ai-trust, proof-of-ai, verifiable-data: the trust chain of an AI result, the AIP-23 envelope of an agent action, and a dataset whose answers are checkable without the data
ai-trust/ links six existing proofs (agent identity, model artifact attestation, host runtime record, policy and signed ledger,
Proof of AI envelope, on-chain witness) into one bundle judged by one verifier that checks only the links; 13/13 in the lab,
16/16 live on testnet 28001 (ledger head notarized). proof-of-ai/ is the AIP-23 envelope builder it uses. verifiable-data/
publishes append-only versions with an RFC 9162 root and a sorted index per field, range and equality queries proven correct
and complete, selective disclosure per field, availability by sampling, and the AIP-23 data envelope notarized (version 2 on
testnet 28001). agents/agent-ancora.mjs gains notarizeEnvelope({kind}), the general form of notarizeHead. Each README says what
is not built: zero-knowledge queries need a prover and are not here. No third party has reviewed any of this.
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@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ notarization command of the verification layer, and the agents' x402 wallet (EIP
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| [`readiness/`](readiness/) | the post-quantum readiness scanner of a public hostname: real TLS handshakes (hybrid only, hybrid preferred, TLS 1.2), HSTS, the certificate; no connection to an address not proven public; a rate limit per client that X-Forwarded-For cannot bypass |
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| [`control-plane/`](control-plane/) | from findings to a finished migration: a prioritized plan from the inventory and the scanner, its execution through the gateway, KMS and PKI with consent per action and a measured proof afterwards, recipes for the servers the products do not touch and a rescan that judges them, a compliance report against NIST IR 8547, the EU roadmap and optionally CNSA 2.0, and a console that checks it all again |
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| [`agents/`](agents/) | limits an AI agent cannot break unseen: a post-quantum identity (ML-DSA-65), a policy (spending per time window, allowed tools and recipients, which actions need human approval), a signed ledger of every action judged against the policy, approvals and revocation signed by people, and a verifier that re-runs the policy over the whole ledger without trusting the agent; two branches of one ledger are a proof of equivocation anyone can check; and a wallet that pays over x402 only what the agent's ledger records and its policy allows, either holding the payment key for the owner or co-signing from a 2-of-2 contract wallet that neither the agent nor the owner can spend alone; both run on the public testnet with their evidence; and the chain as the witness of a ledger: a notarized head, read through the AIP-23 verifier under a post-quantum certified anchor, bounds entry times from below (a backdated entry is caught) |
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| [`proof-of-ai/`](proof-of-ai/) | the AIP-23 envelope of an AI agent's action: model, version, weights digest, prompt, input, output, tools, agent, requester, as digests; verified by the same AIP-23 verifier as every other proof |
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| [`verifiable-data/`](verifiable-data/) | a dataset whose every answer is checkable against a short commitment without the data: RFC 9162 commitments per version (append-only, consistency proofs), equality and range queries proven correct AND complete (contiguous run of a sorted index plus its two neighbours), hash-based selective disclosure of fields, availability sampling against the serving endpoint, and the version's AIP-23 envelope notarized and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; not zero knowledge, and says so |
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| [`ai-trust/`](ai-trust/) | the trust chain of an AI result: the agent's identity (agents/), the model artifact's attestation, the host's runtime record (verify-layer/), the policy and signed ledger, the Proof of AI envelope and the chain as witness, joined in one bundle whose verifier checks only the links between them |
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| [`identity/`](identity/) | post-quantum credentials: an issuer signs claims (hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both required), the holder shows only the claims it picks (selective disclosure in the manner of SD-JWT, RFC 9901, in a format of its own), bound to the verifier's audience and nonce; delegation to a phone, an agent or a ten-minute session key that can only narrow; revocation and an issuer status list in the manner of W3C Bitstring Status List; all checked offline from the files; and compliance without surveillance: a verifier's policy (issuers, required claims) judged on a presentation, recorded as an AIP-23 envelope that carries no personal data; and the Travel Rule between VASPs, the IVMS101 data sealed for the receiving VASP with a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation, signed, bound to the transfer and acknowledged; and the same credentials as standard SD-JWT (IETF RFC 9901): issued with the issuer's Ed25519 key (EdDSA) or its ML-DSA-65 key, presented with a key binding JWT, and verified against the RFC's own example vectors (`identity-cli.mjs verify-sdjwt`, behind Aere Cloud's POST /v1/identity/sd-jwt/verify) |
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Each component's README says what it is **not** and what is **not measured**. No third party has reviewed any of them.
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@@ -37,6 +40,9 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
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| control-plane | planner 30/30, command line 9/9, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers, compliance report 27/27 (with the AIP-23 verifier), console 8/8; the console viewer in a real Chromium, phone and desktop, 26/26 (`node proba-consola-web.mjs`, measured 2026-09-30; needs `playwright-core` and a Chromium, otherwise it exits 2) | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository; viewer 8/8 (`node control-negativ-consola-web.mjs`) |
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| identity | 44/44 (`node proba-identity.mjs`, with the AIP-23 verifier for its envelope test; without it that test is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), compliance 15/15 (`node proba-conformitate.mjs`), Travel Rule 19/19 (`node proba-travel-rule.mjs`), SD-JWT 23/23 (`node proba-sdjwt.mjs`, the RFC 9901 vectors included), measured 2026-09-30 | 49/49 (`node control-negativ-identity.mjs`); compliance 14/14 (`node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs`); Travel Rule 19/19 (`node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs`); SD-JWT 28/28 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt.mjs`) |
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| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 51/51, approval and revocation 39/39, the chain as witness 26/26 without a network and 7/7 on testnet 28001 on 2026-09-30 (`proba-agent-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier), command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); x402 wallet 25/25, 2-of-2 co-signing 16/16 and payment verifier 14/14 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 with the wallet key and 13/13 with the 2-of-2 contract wallet (`x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, `x402/proba-cosign-testnet.mjs`, each needs a funded testnet key); the contract's artifact recompiles byte for byte with solc 0.8.23 (`node x402/recompileaza-contract.mjs --solc <solc>`) | 26/26 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); the chain as witness 11/11 (`node control-negativ-ancora.mjs`); x402 30/30 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`); the contract's own tests (7) and their negative control (4/4) run in the Aere Network contracts project, not in this repository |
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| proof-of-ai | 6/6 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-of-ai.mjs`); without it the probe reports NEMASURAT and exits 2 | one negative control inside the test (an envelope touched after its hash: INVALID) |
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| verifiable-data | 22/22 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-verifiable-data.mjs`: honest answers VALID, nine forged ones INVALID for their named reason, availability sampling on a local server; the envelope row is NEMASURAT without the verifier, exit 2); 24/24 with `--viu` on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (a version notarized with a test key and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; evidence in `dovezi/`) | 5/5 (`node proba-verifiable-data.mjs --control-negativ`: field commitment, index order, completeness, consistency, sampling, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
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| ai-trust | 13/13 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs`: the whole chain on a committed fixture, then ten links broken on purpose, each refused for its named reason); without the verifier it exits 2 | 8/8 (`node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs --control-negativ`) |
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Code comments, most function and variable names (also many exported between the files of a component), test names and control
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messages are in Romanian, and so are the two command words of the KMS HSM tool (explained in its README). Error codes, error
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@@ -45,4 +51,4 @@ interface, command line and data (`definePolicy`, `verifyLedger`, `approve`, ...
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## Licence
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MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 158 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 42, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 19, agents 39, identity 15, readiness 4).
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MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 174 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 42, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 19, agents 39, identity 15, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, readiness 4).
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