agents: the hosted witness for agent ledgers (sandbox on testnet 28001), its probe and negative control; crypto-inventory 0.4.1 resolves a minimum TLS version given through a constant or a ternary; proof-kinds and conformance gain the agent-witness-checkpoint kind; the reproduction scripts of the Shield recipes no longer carry a workstation path
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A generic builder of AERE Proof Protocol envelopes (AIP-23) for the standard proof kinds: `data`, `execution`, `identity`,
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`compliance`, `runtime`, `location`, `device`, `payment`, `ownership`, `time`, `block`, `authorization`, `settlement`,
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`provenance` and, since 2026-10-18, `secret-access`. Every kind produces the same envelope (`statement` plus `statementHash`, the
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`provenance`, since 2026-10-18 `secret-access` and since 2026-10-19 `agent-witness-checkpoint`. Every kind produces the same envelope (`statement` plus `statementHash`, the
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SHA-256 of the canonical statement text), so the same AIP-23 reference verifier checks all of them with no kind-specific
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verification code.
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@@ -25,15 +25,28 @@ review of the secrets service) it may also carry `requestHash` (the digest of th
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`claimedHolder` / `claimedPresenter` (ids a presentation claimed and nobody verified) and `judged` (on a refusal, each grant judged
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with the rules it refused on); envelopes without these fields are byte for byte what they were.
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`agent-witness-checkpoint` is the checkpoint of the hosted agents witness (`agents/martor-agenti.mjs`), in the form of a transparency log
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checkpoint (C2SP tlog-checkpoint: the log's name, its size, its RFC 9162 root): `root` and `previous` (the statementHash of the checkpoint
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before it, absent on the first) are already 32-byte hashes and are refused in another form; `log`, `witness` (the id derived from the
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witness's ML-DSA-65 key, which signs the envelope), `chainId` (where checkpoints are notarized), `treeSize` and `maxMergeDelay` (seconds
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between receiving a head and covering it with a notarized checkpoint) have a vocabulary (below). The leaves of the tree are digests of the
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signed ledger heads it received, nothing of any ledger.
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**A kind may have a vocabulary** (`valori` in its schema: per field, a predicate and what it says), judged by `buildProof` on every
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field present; `secret-access` is the only kind with one: `verdict` is `allowed`, `refused` or `failed`, `operation` one of the
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field present; two kinds have one. `secret-access`: `verdict` is `allowed`, `refused` or `failed`, `operation` one of the
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operations of the secrets service (`SECRET_ACCESS.operations`, which the service requires to be its own list), `version` an integer of
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at least 1 or `null`, `rules` a list of rule names, ids `aere-id:` + 40 hex or `null`, `createdAt` an RFC 3339 time. An envelope with
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the verdict `banana` is no longer built. The reference verifier does not judge vocabularies (it judges the form and the hash of any
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kind), so an envelope written by hand with such values stays `VALID` there: the vocabulary is the builder's promise, not the
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verifier's. `KINDS.json` of the published copy names the values of each field that has them.
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verifier's. `agent-witness-checkpoint` (since 2026-10-19, the adversarial review of the hosted witness): `root` and `previous` 0x + 64
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lowercase hex, `log` 1 to 256 printable ASCII characters without spaces, `witness` `aere-witness:` + 40 lowercase hex, `chainId`, `treeSize`
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and `maxMergeDelay` integers of at least 1, `createdAt` an RFC 3339 time; the vocabulary is one exported object (`AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT`)
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that the witness's own judge of a checkpoint (`verificaPunct` in `agents/martor-agenti.mjs`) imports, so the builder and the judge cannot
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drift apart. Until then a checkpoint with `treeSize` "5" or `maxMergeDelay` 0 was built, and `VALID` at the reference verifier, while the
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witness refused it. `KINDS.json` of the published copy names the values of each field that has them.
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Test: `node proba-proof-kinds.mjs` (28 checks: every kind built and found `VALID` by the reference verifier, seven negative
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Test: `node proba-proof-kinds.mjs` (32 checks since 2026-10-19, after the review of the hosted witness: every kind built and found `VALID` by the reference verifier, eight negative
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controls such as content changed after hashing, a required field missing or a `secret-access` value outside its vocabulary, no raw
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content in any envelope, bytes hashed as bytes, the new `secret-access` fields, the vocabulary held by that kind alone). It needs the AIP-23 reference verifier: `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<path to verify-proof.mjs>` (as published at
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content in any envelope, bytes hashed as bytes, the new `secret-access` fields, the two vocabularies held by those two kinds alone, eleven values outside the vocabulary of the witness checkpoint
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refused, and that vocabulary being the very object the witness imports). It needs the AIP-23 reference verifier: `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<path to verify-proof.mjs>` (as published at
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aere.network/tools, with `verify-anchor.mjs`, `mpt.mjs`, `falcon512.mjs`, `registry-v3.mjs` and `package.json` beside it and `npm install` done there); without it the test reports that it did not measure and exits with 2. Node.js 24.
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