pq-secrets: a zero-trust secrets service on top of pq-kms (each request authorized by an Aere Identity presentation signed for that exact request, per-secret policy whose non-admin grants can only narrow, the same refusal for every unauthorized caller, every operation a signed AIP-23 secret-access envelope); identity: a presentation optionally signed for one exact request; proof-kinds: secret-access with requestHash; conformance 240 rules, 626 vectors
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@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
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# proof-kinds: one builder for every AIP-23 proof kind
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A generic builder of AERE Proof Protocol envelopes (AIP-23) for the standard proof kinds: `data`, `execution`, `identity`,
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`compliance`, `runtime`, `location`, `device`, `payment`, `ownership`, `time`, `block`, `authorization`, `settlement` and
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`provenance`. Every kind produces the same envelope (`statement` plus `statementHash`, the SHA-256 of the canonical statement
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text), so the same AIP-23 reference verifier checks all of them with no kind-specific verification code.
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`compliance`, `runtime`, `location`, `device`, `payment`, `ownership`, `time`, `block`, `authorization`, `settlement`,
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`provenance` and, since 2026-10-18, `secret-access`. Every kind produces the same envelope (`statement` plus `statementHash`, the
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SHA-256 of the canonical statement text), so the same AIP-23 reference verifier checks all of them with no kind-specific
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verification code.
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```
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import { buildProof, KINDS } from './proof-kinds.mjs';
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@@ -15,7 +16,24 @@ A kind is a schema: its required fields, some of them digests, plus `createdAt`.
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an envelope carries digests, never the raw content. A missing required field stops the build with an error instead of producing
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an incomplete envelope. Notarization and the post-quantum certificate over it come from AIP-23, not from this builder.
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Test: `node proba-proof-kinds.mjs` (24 checks: every kind built and found `VALID` by the reference verifier, six negative
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controls such as content changed after hashing or a required field missing, no raw content in any envelope, bytes hashed as
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bytes). It needs the AIP-23 reference verifier: `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<path to verify-proof.mjs>` (as published at
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`secret-access` is the audit entry of the secrets service (`pq-secrets/`): the service (its audience), the secret name, the version,
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the operation, the verdict (`allowed`, `refused`, or since 2026-10-18 `failed`: allowed and entered, then the change could not be
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stored) with the rules that refused, the grant that allowed, the holder and the presenter (key-derived `aere-id` identities,
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verified), the digest of the presentation's signed binding (`presentationHash`) and of the grant's policy (`policyHash`). It never
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carries the secret value, nor a digest of it: a digest of a guessable value does not hide it. Since 2026-10-18 (the adversarial
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review of the secrets service) it may also carry `requestHash` (the digest of the request received, already a 32-byte hash),
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`claimedHolder` / `claimedPresenter` (ids a presentation claimed and nobody verified) and `judged` (on a refusal, each grant judged
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with the rules it refused on); envelopes without these fields are byte for byte what they were.
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**A kind may have a vocabulary** (`valori` in its schema: per field, a predicate and what it says), judged by `buildProof` on every
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field present; `secret-access` is the only kind with one: `verdict` is `allowed`, `refused` or `failed`, `operation` one of the
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operations of the secrets service (`SECRET_ACCESS.operations`, which the service requires to be its own list), `version` an integer of
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at least 1 or `null`, `rules` a list of rule names, ids `aere-id:` + 40 hex or `null`, `createdAt` an RFC 3339 time. An envelope with
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the verdict `banana` is no longer built. The reference verifier does not judge vocabularies (it judges the form and the hash of any
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kind), so an envelope written by hand with such values stays `VALID` there: the vocabulary is the builder's promise, not the
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verifier's. `KINDS.json` of the published copy names the values of each field that has them.
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Test: `node proba-proof-kinds.mjs` (28 checks: every kind built and found `VALID` by the reference verifier, seven negative
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controls such as content changed after hashing, a required field missing or a `secret-access` value outside its vocabulary, no raw
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content in any envelope, bytes hashed as bytes, the new `secret-access` fields, the vocabulary held by that kind alone). It needs the AIP-23 reference verifier: `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<path to verify-proof.mjs>` (as published at
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aere.network/tools, with `verify-anchor.mjs`, `mpt.mjs`, `falcon512.mjs`, `registry-v3.mjs` and `package.json` beside it and `npm install` done there); without it the test reports that it did not measure and exits with 2. Node.js 24.
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
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import fs from 'node:fs'; import crypto from 'node:crypto'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path';
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import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { buildProof, KINDS } from './proof-kinds.mjs';
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import { buildProof, KINDS, SCHEME } from './proof-kinds.mjs';
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const AICI = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
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const VERIFY = process.env.AERE_VERIFY_PROOF ? path.resolve(process.env.AERE_VERIFY_PROOF) : path.resolve(AICI, '..', 'aere-proof-protocol', 'verify.mjs');
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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ function verdict(plicPath) { try { return JSON.parse(execFileSync(process.execPa
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// intrari de proba pentru fiecare fel (continut brut, ca sa verific ca nu se scurge)
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const BRUT = 'CONTINUT-BRUT-BRUT-42';
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const DB = 'db-password'; // numele unui secret din intrarea fixa a felului secret-access (un NUME, nu o valoare)
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const INTRARI = {
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data: { name: 'raport.csv', content: BRUT, createdAt: '2026-09-26T09:00:00Z' },
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execution: { program: 'aere-node', input: BRUT, output: BRUT + 'o', exitCode: 0, createdAt: '2026-09-26T09:00:00Z' },
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@@ -31,10 +32,11 @@ const INTRARI = {
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authorization: { grantor: 'org-x', grantee: 'agent-7', scope: 'payments:send<=100', policy: BRUT, expiresAt: '2026-12-31T00:00:00Z', createdAt: '2026-09-28T09:00:00Z' },
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settlement: { chainId: 2800, txHash: '0x' + '12'.repeat(32), blockHash: '0x' + '34'.repeat(32), from: '0xa', to: '0xb', amount: '100', asset: 'AERE', instruction: BRUT, createdAt: '2026-09-28T09:00:00Z' },
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provenance: { subject: BRUT, parents: [BRUT + '1', BRUT + '2'], process: BRUT + 'p', actor: 'build-bot', createdAt: '2026-09-28T09:00:00Z' },
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'secret-access': { service: 'https://secrets.example', secret: DB, version: 2, operation: 'get', verdict: 'allowed', rules: [], grant: 'deployers', holder: 'aere-id:' + '0'.repeat(40), presenter: 'aere-id:' + '1'.repeat(40), presentation: BRUT, policy: BRUT + 'pol', createdAt: '2026-10-18T09:00:00Z' },
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};
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try {
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cer('schema acopera cele 14 feluri (10 + bloc + autorizare, decontare, provenienta)', KINDS.length >= 14 && ['authorization', 'settlement', 'provenance'].every((k) => KINDS.includes(k)));
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cer('schema acopera cele 15 feluri (10 + bloc + autorizare, decontare, provenienta + acces la secret)', KINDS.length >= 15 && ['authorization', 'settlement', 'provenance', 'secret-access'].every((k) => KINDS.includes(k)));
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for (const k of KINDS) {
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// fiecare fel se judeca separat: un fel care nu se mai poate construi e un RAU numit, nu o exceptie care opreste proba (2026-09-28)
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let plic; try { plic = buildProof(k, INTRARI[k]); } catch (e) { cer(`${k}: constructia a cazut (${e.message})`, false); continue; }
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@@ -69,7 +71,17 @@ try {
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const ps = buildProof('data', { name: 'a', content: 'abc', createdAt: '2026-09-26T09:00:00Z' });
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cer('Buffer/Uint8Array: digestul = sha256 al octetilor (reproductibil cu sha256sum)', pb.statement.sha256 === asteptat && pu.statement.sha256 === asteptat);
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cer('sirurile raman ca inainte (vectorii publicati neschimbati)', ps.statement.sha256 === '0x' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update('abc', 'utf8').digest('hex'));
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// 2026-10-18 (revizuirea adversariala B8): VOCABULARUL felului secret-access. Un plic cu verdictul "banana" era VALID la verificator.
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const SA = INTRARI['secret-access'];
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const rele8b = [['verdict', 'banana'], ['operation', 'fly'], ['rules', 'nu-e-lista'], ['version', -5], ['holder', 'oricine'], ['grant', 42], ['presenter', { x: 1 }], ['createdAt', 'ieri'], ['secret', '../x'], ['judged', [{ grant: 'g' }]], ['claimedPresenter', 'aere-id:XY']]
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.filter(([c, v]) => !arunca(() => buildProof('secret-access', { ...SA, [c]: v })));
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cer('CONTROL: acces la secret cu valori in afara vocabularului (verdict banana, operatie fly, rules sir, version -5, holder oricine, ...) -> eroare la constructie' + (rele8b.length ? ': construite ' + rele8b.map(([c]) => c).join(', ') : ''), rele8b.length === 0);
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const nou = buildProof('secret-access', { ...SA, verdict: 'failed', rules: ['storage'], requestHash: '0x' + 'ab'.repeat(32), claimedPresenter: 'aere-id:' + '2'.repeat(40), judged: [{ grant: 'admin', rules: ['rule'] }] });
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const vechi = buildProof('secret-access', SA);
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cer('acces la secret: requestHash, claimedPresenter, judged si verdictul failed se construiesc; fara ele declaratia are exact campurile de dinainte, in ordinea lor',
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nou.statement.requestHash === '0x' + 'ab'.repeat(32) && nou.statement.verdict === 'failed' && Object.keys(vechi.statement).join(',') === 'v,kind,presentationHash,policyHash,service,secret,version,operation,verdict,rules,grant,holder,presenter,createdAt');
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cer('vocabularul e numai al felului secret-access (celelalte feluri se construiesc exact ca ieri)', KINDS.filter((k) => SCHEME[k].valori).join(',') === 'secret-access');
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} finally { fs.rmSync(T, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
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const total = KINDS.length + 10;
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console.log(`\nProof of everything: ${total - rele}/${total} cum trebuia (${KINDS.length} feluri + 6 controale negative + acoperire + Buffer + parinti)`);
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const total = KINDS.length + 13;
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console.log(`\nProof of everything: ${total - rele}/${total} cum trebuia (${KINDS.length} feluri + 7 controale negative + acoperire + Buffer + parinti + campurile noi + vocabularul)`);
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process.exit(rele ? 1 : 0);
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@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@ const dg = (v) => (v == null ? null : (isDigest(v) ? v.toLowerCase()
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: (Buffer.isBuffer(v) || v instanceof Uint8Array) ? sha256(Buffer.from(v))
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: sha256(Buffer.from(typeof v === 'string' ? v : JSON.stringify(v), 'utf8'))));
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// VOCABULARUL unui fel (2026-10-18, B8): `valori: { camp: [predicat, ce spune] }`, judecat de buildProof pe fiecare camp prezent in
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// declaratie (un camp lipsa il judeca `req`). Un mecanism mic si general; felurile fara `valori` nu se schimba cu nimic.
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// Operatiile si verdictele unui acces la un secret, intr-un singur loc (cloud-gateway/pq-secrets cere, intr-o proba, ca OPERATII lui sa
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// fie exact aceasta lista).
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export const SECRET_ACCESS = Object.freeze({ operations: Object.freeze(['put', 'get', 'metadata', 'rotate', 'revoke-version', 'grant', 'revoke', 'list']), verdicts: Object.freeze(['allowed', 'refused', 'failed']) });
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const NUME_IN_SERVICIU = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$/;
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const eRegula = (r) => typeof r === 'string' && /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$/.test(r);
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const eGrant = (g) => typeof g === 'string' && /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,63}$/.test(g);
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const eIdSauNull = (v) => v === null || (typeof v === 'string' && /^aere-id:[0-9a-f]{40}$/.test(v));
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// schema fiecarui fel: campuri de tip 'digest' (se hashuiesc), 'plain' (raman ca atare), 'bool', 'list'. Toate obligatorii daca in `req`.
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export const SCHEME = {
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'data': { digest: { sha256: 'content' }, plain: { name: 'subject' }, req: ['sha256', 'name'] },
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@@ -45,6 +55,32 @@ export const SCHEME = {
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'settlement': { digest: { instructionHash: 'instruction' }, hash: ['txHash', 'blockHash'], plain: { chainId: 'chainId', from: 'from', to: 'to', amount: 'amount', asset: 'asset' }, req: ['chainId', 'txHash', 'blockHash', 'amount', 'asset'] },
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// provenance: din ce a iesit un artefact (parents), prin ce proces, cine l-a produs
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'provenance': { digest: { subjectHash: 'subject', processHash: 'process' }, list: { parents: 'parentsContent' }, plain: { actor: 'actor' }, req: ['subjectHash', 'parents'] },
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// 2026-10-18 (roadmap pista B, B8, linia Shield): un acces la un secret (cloud-gateway/pq-secrets): ce serviciu (audienta), ce secret, ce
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// versiune, ce operatie, verdictul (allowed | refused) cu regulile care au refuzat, grantul care a permis, detinatorul si prezentatorul
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// (id-uri aere-id, derivate din chei), digestul PREZENTARII (al legaturii semnate: ea numeste prin hash credentialul, dezvaluirile, lantul
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// de delegare, publicul, nonce-ul si momentul) si al politicii grantului. NICIODATA valoarea secretului, nici un digest al ei (un digest
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// al unei valori ghicibile nu o ascunde).
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// 2026-10-18 (revizuirea adversariala B8): `requestHash` (digestul cererii pentru care detinatorul a semnat prezentarea, deja un hash),
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// `claimedHolder` / `claimedPresenter` (id-urile PRETINSE de o prezentare a carei semnatura nu a fost verificata; `holder` si `presenter`
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// poarta numai id-uri verificate), `judged` (pe un refuz: fiecare grant judecat, cu regulile pe care a refuzat) si VOCABULARUL valorilor
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// (`valori`): un plic secret-access cu verdictul "banana" sau operatia "fly" nu se mai poate construi. Campurile noi lipsesc din plicurile
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// de dinainte, deci acelea raman octet cu octet aceleasi.
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'secret-access': { digest: { presentationHash: 'presentation', policyHash: 'policy' }, hash: ['requestHash'], plain: { service: 'service', secret: 'secret', version: 'version', operation: 'operation', verdict: 'verdict', rules: 'rules', grant: 'grant', holder: 'holder', presenter: 'presenter', claimedHolder: 'claimedHolder', claimedPresenter: 'claimedPresenter', judged: 'judged' }, req: ['service', 'operation', 'verdict', 'presentationHash'],
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valori: {
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service: [(v) => typeof v === 'string' && v.length >= 1 && v.length <= 256 && /^[\x21-\x7e]+$/.test(v), '1 to 256 printable ASCII characters without spaces (the audience of the service)'],
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secret: [(v) => v === null || v === '*' || (typeof v === 'string' && NUME_IN_SERVICIU.test(v)), 'a secret name (^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$), "*" for list, or null'],
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version: [(v) => v === null || (Number.isSafeInteger(v) && v >= 1), 'an integer >= 1, or null'],
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operation: [(v) => SECRET_ACCESS.operations.includes(v), SECRET_ACCESS.operations.join(' | ')],
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verdict: [(v) => SECRET_ACCESS.verdicts.includes(v), SECRET_ACCESS.verdicts.join(' | ') + ' (failed: allowed and entered, then the change could not be stored)'],
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rules: [(v) => Array.isArray(v) && v.length <= 128 && v.every(eRegula), 'a list of rule names (^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$), at most 128'],
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grant: [(v) => v === null || eGrant(v), 'a grant id (^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,63}$), or null'],
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holder: [eIdSauNull, 'an aere-id (aere-id: + 40 hex) verified from the presentation, or null'],
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presenter: [eIdSauNull, 'an aere-id verified from the presentation, or null'],
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claimedHolder: [eIdSauNull, 'an aere-id the presentation claims and nobody verified, or null'],
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claimedPresenter: [eIdSauNull, 'an aere-id the presentation claims and nobody verified, or null'],
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judged: [(v) => Array.isArray(v) && v.length <= 64 && v.every((x) => x && typeof x === 'object' && !Array.isArray(x) && Object.keys(x).sort().join(',') === 'grant,rules' && eGrant(x.grant) && Array.isArray(x.rules) && x.rules.length <= 64 && x.rules.every(eRegula)), 'a list of { grant, rules }, at most 64'],
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createdAt: [(v) => typeof v === 'string' && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d{1,9})?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})$/.test(v) && !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(v)), 'an RFC 3339 time'],
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} },
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};
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export const KINDS = Object.keys(SCHEME);
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@@ -81,6 +117,9 @@ export function buildProof(kind, p = {}) {
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for (const r of s.req) {
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if (statement[r] === undefined || statement[r] === null) throw new Error('proof-kinds: ' + kind + ' needs the field "' + r + '"');
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}
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for (const [camp, [bun, spune]] of Object.entries(s.valori || {})) {
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if (statement[camp] !== undefined && !bun(statement[camp])) throw new Error('proof-kinds: ' + kind + ' field "' + camp + '" has a value outside its vocabulary (' + spune + ')');
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}
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const text = JSON.stringify(statement); // canonic AIP-23
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return { v: 1, kind: 'aere-proof-of-' + kind + '-attestation', statement, statementHash: sha256(Buffer.from(text, 'utf8')) };
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}
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