verify-layer: cloud exports (AWS ECS/EC2/Lambda, Azure VMs/Container Instances/Container Apps/Web Apps, GCP Compute Engine/Cloud Run) read from the operator's own CLI export, never from an account; fixtures derived from the vendors' documented examples; a real account is unmeasured and the README says so
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@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ head you hold from outside the host, with the signer you expect, never on its ow
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node sidecar.mjs record --kind deployment --name <name> --version <v> --content-file <file> [--host h] [--log p] [--at T]
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node sidecar.mjs record --kind proof --proof-file <envelope.json> # any AIP-23 envelope, after checking its form and hash
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node sidecar.mjs scan --source docker|kubernetes --input <export.json> [--host h] [--log p]
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node sidecar.mjs scan --source aws-ecs|aws-ec2|aws-lambda|azure-vm|azure-container|azure-containerapp|azure-webapp|gcp-compute|gcp-run --input <export.json> [--task-definitions <f>]
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node sidecar.mjs verify-log --log p [--attested head.json [--signer head.pub.pem]] # 0 intact (and continues the head), 1 broken or not continued
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node sidecar.mjs attest-head --log p [--host h] [--out head.json] [--sign-key head.key.pem] # the head as an aere-audit-head envelope
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node sidecar.mjs keygen --out <dir> # the operator's ML-DSA-65 head key (head.key.pem 0600, head.pub.pem)
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@@ -69,6 +70,59 @@ container, or one that is not in the expected shape, is refused rather than reco
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A hash does not hide a guessable secret: if a password is passed on a command line, anyone who knows the rest of the command
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can test guesses against `commandSha256`. Pass secrets through files or the environment, not arguments.
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## Cloud exports (2026-10-18)
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The same adapter, in the same honest form, for the workloads a cloud runs for you: the operator makes the export **with the vendor's
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own CLI and their own credentials, on their own machine**; the sidecar reads the file. The sidecar holds no cloud credential and
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calls no cloud API. These adapters are measured on the outputs **as the vendors document them** (`fixturi-cloud/`, every file an exact
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copy of a documented example or, for GCP, a form built from the documented schema), **not on a live account**: Aere Network has no
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AWS, Azure or GCP account. What a live export carries beyond the documented example is handled as documented and is NOT MEASURED;
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a test account at each vendor is what it would take to measure it.
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aws ecs describe-tasks --cluster C --tasks $(aws ecs list-tasks --cluster C --query 'taskArns' --output text) > tasks.json
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aws ecs describe-task-definition --task-definition <family:revision> > def.json # one per task definition in use
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node sidecar.mjs scan --source aws-ecs --input tasks.json --task-definitions def.json # def.json may hold one output or a JSON list of them
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aws ec2 describe-instances > ec2.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source aws-ec2 --input ec2.json
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aws lambda list-functions > lambda.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source aws-lambda --input lambda.json
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az vm list -d > vm.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source azure-vm --input vm.json
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az container show -g G -n N > aci.json (collect several into a JSON array); node sidecar.mjs scan --source azure-container --input aci.json
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az containerapp list > aca.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source azure-containerapp --input aca.json
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az webapp list --show-details > web.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source azure-webapp --input web.json
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gcloud compute instances list --format=json > gce.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source gcp-compute --input gce.json
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gcloud run services list --format=json > run.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source gcp-run --input run.json
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What each adapter reads, and what it refuses:
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- **Only what the export says is running.** ECS: tasks and containers with `lastStatus` `RUNNING`; EC2: `State.Name` `running`;
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Azure VM: `powerState` `VM running` (the field `-d` adds; an export without it is refused, it does not say whether a machine runs);
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Container Instances: `containers[].instanceView.currentState.state` `Running` (`az container list` may omit `instanceView`; such an
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export is refused and `az container show` is asked for); Container Apps: `runningStatus` `Running` (`Progressing`, `Stopped`,
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`Suspended` and `Ready`, which the API enumerates without defining, do not count); App Service: `state` `Running`; Compute
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Engine: `status` `RUNNING`; Cloud Run: the `Ready` condition `True`. Lambda is the exception the vendor documents: `list-functions`
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does not return `State`, so every function listed is recorded as deployed with `state: not-in-export`; when the export carries
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`State` (from `get-function-configuration`), only `Active` functions enter.
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- **A file that is not the named CLI's output is refused by name** (`the input is not the output of \`aws ecs describe-tasks\``),
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as is an export with no running workload: a zero is not recorded.
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- **Identity.** The image with its digest when the export has one (`imageIdentity: digest`: an ECS `imageDigest`, an image given as
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`name@sha256:...` on Container Instances, Container Apps or Cloud Run); otherwise the id of the machine or service and the image or
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runtime the export declares, marked `imageIdentity: declared` (an AMI id, an Azure `imageReference`, a GCE boot disk and its
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licenses, a `DOCKER|image` or `NODE|20-lts` runtime); Lambda carries `CodeSha256`, the digest of its package (`codeSha256`). An
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entry's name is the region or zone and the workload's own identifiers (`ecs:cluster/task/container`, `ec2:region/instance`,
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`lambda:region/function`, `azvm:group/name`, `aci:group/name/container`, `aca:group/app/container`, `azwebapp:group/site`,
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`gce:zone/name`, `run:region/service/container`), and its version the digest when there is one.
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- **Names only, never values.** Environment variables enter as their names (ECS: `environment` and `secrets` of the task definition
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plus `overrides`; Lambda: the keys of `Environment.Variables`; Container Instances: `environmentVariables`, neither `value` nor
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`secureValue`; Container Apps: `env`, with `secretRef` names, never `configuration.secrets`; App Service: `appSettings` and
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`connectionStrings` names; Cloud Run: `env`, never `value` or `valueFrom`). EC2 tags, Azure tags, GCE labels and GCE metadata enter
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as keys (`startup-script`, `user-data`, `ssh-keys` live in metadata, with values the adapter never copies). `customData` and
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`userData` of a VM, the admin user, SSH keys, registry credentials, IP addresses and host names are **not copied at all**; an
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ECS secret's `valueFrom` ARN is not copied either. Where the export does not carry the names (ECS tasks without their task
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definition, a site listed without `--show-details`), the descriptor says so (`envSource: not-in-export`, `siteConfigInExport:
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false`) instead of pretending.
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As with Docker and Kubernetes, an entry proves that the export *declared* the workload, at the time the operator says: the vendor's
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API answered the operator, and the operator handed the file to the sidecar. Nothing here checks the export against the vendor.
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## Notarization
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`notarize-head` reads the chain id from the RPC endpoint (it does not trust an argument), refuses an attestation whose
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@@ -111,7 +165,8 @@ other, so both verify commands then say whether each head is signed and by which
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## Tests
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node proba-sidecar.mjs # 45 checks
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node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs # puts each guard back to its absent form and requires the named check to fail
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node proba-adaptoare-cloud.mjs # 60: the nine cloud adapters on the documented exports (fixturi-cloud/)
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node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs # puts each guard back to its absent form and requires the named check to fail (11 + 27 cloud plantings)
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node proba-arbore.mjs # 20: the tree (the reference roots of Certificate Transparency for 1..8 leaves, every proof up to 64 leaves, each attack)
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node control-negativ-arbore.mjs # 14 guards removed in a copy, each turns its named test red
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@@ -133,6 +188,16 @@ comparison, the length check, the attestation hash check, the handling of an unr
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the head signature check, the comparison with `--signer`, the refusal of an unsigned head when `--signer` is given).
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`proba-notarizare-testnet.mjs --key-file <testnet key>` repeats the on-chain run above (9 checks, it needs a funded testnet key).
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`proba-adaptoare-cloud.mjs` (2026-10-18) runs every cloud adapter on the documented export, on the same export with one stopped
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workload added, and on the same export with environment values planted (`fixturi-cloud/`, derived by `deriva.mjs` from the exact
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copies in `fixturi-cloud/surse/`, and compared with them at every run): it requires exactly the running workloads with their
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identities, no planted value anywhere in the log or the descriptors (and the names present, as the positive control), another CLI's
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export refused by name, every descriptor re-hashing to the digest in its envelope, and every envelope `VALID` for the reference
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verifier. `control-negativ-sidecar.mjs` adds three plantings per adapter (the running filter removed, the names replaced by the
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name/value pairs, the shape check removed) and requires each to turn its named check red: measured 38 of 38 on 2026-10-18. The
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adapters are producers, not verifiers, so they name no rule of the conformance suite (`conformance/`), whose rules are those of the
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log and tree verifiers, unchanged.
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**Corrected on 2026-10-03.** Until then the check of a head's signature required the DECLARED scheme to be `ml-dsa-65` but not
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the key to be an ML-DSA-65 key: a head signed with an Ed25519, RSA or P-256 key that declared `ml-dsa-65` was reported as a head
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signed with ML-DSA-65. Found while this verifier was enrolled in the conformance suite (`conformance/`), where it is now a vector.
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@@ -141,7 +206,6 @@ consistency check now also carries a rule id from a declared list (`REGULI` in `
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## What it is not (yet)
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It does not report to a live console over the network, and it has no per-cloud adapters that read deployments from the AWS,
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Azure or GCP APIs with credentials: the runtime adapter above, without credentials, is the first one. It signs heads, not
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each entry, and the host name in an entry is still a declaration. No third party
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has reviewed it.
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It does not report to a live console over the network. Its per-cloud adapters (2026-10-18) read the operator's CLI export: no
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credentials, no live API calls, and they are measured on the vendors' documented outputs, not on a live account (none is held).
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It signs heads, not each entry, and the host name in an entry is still a declaration. No third party has reviewed it.
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