | 16/16 with the AIP-23 verifier, measured 2026-10-05 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs`: the whole chain on a committed fixture, then thirteen bundles broken on purpose, each refused for its named reason, among them an agent with a classical key and an audit head signed with one); without the verifier it exits 2 | 11/11 (`node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs --control-negativ`) |
| conformance | 12/12 on 2026-10-18 with the AIP-23 verifier as served (fetched and installed in an empty folder), Python 3 and testnet 28001 read (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: the rules and the vectors are what the code derives, every rule has a vector, every invalid vector is one operation from its base or one declared change at its producer, the published verifiers pass 553/553, an independent Python implementation passes the 62 it claims and the other 491 are reported not covered, 97,966 malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each get a verdict); without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2 | 295/295 on 2026-10-18: 213/213 rules (`node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: each rule planted out of its verifier in a copy; the vectors that expect it, and only they, must fail), then 76/76 conditions of the device verifier's compound checks, each planted out alone (exactly the vectors written for it must fail), then six controls of the instruments |
| conformance | 12/12 on 2026-10-18 with the AIP-23 verifier as served (fetched and installed in an empty folder), Python 3 and testnet 28001 read (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: the rules and the vectors are what the code derives, every rule has a vector, every invalid vector is one operation from its base or one declared change at its producer, the published verifiers pass 619/619, an independent Python implementation passes the 62 it claims and the other 557 are reported not covered, 100,825 malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each get a verdict); without `--online` the nine chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2 | 321/321 on 2026-10-18: 239/239 rules (`node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: each rule planted out of its verifier in a copy; the vectors that expect it, and only they, must fail), then 76/76 conditions of the device verifier's compound checks, each planted out alone (exactly the vectors written for it must fail), then six controls of the instruments |
| device-identity | 372/372 with the AIP-23 verifier, measured 2026-10-14 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-device.mjs`: fifty-four bundles that must be VALID; seventy-seven with something not brought, not read or not readable, each PARTIAL for its named causes; two hundred and four attack rows, each refused for exactly its named rules, among them a clone with another key, a rolled-back or retracted firmware (also when the release is left out of the bundle), a previous owner that still signs, an owner's retirement written under no ownership head, a replayed attestation, an attestation dated ahead of the verifier's clock, a manufacturer the verifier does not trust, a retirement, a classical key under the ML-DSA-65 name, a signature in another base64 text, a day that does not exist; 804 damaged bundles each given a verdict; the command line through files only; the evidence recorded on testnet 28001 judged again offline); the chain as witness 10/10 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-05, before the repairs of that day (`proba-device-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier; not run again since: the bundles and readings it recorded give the same verdicts under the verifier of now) | 220/220 (`node control-negativ-device.mjs`: the untouched copy green; each of the 47 rules taken out of a copy, the rows that expect it, and only they, go red; 172 more plantings, most of them one condition of a compound check taken out alone, each with its rows) |
| exposure-report | 164 passed and 1 `NEMASURAT` of 165 rows in the AERE development tree on 2026-10-14 (`node proba-expunere.mjs`: codec checks with real public vectors, mode 1 and mode 2 through four mock targets that serve recorded responses, the network guard's proof that in modes 1 and 2 nothing leaves the machine, the language gate, the AIP-23 `compliance` envelopes judged by the reference verifier; the `NEMASURAT` row is mode 3 against a real provider, which would send addresses to a third party); in this copy, after `npm install --ignore-scripts` in its directory: 153 passed, 0 red, 0 broken, 12 `NEMASURAT` with the reason (the rows compared with the AIP-23 verifier, the anchor verifier's RLP encoder and MPT walker and the shield's header pins, none of which is in this repository: with `AERE_PROOF_PROTOCOL_VERIFY`, `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF` and `AERE_EXPUNERE_PINI` naming them the rows run, 162 passed and 3 `NEMASURAT`; the scan of the directory for names from the AERE host inventory; the git-ignore row outside a git tree); the exit code is 0 unless a row is red or broken | inside the test, 2026-10-14: each rule has its reverse planting in a copy of the tool (a foreign provider planted on each network path is caught, a label planted in the language gate is refused, each classification rule taken out turns its row red, a `@noble/curves` 2.x planted first is passed over and alone is named as missing), and the recorded fixtures are judged against their declared date |
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ interface, command line and data (`definePolicy`, `verifyLedger`, `approve`, ...
## Licence
MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 838 (pq-gateway 9, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 73, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 27, agents 39, identity 24, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 565, device-identity 11, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).
MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 904 (pq-gateway 9, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 73, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 27, agents 39, identity 24, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 631, device-identity 11, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).