crypto-inventory 0.4.0: Swift and Kotlin detectors (CryptoKit, CommonCrypto, Security.framework, Android Keystore, Tink, OkHttp, the libsignal Swift and Android APIs), Apple and Android manifests; remediation recipes for Apache and HAProxy measured on real servers, HAProxy precondition fixed
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@@ -227,6 +227,8 @@ export function evalueaza(a) {
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}
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if (g === 'MAC') {
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// 0.4.0 (2026-10-18): autentificatoare care nu sunt HMAC (Poly1305 din CryptoSwift, AES-CMAC din Tink): numite, fara hash
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if (!a.hash && a.nume) return f({ nume: a.nume, primitiv: 'mac', ...rez({ c: CLS.S, motiv: `${a.nume}: symmetric authenticator; a quantum attacker gains at most a quadratic speed-up (Grover) on key search.` }) });
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if (!a.hash) return f({ nume: 'HMAC', primitiv: 'mac', ...rez({ c: CLS.U, motiv: 'HMAC whose hash function is bound to the key object (set where the key is imported or generated), not visible at this call.', rec: REC.UNKNOWN }) });
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const h = HASH[a.hash];
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const nume = `HMAC-${h ? h.n : String(a.hash || 'unknown')}`;
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@@ -295,6 +297,14 @@ export function evalueaza(a) {
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return f({ nume: a.nume, primitiv: 'kem', ...rez({ c: CLS.S, motiv: `${a.nume}: hybrid key exchange (classical ECDH + ML-KEM); stays secure if either component holds. The NIST category given is that of the ML-KEM component.${nota}`, q: pq }) });
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}
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if (g === 'TLS') return tls(a, f);
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// 0.4.0 (2026-10-18, dupa fisierul 8 din raportul libsignal: rustls folosit NUMAI ca verificator de certificate iesea "X25519, schimba
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// furnizorul"): verificarea unui lant de certificate (PKIX in JCA, X509TrustManager, SecTrustEvaluate, pinning) e o expunere de
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// AUTENTIFICARE (lantul e semnat clasic de CA), nu un schimb de cheie; nimic de recoltat acum, nimic de schimbat in codul acesta singur.
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if (g === 'PKI-VERIFY') {
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const nume = a.nume || 'X.509 chain validation (PKIX)';
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const nota = a.nota ? ` ${a.nota}` : '';
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return f({ nume, primitiv: 'signature', ...rez({ c: CLS.V, qv: true, motiv: `${nume}: the certificate chain is authenticated by the issuing CA's classical signatures (RSA or ECDSA), which a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could forge; this is an authentication exposure (impersonation once such a computer exists), not a harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure, since no key is exchanged here.${nota}`, rec: 'Nothing to change in this code alone: certificate chains move to post-quantum or composite signatures only when the issuing CA offers them (no public CA did when this rule was written). Until then keep the trust store small, prefer short-lived certificates, and plan the switch of the trust anchors when post-quantum roots are published.', q: 0 }) });
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}
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if (g === 'JWT-HMAC') {
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const h = HASH[a.hash];
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return f({ nume: a.nume, primitiv: 'mac', ...rez({ c: CLS.S, motiv: `${a.nume} is HMAC-${h ? h.n : a.hash}: symmetric, so a quantum attacker gains at most a quadratic speed-up (Grover); the shared secret must be long and random.` }) });
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