identity: SD-JWT interoperability measured in both directions with @sd-jwt/core 0.23.0 and jose 6.2.12 (ML-DSA-65 included), nested _sd_alg refused, the SD-JWT VC profile (draft-19, dc+sd-jwt, vct, Token Status List offline); conformance: SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC enrolled (213 rules, 13 verifiers, 553 vectors)
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@@ -42,9 +42,10 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
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## What is enrolled
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 artifact kinds. By level:
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142 rules are reported at `integrity`, 36 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at
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`anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 213 rules of 13 verifiers, 17 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-18; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before the SD-JWT verifiers were enrolled). By level: 170 rules are reported at
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`integrity`, 40 at `authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at `anchoring` or at `finality` by
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the place that refused).
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| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
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|---|---|---|
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@@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
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| `agent-ledger` (an agent's signed ledger under its policy) | `agents/agent-ledger.mjs` | 16: `agents.ledger-form`, `.policy`, `.other-policy`, `.session`, `.key`, `.identity`, `.anchor`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.body`, `.signature`, `.hash`, `.time`, `.revocation`, `.approvals`, `.decision` |
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| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 37: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable` |
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| `device-bundle` (the chain of a device: the manufacturer's credential for the device key, a firmware release, the ownership transfers, the owner's authorization, the device's attestation and its AIP-23 envelope, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock, nonce and audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists, firmware policies and status records it read, its own reading of the notarized envelope) | `device-identity/device.mjs` | 47: `device.form`, `.manufacture-form`, `.manufacturer-id`, `.manufacture-holder`, `.manufacture-signature`, `.manufacturer-trusted`, `.manufacture-window`, `.manufacture-status-list`, `.manufacture-revoked`, `.device-key`, `.device-id`, `.firmware-form`, `.firmware-signer`, `.firmware-signature`, `.firmware-model`, `.firmware-retracted`, `.firmware-rollback`, `.firmware-software`, `.chain-length`, `.transfer-form`, `.transfer-device`, `.transfer-ids`, `.transfer-from`, `.transfer-prev`, `.transfer-signature`, `.transfer-time`, `.authorization-form`, `.authorization-device`, `.authorization-owner`, `.authorization-ownership`, `.authorization-signature`, `.authorization-window`, `.authorization-action`, `.status-retired`, `.status-suspended`, `.attestation-form`, `.attestation-key`, `.attestation-device`, `.attestation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.attestation-firmware`, `.attestation-ownership`, `.witness-envelope`, `.witness-time`, `.unreadable` |
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| `sdjwt-presentation` (an SD-JWT of IETF RFC 9901, as issued or with its Key Binding JWT, judged with what the verifier brings: the issuer key it chose, a public JWK, never one taken from the token; its clock; its audience and nonce; the issuer and the explicit type it expects; whether it requires key binding and `exp`) | `identity/sdjwt.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `sdjwt.form`, `.alg`, `.typ`, `.crit`, `.key`, `.signature`, `.issuer`, `.sd-alg`, `.disclosure-form`, `.disclosure-twice`, `.digest-twice`, `.disclosure-name`, `.claim-conflict`, `.unreferenced`, `.time`, `.kb-context`, `.kb-required`, `.kb-cnf`, `.kb-claims`, `.kb-audience`, `.kb-nonce`, `.kb-freshness`, `.kb-sd-hash` |
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| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 23 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
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A module verifier exports the list of rules it can name (`REGULI`; its helper throws on any other) and marks its rules in one of two
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ways, both read by the derivation: a marker on every check of a rule (nine modules), or the rule named at every call of the
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@@ -88,15 +91,21 @@ adapter writes them in the reason of the integrity level, and the vectors compar
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So `vectori/device-bundle/resold-after-retirement.valid.json` is `VALID` here, and a verifier that drops the naming still passes it; that the
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naming is there is measured by the device component's own probe, not by this suite.
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**Not enrolled**, counted in the same file: three verifiers of the identity component that sit beside the enrolled one or on top of
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it: SD-JWT (26 calls of its refusal helper), Travel Rule (20 places that add a reason) and compliance (3). Their refusals are texts,
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not rule ids. Their own probes and negative controls stay what checks them.
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The SD-JWT verifier and the SD-JWT VC profile (enrolled 2026-10-18) stop at their first refusal and name its rule: an integrity refusal
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leaves the authenticity level `NOT_MEASURED` (`not-reached`), an authenticity refusal leaves integrity so. A VC presentation whose
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`status` the verifier waived (`requireStatus: false`) and did not judge is `PARTIAL` (`claim-not-checked`), like a credential whose
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status list was not read. The profile imports `sdjwt.mjs` from its real file, so a planted copy of `sdjwt.mjs` is reached only through
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the artifact `sdjwt-presentation`: no `sdjwt-vc-presentation` vector expects a rule of `sdjwt` (they all exercise them).
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**Not enrolled**, counted in the same file: two verifiers of the identity component that sit on top of the enrolled ones: Travel Rule
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(20 places that add a reason) and compliance (3). Their refusals are texts, not rule ids. Their own probes and negative controls stay
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what checks them.
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## The vectors
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`vectori/` holds 467 vectors (458 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 19 MB, since every device and identity vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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`vectori/` holds 553 vectors (544 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 20 MB, since every device and identity vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 194. By expected verdict: 64 `VALID`, 66 `PARTIAL`, 337 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32. By expected verdict: 81 `VALID`, 68 `PARTIAL`, 404 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
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- the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit
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@@ -118,13 +127,22 @@ envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22
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image and its Proof of Software attestation are the fixtures of the device component; `--proaspat --refa device` makes this one
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source anew when the producers of the device component change, and every other vector stays byte for byte); an envelope with
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random content that nobody notarized; a dataset of 16 records with random salts; and the transaction of the recorded receipt read
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from the chain (two read calls).
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from the chain (two read calls); since 2026-10-18 also an SD-JWT and an SD-JWT VC issued with AERE keys (an issuer, a holder, a
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stranger: three hybrid key pairs each, made and discarded), presented to one verifier, the VC's Status List Tokens (clean, revoked,
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suspended, 8 bits, for another uri, expired, by a stranger, typed JWT, without `iat`, too short, ML-DSA-65) and the forged siblings
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only a key holder can make (a key binding JWT by a stranger or without its nonce, a digest signed twice, a nested `_sd_alg`, a
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disclosure named `_sd`, a claim named `__proto__`, an algorithm confusion, a `status` behind a disclosure, and so on);
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- the SD-JWT vectors have two more sources that are fixed text: the example of RFC 9901 Section 5 with the key of its Appendix A.5
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(`identity/fixturi-rfc9901.json`), and the tokens of `@sd-jwt/core` 0.23.0 and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` 0.23.0 with the status lists of
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`@owf/token-status-list` 0.5.0 (`identity/interop/fixturi-interop-*.json`), which the identity component derived from those
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libraries' real output on 2026-10-18, with their public test keys.
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An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 221 of the
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337 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 249 of the
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404 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
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the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner): the other 116 are made at
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the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner; a digest repeated in an SD-JWT must still be
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signed by its issuer, a key binding JWT for another audience by its holder): the other 155 are made at
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the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
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(`mutation.changed`). Eleven vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
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under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
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@@ -136,9 +154,9 @@ key breaks both the id derivation and the match with the manufacturer's credenti
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```
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AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 458 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 544 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 405 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 491 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
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node implementare-aere.mjs <artifact.json> [--online] # one artifact { artifact, input }: its verdict
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```
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@@ -148,8 +166,10 @@ not JSON at all: a file that is not an envelope is refused at the form level, by
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the vectors show (`{ log, head?, signer? }` for an audit log, `{ ledger, policy }` for an agent's ledger, `{ bundle }` for a trust
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chain, `{ presentation, now, audience?, nonce?, trustedIssuers?, statusLists?, revocations?, maxAgeS? }` for a presentation of a
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credential, `{ bundle, now, nonce?, audience?, trustedManufacturers?, statusLists?, firmwarePolicies?, statusRecords?,
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softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? }` for a device bundle: `now`, the verifier's clock, is required for both, since a verdict
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on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not reproduce).
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softwareAttestation?, anchors?, maxAgeS? }` for a device bundle, `{ sdJwt, issuerKey, issuerAlg?, now, audience?, nonce?,
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expectedIssuer?, expectedTyp?, requireKeyBinding?, requireExp?, maxAgeS? }` for an SD-JWT presentation and the same plus
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`{ expectedVct, statusListJwt?, statusListKey?, statusListAlg?, requireStatus? }` for an SD-JWT VC: `now`, the verifier's clock, is
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required for all of them, since a verdict on the clock of the machine that runs a vector would not reproduce).
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An implementation is a command that answers three calls with JSON on stdout: `--capabilities` (`{ artifacts, rules, online, batch }`:
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what it claims to judge), `<vector.json> [--online]` (the verdict above for the file's `{ artifact, input }`), and, if it says
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@@ -159,14 +179,33 @@ exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expec
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refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
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`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 181 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 213 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 405 vectors, among them every vector of
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the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations and the device bundles. For those six verifiers the
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suite has one implementation, ours.
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 491 vectors, among them every vector of
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the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations, the device bundles and the SD-JWT presentations. For
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those eight verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours (for SD-JWT, the identity component measured our verifier against
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`@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` outside this suite; those libraries are not implementations of this suite's contract).
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## How the suite itself is checked
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Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), when the SD-JWT verifier and the SD-JWT VC profile were enrolled (Node.js 24.14.1; the reference
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verifier of the development repository; testnet 28001 read, nothing sent):
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: 12 rows green, 0 red. The rules and the vectors are what the code derives now: 213 rules of
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13 verifiers, 553 vectors (54 of the kind `sdjwt-presentation`, 32 of `sdjwt-vc-presentation`). Every rule has a vector that
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expects it (213 of 213); every artifact kind has a valid vector (17); every invalid vector is its base with one operation (249) or
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one declared producer change (155); the published verifiers pass 553/553; the independent implementation passes all 62 it claims
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and the other 491 are reported not covered; 97,966 malformed inputs given to the module verifiers each got a verdict and none
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threw (4,398 still accepted, at 193 distinct paths, 4 of them of `sdjwt-presentation` and 2 of `sdjwt-vc-presentation`: the
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optional inputs of the verifier, such as the issuer it expects); 183 malformed envelope files given to the reference verifier each
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got a verdict.
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- `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: 295 rows green, 0 red: 213 of 213 rules (each of the 23 rules of the
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SD-JWT verifier and the 9 of the VC profile planted out in turn fails exactly the vectors that expect it), 76 of 76 conditions of
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the device verifier, six controls of the instruments (an implementation that calls everything valid fails 512 of the 544 offline
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vectors). While the enrolment was being made, the control found one thing and it was fixed before this measurement: with
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`vct-expected` planted out, the VC verifier threw on the vector that names no expected type instead of refusing it by the next
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rule, which the suite reported as a broken vector, not as a refusal.
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Measured on 2026-10-14 (UTC), after the third review of the device verifier (Node.js 24.14.1; the AIP-23 reference verifier fetched
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from aere.network/tools with its four sibling files and `npm install` done in an empty folder, as a stranger would; testnet 28001
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read, nothing sent):
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@@ -267,11 +306,11 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
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## What it is not, and what is not measured
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- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
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467 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
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553 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
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- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
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The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 181; the other
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175 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier and the device
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verifier, are judged here by one implementation.
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The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 213; the other
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207 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
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verifier and the SD-JWT verifiers, are judged here by one implementation.
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- **Finality is the chain's.** The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the
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artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.
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- **Five of the six finality refusals have no vector.** The reference verifier can refuse at its finality level in six places; the
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@@ -320,7 +359,12 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
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not read them; the statement carries its own `kind`, which is under the hash. (This file used to quote 526 malformed envelopes,
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a figure of 2026-10-03 from a run whose script was not kept; the row above replaces it.)
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- **Not part of AIP-23.** The rule ids, the four levels and the verdict form are this suite's reading of the published verifiers;
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AIP-23 defines the envelope. The device verifier is enrolled. Of the identity verifiers published beside these, the presentation verifier is enrolled; SD-JWT,
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Travel Rule and compliance are not.
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AIP-23 defines the envelope. The device verifier is enrolled. Of the identity verifiers published beside these, the presentation
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verifier, the SD-JWT verifier and the SD-JWT VC profile are enrolled; Travel Rule and compliance are not.
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- **The SD-JWT vectors say what two libraries agree on, on these inputs.** The tokens of `@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` in
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the SD-JWT vectors are the fixtures the identity component derived from those libraries' real output on 2026-10-18 (their versions
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are in the vector sources); the expected verdicts are those of our verifiers on them, which the identity component measured against
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the libraries' own verdicts in both directions. A verifier that resolves the issuer key from `iss` or `x5c`, fetches the status list
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or the type metadata, or takes an untyped token by default, is judged here on inputs where all of that is already brought.
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- **The Python implementation** writes numbers the way JavaScript does only for integers and plain decimals, and sorts keys by code
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point (JavaScript's order for keys in the Basic Multilingual Plane).
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