pq-secrets: a zero-trust secrets service on top of pq-kms (each request authorized by an Aere Identity presentation signed for that exact request, per-secret policy whose non-admin grants can only narrow, the same refusal for every unauthorized caller, every operation a signed AIP-23 secret-access envelope); identity: a presentation optionally signed for one exact request; proof-kinds: secret-access with requestHash; conformance 240 rules, 626 vectors

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@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
## What is enrolled
`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 239 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
2026-10-18, when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 187 rules are reported at `integrity`, 49 at
`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 240 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
2026-10-18: 239 when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled, 240 with `identity.request` later that day; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 188 rules are reported at `integrity`, 49 at
`authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at `anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By leve
| `audit-log` (a hash-chained log, alone or against an attested head, signed or not) | `verify-layer/sidecar.mjs` | 13: `auditlog.entry`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.hash`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.head-unsigned`, `.head-scheme`, `.head-key`, `.head-signature`, `.head-signer`, `.head-short`, `.head-rewritten` |
| `audit-inclusion`, `audit-consistency` (RFC 9162 proofs over that log) | `verify-layer/jurnal-arbore.mjs` | 12: `audittree.proof-form`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.inclusion-index`, `.inclusion-entry`, `.inclusion-envelope`, `.inclusion-leaf`, `.inclusion-path`, `.inclusion-head`, `.consistency-start`, `.consistency-end`, `.consistency` |
| `agent-ledger` (an agent's signed ledger under its policy) | `agents/agent-ledger.mjs` | 16: `agents.ledger-form`, `.policy`, `.other-policy`, `.session`, `.key`, `.identity`, `.anchor`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.body`, `.signature`, `.hash`, `.time`, `.revocation`, `.approvals`, `.decision` |
| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 37: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable` |
| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 38: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable`, `.request` (since 2026-10-18: the presentation commits to the request the verifier received, OpenID4VP `transaction_data`) |
| `device-bundle` (the chain of a device: the manufacturer's credential for the device key, a firmware release, the ownership transfers, the owner's authorization, the device's attestation and its AIP-23 envelope, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock, nonce and audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists, firmware policies and status records it read, its own reading of the notarized envelope) | `device-identity/device.mjs` | 47: `device.form`, `.manufacture-form`, `.manufacturer-id`, `.manufacture-holder`, `.manufacture-signature`, `.manufacturer-trusted`, `.manufacture-window`, `.manufacture-status-list`, `.manufacture-revoked`, `.device-key`, `.device-id`, `.firmware-form`, `.firmware-signer`, `.firmware-signature`, `.firmware-model`, `.firmware-retracted`, `.firmware-rollback`, `.firmware-software`, `.chain-length`, `.transfer-form`, `.transfer-device`, `.transfer-ids`, `.transfer-from`, `.transfer-prev`, `.transfer-signature`, `.transfer-time`, `.authorization-form`, `.authorization-device`, `.authorization-owner`, `.authorization-ownership`, `.authorization-signature`, `.authorization-window`, `.authorization-action`, `.status-retired`, `.status-suspended`, `.attestation-form`, `.attestation-key`, `.attestation-device`, `.attestation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.attestation-firmware`, `.attestation-ownership`, `.witness-envelope`, `.witness-time`, `.unreadable` |
| `sdjwt-presentation` (an SD-JWT of IETF RFC 9901, as issued or with its Key Binding JWT, judged with what the verifier brings: the issuer key it chose, a public JWK, never one taken from the token; its clock; its audience and nonce; the issuer and the explicit type it expects; whether it requires key binding and `exp`) | `identity/sdjwt.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `sdjwt.form`, `.alg`, `.typ`, `.crit`, `.key`, `.signature`, `.issuer`, `.sd-alg`, `.disclosure-form`, `.disclosure-twice`, `.digest-twice`, `.disclosure-name`, `.claim-conflict`, `.unreferenced`, `.time`, `.kb-context`, `.kb-required`, `.kb-cnf`, `.kb-claims`, `.kb-audience`, `.kb-nonce`, `.kb-freshness`, `.kb-sd-hash` |
| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 23 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
@@ -116,12 +116,12 @@ issuer and for its status at once.
## The vectors
`vectori/` holds 619 vectors (610 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 85 `VALID`, 69 `PARTIAL`, 465 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
`vectori/` holds 626 vectors (617 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
envelope 67, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 69, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 87 `VALID`, 70 `PARTIAL`, 469 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
- the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit
- the 17 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors; `secret-access`, the audit entry of the secrets service, since 2026-10-18); the audit
log, its heads and its inclusion and consistency proofs come from the verify-layer producers on fixed inputs;
- the receipt, the five market timelines, the notarized dataset commitment and one trust chain of an AI result are the evidence
recorded on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 beside those components;
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22
libraries' real output on 2026-10-18, with their public test keys.
An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 300 of the
465 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 303 of the
469 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner; a digest repeated in an SD-JWT must still be
signed by its issuer, a key binding JWT for another audience by its holder; a Travel Rule header addressed to another VASP, or with a
cut ML-KEM ciphertext, must still be signed by the originator): the other 165 are made at
cut ML-KEM ciphertext, must still be signed by the originator; a presentation without a request must still be signed by its holder): the other 166 are made at
the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
(`mutation.changed`). Twenty-four vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ also establishes no claim, so its policy's rules are not met either).
```
AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 610 offline vectors
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 617 offline vectors
node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 557 reported NOT COVERED
node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
@@ -215,9 +215,9 @@ exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expec
refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 239 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 557 vectors, among them every vector of
JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 240 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 65 vectors it claims (measured 2026-10-18). It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 561 vectors, among them every vector of
the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations, the device bundles, the SD-JWT presentations, the
Travel Rule artifacts and the compliance presentations. For those ten verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours (for SD-JWT,
the identity component measured our verifier against `@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` outside this suite; those libraries are
@@ -225,6 +225,31 @@ not implementations of this suite's contract).
## How the suite itself is checked
Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), in the evening, after the identity verifier gained the rule `request` (a presentation committed to the
request the verifier received; the adversarial review of the secrets service) and its four vectors were derived from a new fresh
source (`identityRequest`; every other fresh source kept, so no other vector's input moved; the 65 earlier identity vectors changed
only in `exercises`, which now lists `identity.request`), on Node.js 24.14.1, offline, with the served reference verifier and with the
one of the development repository: `node proba-conformance.mjs` gives 12 rows green, 0 red, 1 not measured (the 9 vectors that read
testnet 28001). 240 rules of 15 verifiers, 626 vectors (`LA ZI`), every rule has a vector (240 of 240), every INVALID vector (469) is
its base with one operation (303) or one declared producer change (166), the published verifiers pass 617 of 617 offline vectors,
the independent Python implementation passes the 65 it claims and reports the other 561 not covered, 101,833 malformed inputs each got
a verdict. `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ` (offline) gives 319 rows green, 0 red, 3 not measured (the three rules whose
vectors need the testnet): 237 of 240 rules proven load-bearing, `identity.request` among them (planted out, exactly its 2 vectors
fail). Before the change, the same commands on the untouched tree: 12 green, 0 red, 1 not measured; 318 green, 0 red, 3 not
measured (236 of 239). Not run after the change: `--online`.
Measured again on 2026-10-18 (UTC), later the same day, after the AIP-23 kind `secret-access` (the audit entry of the secrets service,
`pq-secrets/`) was added to proof-kinds and its three envelope vectors derived (Node.js 24.14.1, the reference verifier of the
development repository, offline): `node proba-conformance.mjs` gives 10 rows green, 2 red, 1 not measured. The vectors on disk are what
the generator derives (622, `LA ZI`); the 17 kind envelopes are the published kind vectors; every rule has a vector (239 of 239); every
artifact kind has a valid vector (21); every INVALID vector (467) is its base with one operation (302) or one declared producer change
(165); the published verifiers pass 613 of 613 offline vectors; the independent Python implementation passes all 65 it claims and the
other 557 are reported not covered; 100,825 malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each got a verdict. The 9 vectors that
read testnet 28001 were not run (`--online`). The two red rows are the derivation of the `aip23-envelope` rules from the verifier's code
(its finality sites, "appears on 0 FAILED lines of the verifier") and `REGULI.json`, and they were red before this change, on the
untouched tree, in the same run form (measured first): the reference verifier was refactored earlier that day (`judge()` exported,
commit b2cf499c6) and the rule derivation has not followed it yet; the kind added here does not touch them.
Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), after the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier were enrolled, the last two of the identity
component (Node.js 24.14.1; the reference verifier of the development repository; testnet 28001 read, nothing sent; the run is the one
on the final code, after the three fixes below):
@@ -368,10 +393,10 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
## What it is not, and what is not measured
- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
619 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
626 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 239; the other
233 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 240; the other
234 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
verifier, the SD-JWT verifiers, the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier, are judged here by one implementation.
- **Finality is the chain's.** The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the
artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.