pq-secrets: a zero-trust secrets service on top of pq-kms (each request authorized by an Aere Identity presentation signed for that exact request, per-secret policy whose non-admin grants can only narrow, the same refusal for every unauthorized caller, every operation a signed AIP-23 secret-access envelope); identity: a presentation optionally signed for one exact request; proof-kinds: secret-access with requestHash; conformance 240 rules, 626 vectors
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@@ -49,6 +49,19 @@ delegation chain, the verifier's audience and nonce, and the time. Without the v
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for someone else would be accepted, so `verify` reports those checks as not judged instead of passing them. A nonce is the
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verifier's to make fresh and to accept once: a verifier that reuses one accepts a replay within the presentation's age limit.
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**A presentation can also be bound to one request** (since 2026-10-18): `present({ ..., request })` puts `request`, the digest of
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what the holder asks the verifier to do (`0x` + 64 lowercase hex, computed by the verifier's own rule from the request), into the
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binding before it is signed, and `verifyPresentation(p, { ..., request })` then requires exactly that digest (rule `request`: another
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digest, or none at all, is a refusal). Without it the signature covers who the presentation is for, but not what it is used for: a
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presentation made for "read secret db" was handed over as "revoke a grant on db" (the adversarial review of the secrets service).
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A verifier that gives no request leaves a binding that carries one **not judged** (cause `request`), like the audience and the nonce;
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a binding without one, judged by a verifier that gives none, has no request row at all, so every presentation made before the field
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existed verifies exactly as before. The model is `transaction_data` in OpenID for Verifiable Presentations 1.0 (Final, 9 July 2025):
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section 5.1 (the request parameter), section 8.4 (the data signed with the same key as the proof of possession) and appendix B.3.3
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(the `transaction_data_hashes` of the SD-JWT VC Key Binding JWT, SHA-256 by default). `checkCompliance` passes `request` through, and
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takes a `cache` (a `Map` made by the caller for one presentation) so that a service judging the same presentation against many
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policies verifies its signatures once per distinct pair of trusted issuers and maximum age, with the same result as without it.
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Inputs the verifier fetched and cannot read (a malformed status list or revocation) are ignored and reported, never counted against
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the credential; a malformed trusted issuer key is the verifier's own error and stops the verification.
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@@ -287,15 +300,15 @@ the table says, row by row, what is measured here.
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Since 2026-10-05 every refusal of `verifyPresentation` names its rule. A row is `{ name, pass, detail, rule }`; a row that was not
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judged is `{ name, pass: null, detail, unjudged }` with its cause. The result carries `rules`, the sorted ids of the rules that
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refused, and `unjudged`, the sorted causes of what was not judged. The module exports the lists: `REGULI` (37 rules), `NEJUDECATE`
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(7 causes) and `OPRIRI` (the four rules after whose refusal other checks were not made: `form`, `chain-length`, `delegation-form`,
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refused, and `unjudged`, the sorted causes of what was not judged. The module exports the lists: `REGULI` (38 rules since 2026-10-18, with `request`), `NEJUDECATE`
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(8 causes) and `OPRIRI` (the four rules after whose refusal other checks were not made: `form`, `chain-length`, `delegation-form`,
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`unreadable`). A time field that cannot be read (a credential's validity, a delegation's or a presentation's bounds) and a malformed
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earlier link are reported as `unreadable`, which is one of the stopping rules: the checks after it are not made. The verifier does
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not stop at its first refusal: it makes every check it can reach. `valid` is unchanged: true when
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no row failed, also when rows were not judged; a caller that needs "nothing left unjudged" reads `unjudged`.
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With these ids the presentation verifier is enrolled in the conformance suite beside this folder (`conformance/`: 37 rules,
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65 vectors of the artifact kind `identity-presentation`, each rule taken out of a copy of the verifier in turn). Since 2026-10-18 the
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With these ids the presentation verifier is enrolled in the conformance suite beside this folder (`conformance/`: 38 rules,
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69 vectors of the artifact kind `identity-presentation`, four of them for `request` since 2026-10-18, each rule taken out of a copy of the verifier in turn). Since 2026-10-18 the
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SD-JWT verifier and the SD-JWT VC profile are enrolled there too: `verifySdJwt` names the rule of its refusal (`rule`, one of the 23 of
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`REGULI` in `sdjwt.mjs`: `form`, `alg`, `typ`, `crit`, `key`, `signature`, `issuer`, `sd-alg`, `disclosure-form`, `disclosure-twice`,
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`digest-twice`, `disclosure-name`, `claim-conflict`, `unreferenced`, `time`, `kb-context`, `kb-required`, `kb-cnf`, `kb-claims`,
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@@ -343,10 +356,10 @@ line is reported as not judged. The private key files are written with mode 0600
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## Tests
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```
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node proba-identity.mjs # 46: the paths above, each attack of the adversarial review as its own test, the named rules
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node control-negativ-identity.mjs # on a copy, each of 53 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
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node proba-conformitate.mjs # 15: compliance policies judged on real presentations, the record without personal data, the command line
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node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs # on a copy, each of 14 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
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node proba-identity.mjs # 52: the paths above, each attack of the adversarial review as its own test, the named rules
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node control-negativ-identity.mjs # on a copy, each of 57 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
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node proba-conformitate.mjs # 18: compliance policies judged on real presentations, the record without personal data, the command line
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node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs # on a copy, each of 17 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
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node proba-travel-rule.mjs # 19: two VASPs with registry credentials, the whole exchange, and each attack of the review
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node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs # on a copy, each of 19 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
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node proba-sdjwt.mjs # 25: the RFC 9901 vectors, SD-JWTs issued with AERE keys (EdDSA and ML-DSA-65), each attack, the fixtures of @sd-jwt/core
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