pq-secrets: a zero-trust secrets service on top of pq-kms (each request authorized by an Aere Identity presentation signed for that exact request, per-secret policy whose non-admin grants can only narrow, the same refusal for every unauthorized caller, every operation a signed AIP-23 secret-access envelope); identity: a presentation optionally signed for one exact request; proof-kinds: secret-access with requestHash; conformance 240 rules, 626 vectors
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@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ verdict (`vectori/payment-receipt/company-p1-28001.valid.json`).
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## What is enrolled
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 239 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-18, when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
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verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 187 rules are reported at `integrity`, 49 at
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`REGULI.json` is derived from the code (`node deriva-reguli.mjs --verifica`): 240 rules of 15 verifiers, 21 artifact kinds (since
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2026-10-18: 239 when the Travel Rule and the compliance verifiers were enrolled, 240 with `identity.request` later that day; 213 rules of 13 verifiers and 17 kinds after the SD-JWT
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verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By level: 188 rules are reported at `integrity`, 49 at
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`authenticity`, 3 at `anchoring` (one of them, `envelope.finality`, is reported at `anchoring` or at `finality` by the place that refused).
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| artifact kind | judged by | rules |
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@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ verifiers earlier that day; 181 rules of 11 verifiers, 15 kinds before). By leve
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| `audit-log` (a hash-chained log, alone or against an attested head, signed or not) | `verify-layer/sidecar.mjs` | 13: `auditlog.entry`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.hash`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.head-unsigned`, `.head-scheme`, `.head-key`, `.head-signature`, `.head-signer`, `.head-short`, `.head-rewritten` |
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| `audit-inclusion`, `audit-consistency` (RFC 9162 proofs over that log) | `verify-layer/jurnal-arbore.mjs` | 12: `audittree.proof-form`, `.head-form`, `.head-hash`, `.inclusion-index`, `.inclusion-entry`, `.inclusion-envelope`, `.inclusion-leaf`, `.inclusion-path`, `.inclusion-head`, `.consistency-start`, `.consistency-end`, `.consistency` |
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| `agent-ledger` (an agent's signed ledger under its policy) | `agents/agent-ledger.mjs` | 16: `agents.ledger-form`, `.policy`, `.other-policy`, `.session`, `.key`, `.identity`, `.anchor`, `.seq`, `.chain`, `.body`, `.signature`, `.hash`, `.time`, `.revocation`, `.approvals`, `.decision` |
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| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 37: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable` |
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| `identity-presentation` (a credential shown by its holder or by the last delegate of a chain, judged with what the verifier brings: its audience, its nonce, its clock, the issuers it trusts, the status lists and the revocations it was handed) | `identity/identity.mjs` | 38: `identity.form`, `.issuer-id`, `.holder-id`, `.credential-signature`, `.issuer-trusted`, `.credential-window`, `.status-list`, `.credential-revoked`, `.sd-distinct`, `.disclosure-readable`, `.disclosure-signed`, `.disclosure-once`, `.disclosure-plain`, `.claim-name`, `.binding-credential`, `.binding-disclosures`, `.binding-delegations`, `.presenter`, `.presentation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.chain-length`, `.delegation-form`, `.delegation-ids`, `.delegation-from`, `.delegation-parent`, `.delegation-signature`, `.delegation-scope`, `.delegation-window`, `.delegation-depth`, `.delegation-narrows`, `.delegation-credential`, `.delegation-claims`, `.delegation-audience`, `.delegation-revoked`, `.unreadable`, `.request` (since 2026-10-18: the presentation commits to the request the verifier received, OpenID4VP `transaction_data`) |
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| `device-bundle` (the chain of a device: the manufacturer's credential for the device key, a firmware release, the ownership transfers, the owner's authorization, the device's attestation and its AIP-23 envelope, judged with what the verifier brings: its clock, nonce and audience, the manufacturers it trusts, the recall lists, firmware policies and status records it read, its own reading of the notarized envelope) | `device-identity/device.mjs` | 47: `device.form`, `.manufacture-form`, `.manufacturer-id`, `.manufacture-holder`, `.manufacture-signature`, `.manufacturer-trusted`, `.manufacture-window`, `.manufacture-status-list`, `.manufacture-revoked`, `.device-key`, `.device-id`, `.firmware-form`, `.firmware-signer`, `.firmware-signature`, `.firmware-model`, `.firmware-retracted`, `.firmware-rollback`, `.firmware-software`, `.chain-length`, `.transfer-form`, `.transfer-device`, `.transfer-ids`, `.transfer-from`, `.transfer-prev`, `.transfer-signature`, `.transfer-time`, `.authorization-form`, `.authorization-device`, `.authorization-owner`, `.authorization-ownership`, `.authorization-signature`, `.authorization-window`, `.authorization-action`, `.status-retired`, `.status-suspended`, `.attestation-form`, `.attestation-key`, `.attestation-device`, `.attestation-signature`, `.audience`, `.nonce`, `.freshness`, `.attestation-firmware`, `.attestation-ownership`, `.witness-envelope`, `.witness-time`, `.unreadable` |
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| `sdjwt-presentation` (an SD-JWT of IETF RFC 9901, as issued or with its Key Binding JWT, judged with what the verifier brings: the issuer key it chose, a public JWK, never one taken from the token; its clock; its audience and nonce; the issuer and the explicit type it expects; whether it requires key binding and `exp`) | `identity/sdjwt.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 23: `sdjwt.form`, `.alg`, `.typ`, `.crit`, `.key`, `.signature`, `.issuer`, `.sd-alg`, `.disclosure-form`, `.disclosure-twice`, `.digest-twice`, `.disclosure-name`, `.claim-conflict`, `.unreferenced`, `.time`, `.kb-context`, `.kb-required`, `.kb-cnf`, `.kb-claims`, `.kb-audience`, `.kb-nonce`, `.kb-freshness`, `.kb-sd-hash` |
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| `sdjwt-vc-presentation` (an SD-JWT VC of `draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc`, judged as the SD-JWT above plus the profile: the credential type the verifier expects, and the Token Status List it fetched for the `status` the credential names) | `identity/sdjwt-vc.mjs` (enrolled 2026-10-18) | 9 of its own, on top of the 23 of `sdjwt`: `sdjwtvc.vct-expected`, `.vct`, `.vct-mismatch`, `.disclosed-protected`, `.form`, `.status-list`, `.status-index`, `.status-revoked`, `.status-unjudged` |
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@@ -116,12 +116,12 @@ issuer and for its status at once.
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## The vectors
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`vectori/` holds 619 vectors (610 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 65, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 85 `VALID`, 69 `PARTIAL`, 465 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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`vectori/` holds 626 vectors (617 offline, 9 that read testnet 28001; 22 MB, since every device, identity and Travel Rule vector carries its ML-DSA-65 keys and signatures), listed with their digests in `vectori/INDEX.json`:
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envelope 67, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22, ai-trust-bundle 24, audit-log 19, audit-inclusion
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10, audit-consistency 4, agent-ledger 18, identity-presentation 69, device-bundle 194, sdjwt-presentation 54, sdjwt-vc-presentation 32, travel-rule-binding 19, travel-rule-message 26, travel-rule-receipt 9, compliance-presentation 12. By expected verdict: 87 `VALID`, 70 `PARTIAL`, 469 `INVALID`. None is typed by hand
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(`node genereaza-vectori.mjs --verifica` regenerates them and compares byte for byte):
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- the 16 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors); the audit
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- the 17 AIP-23 kinds come from their producers on fixed inputs (the same envelopes as the published AIP-23 kind vectors; `secret-access`, the audit entry of the secrets service, since 2026-10-18); the audit
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log, its heads and its inclusion and consistency proofs come from the verify-layer producers on fixed inputs;
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- the receipt, the five market timelines, the notarized dataset commitment and one trust chain of an AI result are the evidence
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recorded on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 beside those components;
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@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ envelope 64, payment-risk 11, payment-receipt 10, market-timeline 26, dataset 22
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libraries' real output on 2026-10-18, with their public test keys.
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An `INVALID` vector names its `base` and its `mutation`: **one operation** (set, remove or add at one JSON path) applied to the input
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 300 of the
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465 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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of a vector that is not invalid, and it must be refused for exactly the rules in `expected.failed`, not merely refused: 303 of the
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469 are made this way. Where the rule sits under a hash or a signature, one place is not reachable (changing an amount under the
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instruction hash trips the binding first; a false decision in a ledger must still be signed by the agent; a disclosure the issuer never signed must still be signed for by
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the holder; an authorization by a previous owner must still be signed by that owner; a digest repeated in an SD-JWT must still be
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signed by its issuer, a key binding JWT for another audience by its holder; a Travel Rule header addressed to another VASP, or with a
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cut ML-KEM ciphertext, must still be signed by the originator): the other 165 are made at
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cut ML-KEM ciphertext, must still be signed by the originator; a presentation without a request must still be signed by its holder): the other 166 are made at
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the producer, the commitments above the change recomputed with the published formulas, and every path that moved is declared
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(`mutation.changed`). Twenty-four vectors expect more than one rule: rules that guard the same field cannot be separated (a looser policy shown
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under a receipt also makes the risk verdict not reproduce; a Proof of AI envelope that is changed is also no longer the one the
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@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ also establishes no claim, so its policy's rules are not met either).
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```
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AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs from aere.network/tools, with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and npm install done>
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 610 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" # the published verifiers behind the one verdict form: 617 offline vectors
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node conformance.mjs --impl "node implementare-aere.mjs" --online # and the 9 that read testnet 28001 (nothing is sent)
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node conformance.mjs --impl "python3 implementare-integritate.py" # an independent implementation: 62 vectors, 557 reported NOT COVERED
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node conformance.mjs --impl "<your command>" # yours
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@@ -215,9 +215,9 @@ exact set of failed rules and the state of each of the four levels are the expec
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refusal. Without `--online` an implementation must not open a connection.
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`implementare-integritate.py` is the second implementation: Python, standard library only, written from the rules and not from the
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 239 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 62 vectors it claims. It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 557 vectors, among them every vector of
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JavaScript. It claims 6 of the 240 rules (the form and the statement hash of an envelope; the form, the commitment, the salted field
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commitments and the RFC 9162 inclusion of a dataset record) and passes all 65 vectors it claims (measured 2026-10-18). It cannot check an ML-DSA signature
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or read a chain, says so in its capabilities, and the runner reports the rest as not covered: 561 vectors, among them every vector of
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the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity presentations, the device bundles, the SD-JWT presentations, the
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Travel Rule artifacts and the compliance presentations. For those ten verifiers the suite has one implementation, ours (for SD-JWT,
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the identity component measured our verifier against `@sd-jwt/core` and `@sd-jwt/sd-jwt-vc` outside this suite; those libraries are
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@@ -225,6 +225,31 @@ not implementations of this suite's contract).
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## How the suite itself is checked
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Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), in the evening, after the identity verifier gained the rule `request` (a presentation committed to the
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request the verifier received; the adversarial review of the secrets service) and its four vectors were derived from a new fresh
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source (`identityRequest`; every other fresh source kept, so no other vector's input moved; the 65 earlier identity vectors changed
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only in `exercises`, which now lists `identity.request`), on Node.js 24.14.1, offline, with the served reference verifier and with the
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one of the development repository: `node proba-conformance.mjs` gives 12 rows green, 0 red, 1 not measured (the 9 vectors that read
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testnet 28001). 240 rules of 15 verifiers, 626 vectors (`LA ZI`), every rule has a vector (240 of 240), every INVALID vector (469) is
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its base with one operation (303) or one declared producer change (166), the published verifiers pass 617 of 617 offline vectors,
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the independent Python implementation passes the 65 it claims and reports the other 561 not covered, 101,833 malformed inputs each got
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a verdict. `node proba-conformance.mjs --control-negativ` (offline) gives 319 rows green, 0 red, 3 not measured (the three rules whose
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vectors need the testnet): 237 of 240 rules proven load-bearing, `identity.request` among them (planted out, exactly its 2 vectors
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fail). Before the change, the same commands on the untouched tree: 12 green, 0 red, 1 not measured; 318 green, 0 red, 3 not
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measured (236 of 239). Not run after the change: `--online`.
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Measured again on 2026-10-18 (UTC), later the same day, after the AIP-23 kind `secret-access` (the audit entry of the secrets service,
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`pq-secrets/`) was added to proof-kinds and its three envelope vectors derived (Node.js 24.14.1, the reference verifier of the
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development repository, offline): `node proba-conformance.mjs` gives 10 rows green, 2 red, 1 not measured. The vectors on disk are what
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the generator derives (622, `LA ZI`); the 17 kind envelopes are the published kind vectors; every rule has a vector (239 of 239); every
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artifact kind has a valid vector (21); every INVALID vector (467) is its base with one operation (302) or one declared producer change
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(165); the published verifiers pass 613 of 613 offline vectors; the independent Python implementation passes all 65 it claims and the
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other 557 are reported not covered; 100,825 malformed inputs and 183 malformed envelope files each got a verdict. The 9 vectors that
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read testnet 28001 were not run (`--online`). The two red rows are the derivation of the `aip23-envelope` rules from the verifier's code
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(its finality sites, "appears on 0 FAILED lines of the verifier") and `REGULI.json`, and they were red before this change, on the
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untouched tree, in the same run form (measured first): the reference verifier was refactored earlier that day (`judge()` exported,
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commit b2cf499c6) and the rule derivation has not followed it yet; the kind added here does not touch them.
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Measured on 2026-10-18 (UTC), after the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier were enrolled, the last two of the identity
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component (Node.js 24.14.1; the reference verifier of the development repository; testnet 28001 read, nothing sent; the run is the one
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on the final code, after the three fixes below):
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@@ -368,10 +393,10 @@ On 2026-10-05, while the identity verifier was being enrolled, one more, fixed t
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## What it is not, and what is not measured
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- **Not a certification, not an audit, not a mark.** Passing says that an implementation agrees with the published verifiers on these
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619 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
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626 inputs. It does not say either of them is correct, and no third party has reviewed the verifiers, the vectors or this suite.
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- **The vectors and the verifiers have the same authors.** The expected verdicts were written by the people who wrote the verifiers.
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The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 239; the other
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233 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
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The second implementation is independent in code and language, not in authorship, and it covers 6 rules of 240; the other
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234 rules, among them every rule of the trust chain, the audit log, the agents' ledger, the identity verifier, the device
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verifier, the SD-JWT verifiers, the Travel Rule verifier and the compliance verifier, are judged here by one implementation.
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- **Finality is the chain's.** The level says that the post-quantum certificate of the covering anchor verified on the chain where the
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artifact was notarized. Every notarized vector here is on chain 28001, a testnet; nothing in this suite ran on mainnet.
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