conformance: a conformance suite for the AIP-23 proof kinds (one verdict form over the published verifiers, 35 rules derived from code, 122 vectors, a runner for any implementation, a second verifier in Python); four defects it found in the published verifiers are fixed here: the market judge accepted a timeline with its submission event withheld, and three verifiers threw on malformed input instead of refusing by name

This commit is contained in:
Aere Network committed 2026-10-03 13:26:03 +03:00
1 parent 2c000478dc
commit c9f2932e04
145 files changed
+17395 -104

No files matched your search

+6 -4
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ notarization command of the verification layer, and the agents' x402 wallet (EIP
| [`market-settlement/`](market-settlement/) | the dispute and settlement rail of a verifiable infrastructure market, measured end to end on testnet 28001: an order with its reward in escrow and a provider bond, the result committed on chain with its execution envelope notarized under a post-quantum certified anchor, a challenge window in which anyone disputes with a recomputed result and a bond, an arbiter that can only route the escrow (with a permissionless 14-day timeout), deadline reclaims, and an AIP-23 settlement receipt; a pure judge over the job's timeline that checks deadlines, the window, who resolved, the payout, the replay and the proof |
| [`verifiable-data/`](verifiable-data/) | a dataset whose every answer is checkable against a short commitment without the data: RFC 9162 commitments per version (append-only, consistency proofs), equality and range queries proven correct AND complete (contiguous run of a sorted index plus its two neighbours), hash-based selective disclosure of fields, availability sampling against the serving endpoint, and the version's AIP-23 envelope notarized and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; not zero knowledge, and says so |
| [`ai-trust/`](ai-trust/) | the trust chain of an AI result: the agent's identity (agents/), the model artifact's attestation, the host's runtime record (verify-layer/), the policy and signed ledger, the Proof of AI envelope and the chain as witness, joined in one bundle whose verifier checks only the links between them |
| [`conformance/`](conformance/) | a conformance suite for the AIP-23 proof kinds: one verdict form over the verifiers published here (four levels: integrity, authenticity, anchoring, finality; each passed, failed or not measured, with the named rule), 122 vectors derived from the producers and from evidence recorded on testnet 28001 (each invalid one is one operation away from a valid one and must be refused for exactly its named rule), and a runner that scores any implementation given as a command, in any language. Not a certification and not an audit |
| [`identity/`](identity/) | post-quantum credentials: an issuer signs claims (hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both required), the holder shows only the claims it picks (selective disclosure in the manner of SD-JWT, RFC 9901, in a format of its own), bound to the verifier's audience and nonce; delegation to a phone, an agent or a ten-minute session key that can only narrow; revocation and an issuer status list in the manner of W3C Bitstring Status List; all checked offline from the files; and compliance without surveillance: a verifier's policy (issuers, required claims) judged on a presentation, recorded as an AIP-23 envelope that carries no personal data; and the Travel Rule between VASPs, the IVMS101 data sealed for the receiving VASP with a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation, signed, bound to the transfer and acknowledged; and the same credentials as standard SD-JWT (IETF RFC 9901): issued with the issuer's Ed25519 key (EdDSA) or its ML-DSA-65 key, presented with a key binding JWT, and verified against the RFC's own example vectors (`identity-cli.mjs verify-sdjwt`, behind Aere Cloud's POST /v1/identity/sd-jwt/verify) |
Each component's README says what it is **not** and what is **not measured**. No third party has reviewed any of them.
@@ -43,10 +44,11 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
| identity | 44/44 (`node proba-identity.mjs`, with the AIP-23 verifier for its envelope test; without it that test is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), compliance 15/15 (`node proba-conformitate.mjs`), Travel Rule 19/19 (`node proba-travel-rule.mjs`), SD-JWT 23/23 (`node proba-sdjwt.mjs`, the RFC 9901 vectors included), measured 2026-09-30 | 49/49 (`node control-negativ-identity.mjs`); compliance 14/14 (`node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs`); Travel Rule 19/19 (`node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs`); SD-JWT 28/28 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt.mjs`) |
| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 51/51, approval and revocation 39/39, the chain as witness 26/26 without a network and 7/7 on testnet 28001 on 2026-09-30 (`proba-agent-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier), command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); x402 wallet 25/25, 2-of-2 co-signing 16/16 and payment verifier 14/14 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 with the wallet key and 13/13 with the 2-of-2 contract wallet (`x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, `x402/proba-cosign-testnet.mjs`, each needs a funded testnet key); the contract's artifact recompiles byte for byte with solc 0.8.23 (`node x402/recompileaza-contract.mjs --solc <solc>`) | 26/26 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); the chain as witness 11/11 (`node control-negativ-ancora.mjs`); x402 30/30 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`); the contract's own tests (7) and their negative control (4/4) run in the Aere Network contracts project, not in this repository |
| proof-of-ai | 6/6 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-of-ai.mjs`); without it the probe reports NEMASURAT and exits 2 | one negative control inside the test (an envelope touched after its hash: INVALID) |
| payments | 22/22 without a chain (`node proba-risc.mjs`: the verdicts under a policy, the reproducible verdict hash, a receipt verified, nine forged ones refused by name); 9/9 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-plata-28001.mjs`: a payment allowed, paid, its receipt notarized and read back with finality PASSED, the public reader VALID; a payment above the limit refused with nothing sent; the fourth in the window refused; a forged receipt and a loosened policy INVALID) | 8/8 (`node proba-risc.mjs --control-negativ`: counterparty, rate, per-payment limit, window, linkage, USD arithmetic, verdict reproduction, chain facts, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| market-settlement | 20/20 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-piata-28001.mjs`: five scenarios on AereComputeMarketV3 deployed from the committed artifact, every refusal by its named custom error, the provider's notarized envelope read back under a post-quantum certified anchor); the judge on the recorded timelines 16/16 without a chain (`node proba-judecata.mjs`: five honest timelines VALID, ten forged ones INVALID for their named reason, the settlement receipt) | 7/7 (`node proba-judecata.mjs --control-negativ`: deadline, window, arbiter, payout, result bytes, replay, proof, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| verifiable-data | 22/22 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-verifiable-data.mjs`: honest answers VALID, nine forged ones INVALID for their named reason, availability sampling on a local server; the envelope row is NEMASURAT without the verifier, exit 2); 24/24 with `--viu` on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (a version notarized with a test key and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; evidence in `dovezi/`) | 5/5 (`node proba-verifiable-data.mjs --control-negativ`: field commitment, index order, completeness, consistency, sampling, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| payments | 23/23 without a chain (`node proba-risc.mjs`: the verdicts under a policy, the reproducible verdict hash, a receipt verified, nine forged ones refused by name, a malformed payment refused by name); 9/9 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-plata-28001.mjs`: a payment allowed, paid, its receipt notarized and read back with finality PASSED, the public reader VALID; a payment above the limit refused with nothing sent; the fourth in the window refused; a forged receipt and a loosened policy INVALID) | 10/10 (`node proba-risc.mjs --control-negativ`: form, asset, counterparty, rate, per-payment limit, window, linkage, USD arithmetic, verdict reproduction, chain facts, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| market-settlement | 20/20 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-piata-28001.mjs`: five scenarios on AereComputeMarketV3 deployed from the committed artifact, every refusal by its named custom error, the provider's notarized envelope read back under a post-quantum certified anchor); the judge on the recorded timelines 21/21 without a chain (`node proba-judecata.mjs`: five honest timelines VALID, fifteen forged or malformed ones INVALID for their named reason, the settlement receipt) | 10/10 (`node proba-judecata.mjs --control-negativ`: form, completeness of the timeline, posting, deadline, window, arbiter, payout, result bytes, replay, proof, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| verifiable-data | 23/23 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-verifiable-data.mjs`: honest answers VALID, ten forged or malformed ones INVALID for their named reason, availability sampling on a local server; the envelope row is NEMASURAT without the verifier, exit 2); the two chain rows of `--viu` measured on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (a version notarized with a test key and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; evidence in `dovezi/`) | 5/5 (`node proba-verifiable-data.mjs --control-negativ`: field commitment, index order, completeness, consistency, sampling, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
| ai-trust | 13/13 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs`: the whole chain on a committed fixture, then ten links broken on purpose, each refused for its named reason); without the verifier it exits 2 | 8/8 (`node proba-lant-de-incredere.mjs --control-negativ`) |
| conformance | 10/10 on 2026-10-03 with the AIP-23 verifier, Python 3 and testnet 28001 read (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-conformance.mjs --online`: the rules and the vectors are what the code derives, every rule has a vector, every invalid vector is one operation from its base, the published verifiers pass 122/122, an independent Python implementation passes the 55 it claims, 6,847 malformed inputs each get a verdict); without `--online` the five chain vectors are reported unmeasured and the exit code is 2 | 35/35 rules (`node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ --online`: each rule planted out of its verifier in a copy; the vectors that expect it, and only they, must fail), then five controls of the instruments |
Code comments, most function and variable names (also many exported between the files of a component), test names and control
messages are in Romanian, and so are the two command words of the KMS HSM tool (explained in its README). Error codes, error
@@ -55,4 +57,4 @@ interface, command line and data (`definePolicy`, `verifyLedger`, `approve`, ...
## Licence
MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 191 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 42, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 19, agents 39, identity 15, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, readiness 4).
MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 325 (pq-gateway 6, pq-kms 10, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 42, verify-layer 12, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 19, agents 39, identity 15, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 134, readiness 4).