crypto-inventory 0.3.0 and the control-plane planner after the second run on a tree that is not ours (libsignal): BoringSSL, Noise hfs, libcrux Kyber, the libsignal Java/Node API; self-signed trust anchors are blocked, test code is LOW with its own scope

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Aere Network committed 2026-10-18 07:52:31 +03:00
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@@ -25,7 +25,15 @@ Only a finding with no call context (no `api`, no language) keeps the old routin
known, so it is not guessed. The inventory's TLS configuration findings still go to the gateway.
{ ref, asset, problem, current, target, method: "auto-aere" | "manual" | "blocked", product: "gateway" | "kms" | "pki" | null,
how, cn?, primitive?, urgency: "CRITICAL" | "HIGH" | "MEDIUM" | "LOW", blocker, location, source }
how, cn?, primitive?, urgency: "CRITICAL" | "HIGH" | "MEDIUM" | "LOW", blocker, scope: "production" | "test", location, source }
Two rules added on 2026-10-18 after the run on the libsignal tree. A finding in **test code** (`tests/`, `benches/`, `fuzz/`,
`examples/`, `*Test.java`, `*.test.ts`, ...; the path rule lives in `scopulCaii`) stays in the plan but with `scope: "test"`,
urgency `LOW` and a `how` that says so, and `summary.byScope` counts it apart: on libsignal 76 of 197 actions (75 of them HIGH)
were in such files and stood in front of the production call sites. A **self-signed certificate** that is a pinned trust anchor
(valid for more than five years, or whose CN is not a host name: the AMD, Google and AWS attestation roots in libsignal) is
`blocked` with the reason written, not "auto through the PQ PKI": the PKI cannot replace a root the verifier pins, only its owner
can publish a post-quantum one. A short self-signed service certificate for a host name is still reissued by the PKI for the same CN.
Harvest-now-decrypt-later applies to key exchange and encrypted data, **not to signatures** (a signature is public; it is not
harvested), so a classical key exchange on a public endpoint is the only CRITICAL case, and a classical signature is a future
@@ -67,7 +75,9 @@ required property is measured), `UNRESOLVED`, or `UNMEASURED` (the scan failed,
applied the change: `--applied-at`, otherwise the plan's `generatedAt`; with neither, everything is `UNMEASURED`). A domain in the
plan that is not a host name gets no recipe, so no command to copy is built with it. What is measured by us is written on every
recipe (`measured`): the `node` profile end to end; for nginx, Apache and HAProxy only that OpenSSL 3.5 accepts the group list (the
directive comes from their documentation); Go from the 1.24 release notes, not measured.
directive comes from their documentation); nginx and Go measured end to end on 2026-10-18 on real servers started from exactly the recipe's
fragments (nginx 1.31.7 with OpenSSL 3.5.8/3.5.9 in a container, Go 1.26.5): hybrid-only client accepted, TLS 1.2 refused, HSTS sent
(`dovezi/retete-2026-10-18/`); Apache and HAProxy still from their documentation.
## 4. Compliance report: `raport-conformitate.mjs`