verify-layer: cloud exports (AWS ECS/EC2/Lambda, Azure VMs/Container Instances/Container Apps/Web Apps, GCP Compute Engine/Cloud Run) read from the operator's own CLI export, never from an account; fixtures derived from the vendors' documented examples; a real account is unmeasured and the README says so

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@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ head you hold from outside the host, with the signer you expect, never on its ow
node sidecar.mjs record --kind deployment --name <name> --version <v> --content-file <file> [--host h] [--log p] [--at T]
node sidecar.mjs record --kind proof --proof-file <envelope.json> # any AIP-23 envelope, after checking its form and hash
node sidecar.mjs scan --source docker|kubernetes --input <export.json> [--host h] [--log p]
node sidecar.mjs scan --source aws-ecs|aws-ec2|aws-lambda|azure-vm|azure-container|azure-containerapp|azure-webapp|gcp-compute|gcp-run --input <export.json> [--task-definitions <f>]
node sidecar.mjs verify-log --log p [--attested head.json [--signer head.pub.pem]] # 0 intact (and continues the head), 1 broken or not continued
node sidecar.mjs attest-head --log p [--host h] [--out head.json] [--sign-key head.key.pem] # the head as an aere-audit-head envelope
node sidecar.mjs keygen --out <dir> # the operator's ML-DSA-65 head key (head.key.pem 0600, head.pub.pem)
@@ -69,6 +70,59 @@ container, or one that is not in the expected shape, is refused rather than reco
A hash does not hide a guessable secret: if a password is passed on a command line, anyone who knows the rest of the command
can test guesses against `commandSha256`. Pass secrets through files or the environment, not arguments.
## Cloud exports (2026-10-18)
The same adapter, in the same honest form, for the workloads a cloud runs for you: the operator makes the export **with the vendor's
own CLI and their own credentials, on their own machine**; the sidecar reads the file. The sidecar holds no cloud credential and
calls no cloud API. These adapters are measured on the outputs **as the vendors document them** (`fixturi-cloud/`, every file an exact
copy of a documented example or, for GCP, a form built from the documented schema), **not on a live account**: Aere Network has no
AWS, Azure or GCP account. What a live export carries beyond the documented example is handled as documented and is NOT MEASURED;
a test account at each vendor is what it would take to measure it.
aws ecs describe-tasks --cluster C --tasks $(aws ecs list-tasks --cluster C --query 'taskArns' --output text) > tasks.json
aws ecs describe-task-definition --task-definition <family:revision> > def.json # one per task definition in use
node sidecar.mjs scan --source aws-ecs --input tasks.json --task-definitions def.json # def.json may hold one output or a JSON list of them
aws ec2 describe-instances > ec2.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source aws-ec2 --input ec2.json
aws lambda list-functions > lambda.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source aws-lambda --input lambda.json
az vm list -d > vm.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source azure-vm --input vm.json
az container show -g G -n N > aci.json (collect several into a JSON array); node sidecar.mjs scan --source azure-container --input aci.json
az containerapp list > aca.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source azure-containerapp --input aca.json
az webapp list --show-details > web.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source azure-webapp --input web.json
gcloud compute instances list --format=json > gce.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source gcp-compute --input gce.json
gcloud run services list --format=json > run.json; node sidecar.mjs scan --source gcp-run --input run.json
What each adapter reads, and what it refuses:
- **Only what the export says is running.** ECS: tasks and containers with `lastStatus` `RUNNING`; EC2: `State.Name` `running`;
Azure VM: `powerState` `VM running` (the field `-d` adds; an export without it is refused, it does not say whether a machine runs);
Container Instances: `containers[].instanceView.currentState.state` `Running` (`az container list` may omit `instanceView`; such an
export is refused and `az container show` is asked for); Container Apps: `runningStatus` `Running` (`Progressing`, `Stopped`,
`Suspended` and `Ready`, which the API enumerates without defining, do not count); App Service: `state` `Running`; Compute
Engine: `status` `RUNNING`; Cloud Run: the `Ready` condition `True`. Lambda is the exception the vendor documents: `list-functions`
does not return `State`, so every function listed is recorded as deployed with `state: not-in-export`; when the export carries
`State` (from `get-function-configuration`), only `Active` functions enter.
- **A file that is not the named CLI's output is refused by name** (`the input is not the output of \`aws ecs describe-tasks\``),
as is an export with no running workload: a zero is not recorded.
- **Identity.** The image with its digest when the export has one (`imageIdentity: digest`: an ECS `imageDigest`, an image given as
`name@sha256:...` on Container Instances, Container Apps or Cloud Run); otherwise the id of the machine or service and the image or
runtime the export declares, marked `imageIdentity: declared` (an AMI id, an Azure `imageReference`, a GCE boot disk and its
licenses, a `DOCKER|image` or `NODE|20-lts` runtime); Lambda carries `CodeSha256`, the digest of its package (`codeSha256`). An
entry's name is the region or zone and the workload's own identifiers (`ecs:cluster/task/container`, `ec2:region/instance`,
`lambda:region/function`, `azvm:group/name`, `aci:group/name/container`, `aca:group/app/container`, `azwebapp:group/site`,
`gce:zone/name`, `run:region/service/container`), and its version the digest when there is one.
- **Names only, never values.** Environment variables enter as their names (ECS: `environment` and `secrets` of the task definition
plus `overrides`; Lambda: the keys of `Environment.Variables`; Container Instances: `environmentVariables`, neither `value` nor
`secureValue`; Container Apps: `env`, with `secretRef` names, never `configuration.secrets`; App Service: `appSettings` and
`connectionStrings` names; Cloud Run: `env`, never `value` or `valueFrom`). EC2 tags, Azure tags, GCE labels and GCE metadata enter
as keys (`startup-script`, `user-data`, `ssh-keys` live in metadata, with values the adapter never copies). `customData` and
`userData` of a VM, the admin user, SSH keys, registry credentials, IP addresses and host names are **not copied at all**; an
ECS secret's `valueFrom` ARN is not copied either. Where the export does not carry the names (ECS tasks without their task
definition, a site listed without `--show-details`), the descriptor says so (`envSource: not-in-export`, `siteConfigInExport:
false`) instead of pretending.
As with Docker and Kubernetes, an entry proves that the export *declared* the workload, at the time the operator says: the vendor's
API answered the operator, and the operator handed the file to the sidecar. Nothing here checks the export against the vendor.
## Notarization
`notarize-head` reads the chain id from the RPC endpoint (it does not trust an argument), refuses an attestation whose
@@ -111,7 +165,8 @@ other, so both verify commands then say whether each head is signed and by which
## Tests
node proba-sidecar.mjs # 45 checks
node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs # puts each guard back to its absent form and requires the named check to fail
node proba-adaptoare-cloud.mjs # 60: the nine cloud adapters on the documented exports (fixturi-cloud/)
node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs # puts each guard back to its absent form and requires the named check to fail (11 + 27 cloud plantings)
node proba-arbore.mjs # 20: the tree (the reference roots of Certificate Transparency for 1..8 leaves, every proof up to 64 leaves, each attack)
node control-negativ-arbore.mjs # 14 guards removed in a copy, each turns its named test red
@@ -133,6 +188,16 @@ comparison, the length check, the attestation hash check, the handling of an unr
the head signature check, the comparison with `--signer`, the refusal of an unsigned head when `--signer` is given).
`proba-notarizare-testnet.mjs --key-file <testnet key>` repeats the on-chain run above (9 checks, it needs a funded testnet key).
`proba-adaptoare-cloud.mjs` (2026-10-18) runs every cloud adapter on the documented export, on the same export with one stopped
workload added, and on the same export with environment values planted (`fixturi-cloud/`, derived by `deriva.mjs` from the exact
copies in `fixturi-cloud/surse/`, and compared with them at every run): it requires exactly the running workloads with their
identities, no planted value anywhere in the log or the descriptors (and the names present, as the positive control), another CLI's
export refused by name, every descriptor re-hashing to the digest in its envelope, and every envelope `VALID` for the reference
verifier. `control-negativ-sidecar.mjs` adds three plantings per adapter (the running filter removed, the names replaced by the
name/value pairs, the shape check removed) and requires each to turn its named check red: measured 38 of 38 on 2026-10-18. The
adapters are producers, not verifiers, so they name no rule of the conformance suite (`conformance/`), whose rules are those of the
log and tree verifiers, unchanged.
**Corrected on 2026-10-03.** Until then the check of a head's signature required the DECLARED scheme to be `ml-dsa-65` but not
the key to be an ML-DSA-65 key: a head signed with an Ed25519, RSA or P-256 key that declared `ml-dsa-65` was reported as a head
signed with ML-DSA-65. Found while this verifier was enrolled in the conformance suite (`conformance/`), where it is now a vector.
@@ -141,7 +206,6 @@ consistency check now also carries a rule id from a declared list (`REGULI` in `
## What it is not (yet)
It does not report to a live console over the network, and it has no per-cloud adapters that read deployments from the AWS,
Azure or GCP APIs with credentials: the runtime adapter above, without credentials, is the first one. It signs heads, not
each entry, and the host name in an entry is still a declaration. No third party
has reviewed it.
It does not report to a live console over the network. Its per-cloud adapters (2026-10-18) read the operator's CLI export: no
credentials, no live API calls, and they are measured on the vendors' documented outputs, not on a live account (none is held).
It signs heads, not each entry, and the host name in an entry is still a declaration. No third party has reviewed it.