agents: the hosted witness for agent ledgers (sandbox on testnet 28001), its probe and negative control; crypto-inventory 0.4.1 resolves a minimum TLS version given through a constant or a ternary; proof-kinds and conformance gain the agent-witness-checkpoint kind; the reproduction scripts of the Shield recipes no longer carry a workstation path
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@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ notarization command of the verification layer and for the agents' x402 wallet (
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| [`pq-pki/`](pq-pki/) | a private certificate authority for ML-DSA (X.509 v3, RFC 9881): root and issuing CAs, leaf certificates, revocation lists, and a strict chain verifier compared against OpenSSL |
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| [`crypto-inventory/`](crypto-inventory/) | a cryptographic inventory of source code (JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Java, Kotlin, Swift, Go, Rust, PEM blocks, dependency manifests including Cargo.toml, Package.swift, Podfile and Gradle): every use classified by its exposure to a quantum computer, with a migration target, written as a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM; nothing from the scanned tree is executed, and its cost stays linear on input built to be slow |
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| [`verify-layer/`](verify-layer/) | an audit-log sidecar for any deployment: entries are AIP-23 envelopes in a hash chain, the runtime adapter records every running Docker or Kubernetes container without any secret value, and from 2026-10-18 the same for what the operator's own cloud CLI exports (AWS ECS, EC2, Lambda; Azure VMs, Container Instances, Container Apps, Web Apps; GCP Compute Engine, Cloud Run), read from the export file and never from an account, and the head of the chain can be signed by the operator (ML-DSA-65) and notarized on Aere Network under a post-quantum validator certificate; it says plainly what that proves (the history before a published head) and what it does not (that the host told the truth); the same log as a Merkle tree (RFC 9162): signed tree heads, and inclusion and consistency proofs of a few hashes that anyone checks without the log |
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| [`proof-kinds/`](proof-kinds/) | the AIP-23 envelope builder the verification layer uses: fifteen proof kinds (`secret-access` since 2026-10-18), one envelope format, digests instead of raw content |
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| [`proof-kinds/`](proof-kinds/) | the AIP-23 envelope builder the verification layer uses: sixteen proof kinds (`secret-access` since 2026-10-18, `agent-witness-checkpoint` since 2026-10-19), one envelope format, digests instead of raw content |
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| [`readiness/`](readiness/) | the post-quantum readiness scanner of a public hostname: real TLS handshakes (hybrid only, hybrid preferred, TLS 1.2), HSTS, the certificate; no connection to an address not proven public; a rate limit per client that X-Forwarded-For cannot bypass |
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| [`control-plane/`](control-plane/) | from findings to a finished migration: a prioritized plan from the inventory and the scanner, its execution through the gateway, KMS and PKI with consent per action and a measured proof afterwards, recipes for the servers the products do not touch and a rescan that judges them, a compliance report against NIST IR 8547, the EU roadmap and optionally CNSA 2.0, and a console that checks it all again |
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| [`agents/`](agents/) | limits an AI agent cannot break unseen: a post-quantum identity (ML-DSA-65), a policy (spending per time window, allowed tools and recipients, which actions need human approval), a signed ledger of every action judged against the policy, approvals and revocation signed by people, and a verifier that re-runs the policy over the whole ledger without trusting the agent; two branches of one ledger are a proof of equivocation anyone can check; and a wallet that pays over x402 only what the agent's ledger records and its policy allows, either holding the payment key for the owner or co-signing from a 2-of-2 contract wallet that neither the agent nor the owner can spend alone; both run on the public testnet with their evidence; and the chain as the witness of a ledger: a notarized head, read through the AIP-23 verifier under a post-quantum certified anchor, bounds entry times from below (a backdated entry is caught) |
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| [`agents/`](agents/) | limits an AI agent cannot break unseen: a post-quantum identity (ML-DSA-65), a policy (spending per time window, allowed tools and recipients, which actions need human approval), a signed ledger of every action judged against the policy, approvals and revocation signed by people, and a verifier that re-runs the policy over the whole ledger without trusting the agent; two branches of one ledger are a proof of equivocation anyone can check; and a wallet that pays over x402 only what the agent's ledger records and its policy allows, either holding the payment key for the owner or co-signing from a 2-of-2 contract wallet that neither the agent nor the owner can spend alone; both run on the public testnet with their evidence; and the chain as the witness of a ledger: a notarized head, read through the AIP-23 verifier under a post-quantum certified anchor, bounds entry times from below (a backdated entry is caught); and a hosted witness (sandbox on testnet 28001; mainnet at activation): the agent sends its ledger head signed with its ML-DSA-65 key, never the ledger, the witness checks it continues the last head it holds (a conflicting head is a proof of equivocation, kept and returned), logs it in an RFC 9162 tree whose checkpoints it signs and notarizes, and returns a receipt with an inclusion proof that anyone checks without the witness and that the ledger verifier takes as an anchor |
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| [`proof-of-ai/`](proof-of-ai/) | the AIP-23 envelope of an AI agent's action: model, version, weights digest, prompt, input, output, tools, agent, requester, as digests; verified by the same AIP-23 verifier as every other proof |
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| [`payments/`](payments/) | the risk step and the receipt of a payment for a person or a company: a declared policy (per-payment and sliding-window limits in USD per payer, assets allowed, counterparties refused with their source) gives a verdict anyone reproduces from the same inputs, with the signals it does not have named as unmeasured (no sanctions list, no identity tier); the receipt is an instruction (payer, payee, the amount in the asset and in USD at the rate declared as an input, the transaction, the verdict with its policy under hash) committed to by an AIP-23 settlement envelope, notarized and read back under a post-quantum certified anchor; a reader checks it against the policy, the inputs and the chain with plain JSON-RPC |
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| [`market-settlement/`](market-settlement/) | the dispute and settlement rail of a verifiable infrastructure market, measured end to end on testnet 28001: an order with its reward in escrow and a provider bond, the result committed on chain with its execution envelope notarized under a post-quantum certified anchor, a challenge window in which anyone disputes with a recomputed result and a bond, an arbiter that can only route the escrow (with a permissionless 14-day timeout), deadline reclaims, and an AIP-23 settlement receipt; a pure judge over the job's timeline that checks deadlines, the window, who resolved, the payout, the replay and the proof |
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@@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ test, counts as a failure of the control. Results measured on 2026-09-29 (Node.j
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| pq-kms | 62/62 (`node test/proba.mjs`); HSM root on SoftHSM2 + OpenSC 20/20 (`pq-kms/test/proba-hsm.mjs`, Linux); sealed-file trust rules 7/7 (`pq-kms/test/proba-hsm-incredere.mjs`) | 16/16 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); sealed-file rules 2/2 in this repository (`pq-kms/test/control-negativ-hsm-incredere.mjs`) |
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| pq-secrets | 43/43 on 2026-10-18 (`node test/proba-secrete.mjs`: the whole flow with keys born at run time, each refusal by name, a presentation signed for one request refused on any other, grant attenuation, the same refusal for every unauthorized caller, concurrent writes, rotation, revoked versions, the value searched for as a string in the log and on disk, the log intact after 100 operations, every envelope VALID for the AIP-23 reference verifier when `AERE_VERIFY_PROOF` names it, otherwise skipped by name); an adversarial review ran more than sixty attacks before publication, and the three that still succeed are limits written in the README | 43/43 on 2026-10-18 (`node test/control-negativ-secrete.mjs`: each guard planted out in a copy, the named checks must fail; `--autoproba` 5/5) |
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| pq-pki | 28/28 on 2026-10-19 (`node test/proba.mjs`), each verdict compared with OpenSSL 3.5; since 2026-10-19 the signature algorithm a certificate or a revocation list declares must be its issuer key's | 26/26 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`) |
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| crypto-inventory | 68/68 (`node test/proba.mjs`, measured 2026-10-18 with the Rust, Swift and Kotlin detectors, glob imports, libcrux, BoringSSL, the libsignal Java/Node/Swift/Android APIs, CryptoKit, CommonCrypto, Security.framework, Android Keystore, Tink and OkHttp included); cost on hostile input 13/13 linear (`node test/proba-timp.mjs`) | 35/35 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); cost 5/5 in this repository (`node test/control-negativ-timp.mjs`; its fourth case compares with version 0.1.0 from the development history and is skipped here) |
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| crypto-inventory | 68/68 (`node test/proba.mjs`, measured 2026-10-19 with the Rust, Swift and Kotlin detectors, glob imports, libcrux, BoringSSL, the libsignal Java/Node/Swift/Android APIs, CryptoKit, CommonCrypto, Security.framework, Android Keystore, Tink and OkHttp included, and since 0.4.1 a TLS version given through a constant or a conditional); cost on hostile input 13/13 linear (`node test/proba-timp.mjs`) | 38/38 (`node test/control-negativ.mjs`); cost 5/5 in this repository (`node test/control-negativ-timp.mjs`; its fourth case compares with version 0.1.0 from the development history and is skipped here) |
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| verify-layer | 45/45 with the AIP-23 reference verifier, measured from a fresh clone on 2026-10-18 (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs> node proba-sidecar.mjs`, where verify-proof.mjs is the one served at aere.network/tools with verify-anchor.mjs, mpt.mjs, falcon512.mjs, registry-v3.mjs and package.json beside it and `npm install` done there; verify-proof.mjs alone gives 41/45, because the four finality checks need the anchor verifier); without it 40 run, 5 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2; the cloud adapters 60/60 with the same verifier on 2026-10-18 (`node proba-adaptoare-cloud.mjs`: nine fixtures derived from the vendors' documented CLI and REST examples by `fixturi-cloud/deriva.mjs`; without the verifier 59 run and one is skipped; a real account is unmeasured and the README says so); the Merkle tree 20/20 (`node proba-arbore.mjs`: the reference roots of Certificate Transparency, every proof up to 64 leaves, each attack), measured 2026-09-30 | 37/37 from a fresh clone of this repository on 2026-10-18 (`node control-negativ-sidecar.mjs`: the ten original plantings plus the cloud adapter rules; the case that compares with the development history is skipped here, and is the 38th in the development tree); the tree 14/14 (`node control-negativ-arbore.mjs`) |
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| proof-kinds | 28/28 on 2026-10-18 with the same verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-kinds.mjs`: fifteen kinds, the allowed values of the `secret-access` fields included) | seven negative controls inside the test |
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| proof-kinds | 30/30 on 2026-10-19 with the same verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-kinds.mjs`: sixteen kinds, the allowed values of the `secret-access` fields included) | eight negative controls inside the test |
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| readiness | 6/6 (`node proba-adrese-private.mjs`: the private-address rules, and a local listener no scan may touch) | the rate limit and the queue bound are tested where the service runs, not here (its README says so) |
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| control-plane | planner 44/44 (2026-10-18: a key agreement or a client-side TLS configured by the application itself is not routed to the TLS gateway; a self-signed trust anchor is blocked, not "automatic through PKI"; test code is LOW with its own scope), command line 10/10, execution 30/30 on real products started locally, remediation 33/33 on real TLS servers (all five server profiles measured end to end on 2026-10-18: nginx, Apache, HAProxy, Node, Go), compliance report 30/30 (with the AIP-23 verifier; test-code findings are counted apart and are not "exposed today"), console 8/8; the console viewer in a real Chromium, phone and desktop, 26/26 (`node proba-consola-web.mjs`, measured 2026-09-30; needs `playwright-core` and a Chromium, otherwise it exits 2) | remediation 7/7, compliance report 3/3 in this repository; viewer 8/8 (`node control-negativ-consola-web.mjs`) |
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| identity | 52/52 (`node proba-identity.mjs`, a presentation optionally signed for one exact request (`request`) included, with the AIP-23 verifier for its envelope test; without it that test is reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), compliance 18/18 (`node proba-conformitate.mjs`) and Travel Rule 20/20 (`node proba-travel-rule.mjs`) with the same verifier (without it each reports one test unmeasured and exits 2; 2026-10-18: a missing originator id or nonce is a refusal, found when the verifier was enrolled in the conformance suite), SD-JWT 31/31 (`node proba-sdjwt.mjs`, the RFC 9901 vectors and fixtures derived from @sd-jwt/core 0.23.0 included; since 2026-10-19 the keys of an AERE identity are judged on their ML-DSA-65 half by default, the Ed25519 half only on request, and every verdict says `postQuantum`), SD-JWT VC 11/11 (`node proba-sdjwt-vc.mjs`); interoperability with @sd-jwt/core and jose in both directions 26/26 and 28/28 (`interop/`, with those libraries installed in a folder you name; otherwise reported unmeasured), measured 2026-10-18, before the 2026-10-19 change; the scripts now ask for the Ed25519 half explicitly and have not been re-run since | 57/57 (`node control-negativ-identity.mjs`); compliance 17/17 (`node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs`); Travel Rule 20/20 (`node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs`); SD-JWT 39/39 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt.mjs`); SD-JWT VC 20/20 (`node control-negativ-sdjwt-vc.mjs`) |
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| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 59/59 on 2026-10-19 (since then an equivocation proof must be made with the agent's ML-DSA-65 key), approval and revocation 39/39, the chain as witness 26/26 without a network and 7/7 on testnet 28001 on 2026-09-30 (`proba-agent-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier), command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); x402 wallet 25/25, 2-of-2 co-signing 16/16 and payment verifier 14/14 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 with the wallet key and 13/13 with the 2-of-2 contract wallet (`agents/x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, `agents/x402/proba-cosign-testnet.mjs`, each needs a funded testnet key); the contract's artifact recompiles byte for byte with solc 0.8.23 (`node x402/recompileaza-contract.mjs --solc <solc>`) | 28/28 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); the chain as witness 11/11 (`node control-negativ-ancora.mjs`); x402 30/30 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`); the contract's own tests (7) and their negative control (4/4) run in the Aere Network contracts project, not in this repository |
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| agents | policy 27/27 with the AIP-23 verifier (without it 25 run, 2 are reported as skipped and the exit code is 2), ledger 59/59 on 2026-10-19 (since then an equivocation proof must be made with the agent's ML-DSA-65 key), approval and revocation 39/39, the chain as witness 26/26 without a network and 7/7 on testnet 28001 on 2026-09-30 (`proba-agent-ancora-testnet.mjs`, needs a funded testnet key and the AIP-23 verifier), command line 23/23 through files and processes only (on Linux and macOS one more test checks the key file mode; not measured here); the hosted witness 71/71 without a network, with a local notary mock (`proba-martor-agenti.mjs`; the AIP-23 rows need the verifier, without it they are skipped by name and the exit code is 2), and 75/75 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-19 (`proba-martor-agenti.mjs --testnet`, needs a funded testnet key or the faucet: a checkpoint notarized, the receipt VALID with post-quantum finality, a backdated ledger caught with it; evidence in `agents/dovezi-martor-agenti-28001/`); x402 wallet 25/25, 2-of-2 co-signing 16/16 and payment verifier 14/14 without a network; on the public testnet 28001, 9/9 with the wallet key and 13/13 with the 2-of-2 contract wallet (`agents/x402/proba-x402-testnet.mjs`, `agents/x402/proba-cosign-testnet.mjs`, each needs a funded testnet key); the contract's artifact recompiles byte for byte with solc 0.8.23 (`node x402/recompileaza-contract.mjs --solc <solc>`) | 28/28 (`node control-negativ-aprobare.mjs`); the chain as witness 11/11 (`node control-negativ-ancora.mjs`); the hosted witness 24/24 (`node control-negativ-martor-agenti.mjs`); x402 30/30 (`node x402/control-negativ-wallet.mjs`); the contract's own tests (7) and their negative control (4/4) run in the Aere Network contracts project, not in this repository |
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| proof-of-ai | 6/6 with the AIP-23 verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=... node proba-proof-of-ai.mjs`); without it the probe reports NEMASURAT and exits 2 | one negative control inside the test (an envelope touched after its hash: INVALID) |
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| payments | 23/23 without a chain (`node proba-risc.mjs`: the verdicts under a policy, the reproducible verdict hash, a receipt verified, nine forged ones refused by name, a malformed payment refused by name); 9/9 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-plata-28001.mjs`: a payment allowed, paid, its receipt notarized and read back with finality PASSED, the public reader VALID; a payment above the limit refused with nothing sent; the fourth in the window refused; a forged receipt and a loosened policy INVALID) | 10/10 (`node proba-risc.mjs --control-negativ`: form, asset, counterparty, rate, per-payment limit, window, linkage, USD arithmetic, verdict reproduction, chain facts, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
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| market-settlement | 20/20 on testnet 28001 on 2026-10-02 (`AERE_TESTNET_KEY_FILE=... AERE_ETHERS_DIR=... node proba-piata-28001.mjs`: five scenarios on AereComputeMarketV3 deployed from the committed artifact, every refusal by its named custom error, the provider's notarized envelope read back under a post-quantum certified anchor); the judge on the recorded timelines 26/26 without a chain (`node proba-judecata.mjs`: seven honest readings VALID, eighteen forged or malformed ones INVALID for their named reason, the settlement receipt) | 10/10 (`node proba-judecata.mjs --control-negativ`: form, completeness of the timeline, posting, deadline, window, arbiter, payout, result bytes, replay, proof, each planted out on a copy and each forged fixture then accepted) |
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@@ -64,4 +64,4 @@ interface, command line and data (`definePolicy`, `verifyLedger`, `approve`, ...
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## Licence
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MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 967 (pq-gateway 9, pq-kms 10, pq-secrets 6, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 73, verify-layer 56, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 27, agents 39, identity 24, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 643, device-identity 11, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).
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MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE). Files: 975 (pq-gateway 9, pq-kms 10, pq-secrets 6, pq-pki 6, crypto-inventory 73, verify-layer 56, proof-kinds 3, control-plane 27, agents 44, identity 24, proof-of-ai 3, ai-trust 6, verifiable-data 7, market-settlement 9, payments 8, conformance 646, device-identity 11, exposure-report 18, readiness 4).
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