crypto-inventory 0.3.0 and the control-plane planner after the second run on a tree that is not ours (libsignal): BoringSSL, Noise hfs, libcrux Kyber, the libsignal Java/Node API; self-signed trust anchors are blocked, test code is LOW with its own scope
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@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
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| pq-gateway | 33/33 (`node proba-pq-gateway.mjs`) | 33/33 (`bash proba-pq-gateway-control-negativ.sh`) |
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| pq-kms | 62/62 (`node test/proba.mjs`); HSM root on SoftHSM2 + OpenSC 20/20 (`pq-kms/test/proba-hsm.mjs`, Linux); sealed-file trust rules 7/7 (`pq-kms/test/proba-hsm-incredere.mjs`) | 16/16 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); sealed-file rules 2/2 in this repository (`pq-kms/test/control-negativ-hsm-incredere.mjs`) |
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| pq-pki | 27/27 (`node test/proba.mjs`), each verdict compared with OpenSSL 3.5 | 22/22 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`) |
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| crypto-inventory | 46/46 (`node test/proba.mjs`, measured 2026-10-18 with the Rust detector, glob imports and libcrux included); cost on hostile input 8/8 linear (`node test/proba-timp.mjs`) | 21/21 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); cost 3/3 in this repository (`node test/control-negativ-timp.mjs`; its fourth case compares with version 0.1.0 from the development history and is skipped here) |
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| crypto-inventory | 52/52 (`node test/proba.mjs`, measured 2026-10-18 with the Rust detector, glob imports, libcrux, BoringSSL and the libsignal Java/Node API included); cost on hostile input 8/8 linear (`node test/proba-timp.mjs`) | 25/25 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); cost 3/3 in this repository (`node test/control-negativ-timp.mjs`; its fourth case compares with version 0.1.0 from the development history and is skipped here) |
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| verify-layer | 45/45 with the AIP-23 reference verifier, measured 2026-10-05 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools> node proba-sidecar.mjs`); without it 40 run, 5 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2; the Merkle tree 20/20 (`node proba-arbore.mjs`: the reference roots of Certificate Transparency, every proof up to 64 leaves, each attack), measured 2026-09-30 | 10/10 in this repository on 2026-10-05 (`node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs`; its eleventh case compares with the version from the development history and is skipped here); the tree 14/14 (`node control-negativ-arbore.mjs`) |
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| proof-kinds | 24/24 with the same verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-kinds.mjs`) | six negative controls inside the test |
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| readiness | 6/6 (`node proba-adrese-private.mjs`: the private-address rules, and a local listener no scan may touch) | the rate limit and the queue bound are tested where the service runs, not here (its README says so) |
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| control-plane | planner 35/35 (2026-10-18: a key agreement or a client-side TLS configured by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway), command line 9/9, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers, compliance report 27/27 (with the AIP-23 verifier), console 8/8; the console viewer in a real Chromium, phone and desktop, 26/26 (`node proba-consola-web.mjs`, measured 2026-09-30; needs `playwright-core` and a Chromium, otherwise it exits 2) | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository; viewer 8/8 (`node control-negativ-consola-web.mjs`) |
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| control-plane | planner 44/44 (2026-10-18: a key agreement or a client-side TLS configured by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway; a self-signed trust anchor is blocked, not "automatic through PKI"; test code is LOW with its own scope), command line 10/10, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers, compliance report 30/30 (with the AIP-23 verifier; test-code findings are counted apart and are not "exposed today"), console 8/8; the console viewer in a real Chromium, phone and desktop, 26/26 (`node proba-consola-web.mjs`, measured 2026-09-30; needs `playwright-core` and a Chromium, otherwise it exits 2) | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository; viewer 8/8 (`node control-negativ-consola-web.mjs`) |
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| identity | 46/46 (`node proba-identity.mjs`, with the AIP-23 verifier for its envelope test; without it that test is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), compliance 15/15 (`node proba-conformitate.mjs`), Travel Rule 19/19 (`node proba-travel-rule.mjs`), SD-JWT 23/23 (`node proba-sdjwt.mjs`, the RFC 9901 vectors included), measured 2026-10-05 | 53/53 (`node control-negativ-identity.mjs`); compliance 14/14 (`node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs`); Travel Rule 19/19 (`node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs`); SD-JWT 29/29 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt.mjs`) |
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| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 54/54 on 2026-10-05, approval and revocation 39/39, the chain as witness 26/26 without a network and 7/7 on testnet 28001 on 2026-09-30 (`proba-agent-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier), command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); x402 wallet 25/25, 2-of-2 co-signing 16/16 and payment verifier 14/14 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 with the wallet key and 13/13 with the 2-of-2 contract wallet (`agents/x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, `agents/x402/proba-cosign-testnet.mjs`, each needs a funded testnet key); the contract's artifact recompiles byte for byte with solc 0.8.23 (`node x402/recompileaza-contract.mjs --solc <solc>`) | 26/26 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); the chain as witness 11/11 (`node control-negativ-ancora.mjs`); x402 30/30 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`); the contract's own tests (7) and their negative control (4/4) run in the Aere Network contracts project, not in this repository |
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| proof-of-ai | 6/6 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-of-ai.mjs`); without it the probe reports NEMASURAT and exits 2 | one negative control inside the test (an envelope touched after its hash: INVALID) |
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@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ interface, command line and data (`definePolicy`, `verifyLedger`, `approve`, ...
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## Licence
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MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 706 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 48, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 19, agents 39, identity 15, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 479, device-identity 11, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).
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MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 722 (pq-gateway 9, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 55, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 25, agents 39, identity 15, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 479, device-identity 11, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).
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