agents: the hosted witness for agent ledgers (sandbox on testnet 28001), its probe and negative control; crypto-inventory 0.4.1 resolves a minimum TLS version given through a constant or a ternary; proof-kinds and conformance gain the agent-witness-checkpoint kind; the reproduction scripts of the Shield recipes no longer carry a workstation path
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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A generic builder of AERE Proof Protocol envelopes (AIP-23) for the standard proof kinds: `data`, `execution`, `identity`,
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`compliance`, `runtime`, `location`, `device`, `payment`, `ownership`, `time`, `block`, `authorization`, `settlement`,
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`provenance` and, since 2026-10-18, `secret-access`. Every kind produces the same envelope (`statement` plus `statementHash`, the
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`provenance`, since 2026-10-18 `secret-access` and since 2026-10-19 `agent-witness-checkpoint`. Every kind produces the same envelope (`statement` plus `statementHash`, the
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SHA-256 of the canonical statement text), so the same AIP-23 reference verifier checks all of them with no kind-specific
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verification code.
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@@ -25,15 +25,28 @@ review of the secrets service) it may also carry `requestHash` (the digest of th
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`claimedHolder` / `claimedPresenter` (ids a presentation claimed and nobody verified) and `judged` (on a refusal, each grant judged
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with the rules it refused on); envelopes without these fields are byte for byte what they were.
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`agent-witness-checkpoint` is the checkpoint of the hosted agents witness (`agents/martor-agenti.mjs`), in the form of a transparency log
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checkpoint (C2SP tlog-checkpoint: the log's name, its size, its RFC 9162 root): `root` and `previous` (the statementHash of the checkpoint
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before it, absent on the first) are already 32-byte hashes and are refused in another form; `log`, `witness` (the id derived from the
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witness's ML-DSA-65 key, which signs the envelope), `chainId` (where checkpoints are notarized), `treeSize` and `maxMergeDelay` (seconds
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between receiving a head and covering it with a notarized checkpoint) have a vocabulary (below). The leaves of the tree are digests of the
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signed ledger heads it received, nothing of any ledger.
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**A kind may have a vocabulary** (`valori` in its schema: per field, a predicate and what it says), judged by `buildProof` on every
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field present; `secret-access` is the only kind with one: `verdict` is `allowed`, `refused` or `failed`, `operation` one of the
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field present; two kinds have one. `secret-access`: `verdict` is `allowed`, `refused` or `failed`, `operation` one of the
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operations of the secrets service (`SECRET_ACCESS.operations`, which the service requires to be its own list), `version` an integer of
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at least 1 or `null`, `rules` a list of rule names, ids `aere-id:` + 40 hex or `null`, `createdAt` an RFC 3339 time. An envelope with
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the verdict `banana` is no longer built. The reference verifier does not judge vocabularies (it judges the form and the hash of any
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kind), so an envelope written by hand with such values stays `VALID` there: the vocabulary is the builder's promise, not the
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verifier's. `KINDS.json` of the published copy names the values of each field that has them.
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verifier's. `agent-witness-checkpoint` (since 2026-10-19, the adversarial review of the hosted witness): `root` and `previous` 0x + 64
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lowercase hex, `log` 1 to 256 printable ASCII characters without spaces, `witness` `aere-witness:` + 40 lowercase hex, `chainId`, `treeSize`
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and `maxMergeDelay` integers of at least 1, `createdAt` an RFC 3339 time; the vocabulary is one exported object (`AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT`)
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that the witness's own judge of a checkpoint (`verificaPunct` in `agents/martor-agenti.mjs`) imports, so the builder and the judge cannot
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drift apart. Until then a checkpoint with `treeSize` "5" or `maxMergeDelay` 0 was built, and `VALID` at the reference verifier, while the
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witness refused it. `KINDS.json` of the published copy names the values of each field that has them.
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Test: `node proba-proof-kinds.mjs` (28 checks: every kind built and found `VALID` by the reference verifier, seven negative
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Test: `node proba-proof-kinds.mjs` (32 checks since 2026-10-19, after the review of the hosted witness: every kind built and found `VALID` by the reference verifier, eight negative
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controls such as content changed after hashing, a required field missing or a `secret-access` value outside its vocabulary, no raw
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content in any envelope, bytes hashed as bytes, the new `secret-access` fields, the vocabulary held by that kind alone). It needs the AIP-23 reference verifier: `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<path to verify-proof.mjs>` (as published at
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content in any envelope, bytes hashed as bytes, the new `secret-access` fields, the two vocabularies held by those two kinds alone, eleven values outside the vocabulary of the witness checkpoint
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refused, and that vocabulary being the very object the witness imports). It needs the AIP-23 reference verifier: `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<path to verify-proof.mjs>` (as published at
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aere.network/tools, with `verify-anchor.mjs`, `mpt.mjs`, `falcon512.mjs`, `registry-v3.mjs` and `package.json` beside it and `npm install` done there); without it the test reports that it did not measure and exits with 2. Node.js 24.
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
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import fs from 'node:fs'; import crypto from 'node:crypto'; import os from 'node:os'; import path from 'node:path';
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import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { buildProof, KINDS, SCHEME } from './proof-kinds.mjs';
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import { buildProof, KINDS, SCHEME, AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT } from './proof-kinds.mjs';
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const AICI = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
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const VERIFY = process.env.AERE_VERIFY_PROOF ? path.resolve(process.env.AERE_VERIFY_PROOF) : path.resolve(AICI, '..', 'aere-proof-protocol', 'verify.mjs');
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@@ -33,10 +33,12 @@ const INTRARI = {
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settlement: { chainId: 2800, txHash: '0x' + '12'.repeat(32), blockHash: '0x' + '34'.repeat(32), from: '0xa', to: '0xb', amount: '100', asset: 'AERE', instruction: BRUT, createdAt: '2026-09-28T09:00:00Z' },
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provenance: { subject: BRUT, parents: [BRUT + '1', BRUT + '2'], process: BRUT + 'p', actor: 'build-bot', createdAt: '2026-09-28T09:00:00Z' },
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'secret-access': { service: 'https://secrets.example', secret: DB, version: 2, operation: 'get', verdict: 'allowed', rules: [], grant: 'deployers', holder: 'aere-id:' + '0'.repeat(40), presenter: 'aere-id:' + '1'.repeat(40), presentation: BRUT, policy: BRUT + 'pol', createdAt: '2026-10-18T09:00:00Z' },
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// 2026-10-19 (B3): capul de jurnal al martorului gazduit al agentilor (radacina si capul de dinainte sunt deja hash-uri de 32 de octeti)
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'agent-witness-checkpoint': { root: '0x' + '5a'.repeat(32), previous: '0x' + '6b'.repeat(32), log: 'aere-agent-witness/28001', witness: 'aere-witness:' + '7c'.repeat(20), chainId: 28001, treeSize: 3, maxMergeDelay: 1800, createdAt: '2026-10-19T09:00:00Z' },
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};
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try {
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cer('schema acopera cele 15 feluri (10 + bloc + autorizare, decontare, provenienta + acces la secret)', KINDS.length >= 15 && ['authorization', 'settlement', 'provenance', 'secret-access'].every((k) => KINDS.includes(k)));
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cer('schema acopera cele 16 feluri (10 + bloc + autorizare, decontare, provenienta + acces la secret + capul martorului agentilor)', KINDS.length >= 16 && ['authorization', 'settlement', 'provenance', 'secret-access', 'agent-witness-checkpoint'].every((k) => KINDS.includes(k)));
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for (const k of KINDS) {
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// fiecare fel se judeca separat: un fel care nu se mai poate construi e un RAU numit, nu o exceptie care opreste proba (2026-09-28)
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let plic; try { plic = buildProof(k, INTRARI[k]); } catch (e) { cer(`${k}: constructia a cazut (${e.message})`, false); continue; }
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@@ -80,8 +82,22 @@ try {
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const vechi = buildProof('secret-access', SA);
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cer('acces la secret: requestHash, claimedPresenter, judged si verdictul failed se construiesc; fara ele declaratia are exact campurile de dinainte, in ordinea lor',
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nou.statement.requestHash === '0x' + 'ab'.repeat(32) && nou.statement.verdict === 'failed' && Object.keys(vechi.statement).join(',') === 'v,kind,presentationHash,policyHash,service,secret,version,operation,verdict,rules,grant,holder,presenter,createdAt');
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cer('vocabularul e numai al felului secret-access (celelalte feluri se construiesc exact ca ieri)', KINDS.filter((k) => SCHEME[k].valori).join(',') === 'secret-access');
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cer('vocabularul e numai al felurilor secret-access si agent-witness-checkpoint (celelalte se construiesc exact ca ieri)', KINDS.filter((k) => SCHEME[k].valori).join(',') === 'secret-access,agent-witness-checkpoint');
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// 2026-10-19 (B3): capul martorului agentilor: radacina trebuie sa fie deja un hash de 32 de octeti (nu se hashuieste), primul cap nu are
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// `previous`, iar ordinea campurilor e cea a constructorului (semnatura martorului e peste exact acest text)
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const AW = INTRARI['agent-witness-checkpoint'];
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const primul = buildProof('agent-witness-checkpoint', { ...AW, previous: undefined });
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cer('CONTROL: capul martorului cu radacina care nu e hash de 32 de octeti, sau fara maxMergeDelay -> eroare; primul cap fara previous; campurile in ordinea constructorului',
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arunca(() => buildProof('agent-witness-checkpoint', { ...AW, root: 'radacina' })) && arunca(() => buildProof('agent-witness-checkpoint', { ...AW, maxMergeDelay: undefined }))
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&& !('previous' in primul.statement) && Object.keys(buildProof('agent-witness-checkpoint', AW).statement).join(',') === 'v,kind,root,previous,log,witness,chainId,treeSize,maxMergeDelay,createdAt');
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// 2026-10-19 (revizia adversariala B3, constatarea 8): VOCABULARUL capului martorului, scris o data (AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT) si importat si
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// de judecatorul martorului (verificaPunct). Pana azi treeSize "5", maxMergeDelay 0 sau witness "x" se construiau si erau VALID la verificator.
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const releAW = [['treeSize', '5'], ['treeSize', 0], ['chainId', '28001'], ['chainId', 0], ['maxMergeDelay', 0], ['maxMergeDelay', 1.5], ['witness', 'x'], ['witness', 'aere-witness:' + 'AB'.repeat(20)],
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['log', ''], ['log', 'cu spatiu'], ['createdAt', 'ieri']].filter(([c, v]) => !arunca(() => buildProof('agent-witness-checkpoint', { ...AW, [c]: v })));
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cer('CONTROL: capul martorului cu valori in afara vocabularului (treeSize "5" sau 0, chainId "28001" sau 0, maxMergeDelay 0 sau 1.5, witness "x" sau cu majuscule, log gol sau cu spatiu, createdAt "ieri") -> eroare la constructie' + (releAW.length ? ': construite ' + releAW.map(([c, v]) => c + '=' + JSON.stringify(v)).join(', ') : ''), releAW.length === 0);
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cer('capul martorului: vocabularul e chiar obiectul exportat (AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT.valori), pe care il importa judecatorul martorului; valorile bune se construiesc octet cu octet ca ieri',
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SCHEME['agent-witness-checkpoint'].valori === AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT.valori && Object.isFrozen(AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT.valori) && buildProof('agent-witness-checkpoint', AW).statementHash === '0x' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify({ v: 1, kind: 'aere-proof-of-agent-witness-checkpoint', root: AW.root, previous: AW.previous, log: AW.log, witness: AW.witness, chainId: AW.chainId, treeSize: AW.treeSize, maxMergeDelay: AW.maxMergeDelay, createdAt: AW.createdAt }), 'utf8').digest('hex'));
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} finally { fs.rmSync(T, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
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const total = KINDS.length + 13;
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console.log(`\nProof of everything: ${total - rele}/${total} cum trebuia (${KINDS.length} feluri + 7 controale negative + acoperire + Buffer + parinti + campurile noi + vocabularul)`);
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const total = KINDS.length + 16;
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console.log(`\nProof of everything: ${total - rele}/${total} cum trebuia (${KINDS.length} feluri + 9 controale negative + acoperire + Buffer + parinti + campurile noi + doua vocabulare + capul martorului)`);
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process.exit(rele ? 1 : 0);
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@@ -29,6 +29,26 @@ const NUME_IN_SERVICIU = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$/;
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const eRegula = (r) => typeof r === 'string' && /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$/.test(r);
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const eGrant = (g) => typeof g === 'string' && /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,63}$/.test(g);
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const eIdSauNull = (v) => v === null || (typeof v === 'string' && /^aere-id:[0-9a-f]{40}$/.test(v));
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const eRfc3339 = (v) => typeof v === 'string' && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d{1,9})?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})$/.test(v) && !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(v));
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const eHash32 = (v) => typeof v === 'string' && /^0x[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(v);
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// 2026-10-19 (revizia adversariala B3, constatarea 8): VOCABULARUL capului de jurnal al martorului gazduit al agentilor, scris O SINGURA DATA
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// aici. Pana azi constructorul felului copia campurile ca atare (treeSize '5', maxMergeDelay 0, witness 'x' se construiau, iar plicul era
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// VALID la verificatorul AIP-23), in timp ce martorul (tools/agent-policy/martor-agenti.mjs, verificaPunct) judeca forma cu propria lui copie a
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// regulilor. Acum verificaPunct importa exact acest obiect, deci cele doua nu mai pot diverge. Valorile bune nu se schimba: vectorii
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// publicati raman octet cu octet aceiasi.
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export const AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT = Object.freeze({
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valori: Object.freeze({
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root: [eHash32, 'a 32-byte hash, 0x + 64 lowercase hex (the RFC 9162 root of the log)'],
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previous: [eHash32, 'the statementHash of the checkpoint before, 0x + 64 lowercase hex (absent on the first)'],
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log: [(v) => typeof v === 'string' && v.length >= 1 && v.length <= 256 && /^[\x21-\x7e]+$/.test(v), '1 to 256 printable ASCII characters without spaces (the log name)'],
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witness: [(v) => typeof v === 'string' && /^aere-witness:[0-9a-f]{40}$/.test(v), 'aere-witness: + 40 lowercase hex (derived from the ML-DSA-65 key of the witness)'],
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chainId: [(v) => Number.isSafeInteger(v) && v >= 1, 'a positive integer (the chain the checkpoints are notarized on)'],
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treeSize: [(v) => Number.isSafeInteger(v) && v >= 1, 'an integer >= 1 (the number of heads in the log)'],
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maxMergeDelay: [(v) => Number.isSafeInteger(v) && v >= 1, 'an integer number of seconds >= 1 (the maximum merge delay)'],
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createdAt: [eRfc3339, 'an RFC 3339 time'],
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}),
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});
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// schema fiecarui fel: campuri de tip 'digest' (se hashuiesc), 'plain' (raman ca atare), 'bool', 'list'. Toate obligatorii daca in `req`.
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export const SCHEME = {
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@@ -81,6 +101,15 @@ export const SCHEME = {
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judged: [(v) => Array.isArray(v) && v.length <= 64 && v.every((x) => x && typeof x === 'object' && !Array.isArray(x) && Object.keys(x).sort().join(',') === 'grant,rules' && eGrant(x.grant) && Array.isArray(x.rules) && x.rules.length <= 64 && x.rules.every(eRegula)), 'a list of { grant, rules }, at most 64'],
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createdAt: [(v) => typeof v === 'string' && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d{1,9})?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})$/.test(v) && !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(v)), 'an RFC 3339 time'],
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} },
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// 2026-10-19 (roadmap pista B, B3, linia Agents): CAPUL DE JURNAL al martorului gazduit al agentilor (tools/agent-policy/martor-agenti.mjs),
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// in forma unui checkpoint de jurnal transparent (C2SP tlog-checkpoint: numele jurnalului, marimea, radacina RFC 9162): marimea si radacina
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// arborelui capetelor de registru primite, capul de dinainte (statementHash-ul lui), numele jurnalului, id-ul martorului (derivat din cheia
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// lui ML-DSA-65, care semneaza plicul), lantul pe care se notarizeaza capetele (28001 in sandbox) si intarzierea maxima promisa intre primirea
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// unui cap si acoperirea lui de un cap notarizat (secunde, ca MMD-ul din RFC 9162). Nimic din vreun registru: frunzele sunt digesturi.
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// Felurile de dinainte nu se schimba cu nimic.
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// 2026-10-19 (revizia B3): cu vocabularul de mai sus (AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT), importat si de judecatorul martorului.
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'agent-witness-checkpoint': { hash: ['root', 'previous'], plain: { log: 'log', witness: 'witness', chainId: 'chainId', treeSize: 'treeSize', maxMergeDelay: 'maxMergeDelay' }, req: ['root', 'log', 'witness', 'chainId', 'treeSize', 'maxMergeDelay'],
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valori: AGENT_WITNESS_CHECKPOINT.valori },
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};
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export const KINDS = Object.keys(SCHEME);
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