verify-layer: verify-consistency names the signer of each head (or unsigned); identity: Travel Rule requires a replay store

- verify-consistency without --signer now says whether each head is signed and by which key, and that no expected signer was
  checked (verify-inclusion already did; the README said the output does)
- openMessage opens nothing without a replay store (seen: an object with has/add that keeps the ids for at least maxAgeS);
  before, the same signed and sealed message could be opened any number of times when no store was given

Tests: verify-layer tree 20/20, negative control 14/14; sidecar 44/44, 9/9; travel rule 19/19, negative control 19/19.
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Aere Network committed 2026-09-30 10:31:23 +03:00
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@@ -120,7 +120,9 @@ import { generateKemKeys, bindKemKeys, acceptBeneficiary, sealMessage, openMessa
```
`openMessage` refuses a message not signed by the originator it names, sealed for another VASP or other keys, older or newer than 300
seconds on its clock, already received (`seen`), or whose originator is not proven a VASP. `travelRuleRecord` writes an AIP-23
seconds on its clock, already received, or whose originator is not proven a VASP. The replay store `seen` is required (a `Set`, or
any object with `has` and `add`, that keeps the ids for at least the 300 seconds): without one, `openMessage` opens nothing, since
the same signed and sealed message could otherwise be opened any number of times. `travelRuleRecord` writes an AIP-23
`compliance` envelope with no personal data and no amount: a pseudonymous transfer reference, the policy name, the result and a digest
of the exchange. What it does not do: validate the IVMS101 schema (it carries the object as given and requires `originator` and
`beneficiary`), find the beneficiary's VASP from an address (that is a discovery protocol's job), or say that a transfer is lawful.
@@ -139,8 +141,8 @@ node proba-identity.mjs # 43: the paths above, and each attack of t
node control-negativ-identity.mjs # on a copy, each of 46 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
node proba-conformitate.mjs # 14: compliance policies judged on real presentations, the record without personal data, the command line
node control-negativ-conformitate.mjs # on a copy, each of 13 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
node proba-travel-rule.mjs # 18: two VASPs with registry credentials, the whole exchange, and each attack of the review
node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs # on a copy, each of 18 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
node proba-travel-rule.mjs # 19: two VASPs with registry credentials, the whole exchange, and each attack of the review
node control-negativ-travel-rule.mjs # on a copy, each of 19 guards removed -> its own named test turns red
```
The envelope test needs the AIP-23 reference verifier (`AERE_VERIFY_PROOF=<verify-proof.mjs>`); without it that test is reported as
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@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ const PLANTARI = [
['destinatarul nu se mai compara', [['if (m.to.id !== me) motive.push(', 'if (false) motive.push(']], 'ATAC: alt VASP (C)'],
['cheile KEM ale destinatarului nu se mai compara', [['if (canonical(m.to.kem) !== canonical(kem.public)) motive.push(', 'if (false) motive.push(']], 'ATAC: alt VASP (C)'],
['prospetimea nu se mai cere', [["if (Math.abs(acum - timp(m.createdAt, 'createdAt')) > maxAgeS * 1000) motive.push(", 'if (false) motive.push(']], 'ATAC: acelasi mesaj primit a doua oara'],
['reluarea nu se mai opreste', [['if (seen && seen.has(m.id)) motive.push(', 'if (false) motive.push(']], 'ATAC: acelasi mesaj primit a doua oara'],
['reluarea nu se mai opreste', [[' else if (seen.has(m.id)) motive.push(', ' else if (false) motive.push(']], 'ATAC: acelasi mesaj primit a doua oara'],
// B-26: forma publicata in f75c334 (seen optional: fara el, orice reluare trecea)
['magazia de reluare iar optionala (B-26)', [[" if (!seen || typeof seen.has !== 'function' || typeof seen.add !== 'function') motive.push(", " if (false) motive.push("], [" else if (seen.has(m.id)) motive.push(", " else if (seen && seen.has && seen.has(m.id)) motive.push("], [' seen.add(m.id);', ' if (seen && seen.add) seen.add(m.id);']], 'B-26'],
['initiatorul nu mai trebuie dovedit VASP', [["motive.push(...v.motive.map((x) => 'originator VASP: ' + x));", '']], 'ATAC: initiatorul nedovedit ca VASP'],
['antetul nu mai e legat de cifru (nici AAD, nici derivarea)', [["const c = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', d.key, d.iv); c.setAAD(aad);", "const c = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', d.key, d.iv);"], ['dc.setAAD(aad); dc.setAuthTag', 'dc.setAuthTag'], ["crypto.createHash('sha256').update(transcript).digest()", 'Buffer.alloc(32)']], 'ATAC: suma din antet schimbata'],
['numai secretul X25519 intra in cheie', [['const ikm = Buffer.concat([ssK, ssX]);', 'const ikm = Buffer.concat([ssX]);']], 'KEM hibrid'],
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@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ const bindB = TR.bindKemKeys({ vasp: B, kem: kemB, validUntil: '2026-12-31T00:00
const accB = TR.acceptBeneficiary({ binding: bindB, presentation: pres(credB, B, A.id, 'n-acc'), registries: [reg.id], originatorId: A.id, nonce: 'n-acc', now: NOW, statusLists: [LISTA] });
const MID = 'urn:uuid:11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555';
const sigileaza = (o = {}) => TR.sealMessage({ from: A, beneficiary: accB.beneficiary, ivms101: IVMS, transfer: TRANSFER, presentation: pres(credA, A, B.id, MID), messageId: MID, now: NOW, ...o });
const deschide = (m, o = {}) => TR.openMessage(m, { me: B.id, kem: kemB, registries: [reg.id], now: NOW, statusLists: [LISTA], ...o });
const deschide = (m, o = {}) => TR.openMessage(m, { me: B.id, kem: kemB, registries: [reg.id], now: NOW, statusLists: [LISTA], seen: new Set(), ...o });
const are = (r, re) => !r.ok && r.motive.some((x) => re.test(x));
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- beneficiarul acceptat
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ test('ATAC: mesaj semnat de un strain in numele lui A -> refuzat; semnatura lui
const m2 = clon(M); m2.signature = I.signText('kem-binding', text, A); cere(are(deschide(m2), /not signed by the originator/), 'alt scop a trecut');
});
test('ATAC: alt VASP (C) incearca sa deschida mesajul lui B -> refuzat; cu cheile lui KEM in numele lui B -> refuzat', () => {
cere(are(TR.openMessage(M, { me: C.id, kem: kemC, registries: [reg.id], now: NOW, statusLists: [LISTA] }), /is for/), 'C l-a deschis');
cere(are(TR.openMessage(M, { me: B.id, kem: kemC, registries: [reg.id], now: NOW, statusLists: [LISTA] }), /other KEM keys/), 'cheile lui C au trecut');
cere(are(TR.openMessage(M, { me: C.id, kem: kemC, registries: [reg.id], now: NOW, statusLists: [LISTA], seen: new Set() }), /is for/), 'C l-a deschis');
cere(are(TR.openMessage(M, { me: B.id, kem: kemC, registries: [reg.id], now: NOW, statusLists: [LISTA], seen: new Set() }), /other KEM keys/), 'cheile lui C au trecut');
});
test('KEM hibrid: fara secretul ML-KEM corect (cheia X25519 buna) sau fara cel X25519 (ML-KEM bun), mesajul nu se descifreaza', () => {
const k1 = { public: kemB.public }; Object.defineProperty(k1, 'privat', { value: { x25519: kemB.privat.x25519, mlkem768: kemC.privat.mlkem768 } });
@@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ test('KEM hibrid: fara secretul ML-KEM corect (cheia X25519 buna) sau fara cel X
const r1 = deschide(M, { kem: k1 }), r2 = deschide(M, { kem: k2 });
cere(!r1.ok && !r2.ok && r1.motive.concat(r2.motive).every((x) => /modified|does not open/.test(x)), r1.motive.concat(r2.motive).join(' | '));
});
// B-26 (2026-09-30, revizuirea adversariala): fara magazia de reluare, acelasi mesaj se deschidea de oricate ori
test('B-26: fara magazia de reluare (seen lipsa sau fara has/add) nu se deschide nimic', () => {
cere(are(deschide(M, { seen: undefined }), /no replay store/), 'fara seen s-a deschis');
cere(are(deschide(M, { seen: {} }), /no replay store/), 'un obiect fara has/add a trecut drept magazie');
});
test('ATAC: acelasi mesaj primit a doua oara (reluare) -> refuzat; un mesaj vechi (301 s) -> refuzat', () => {
const seen = new Set(); cere(deschide(M, { seen }).ok, 'prima deschidere');
cere(are(deschide(M, { seen }), /replay/), 'reluarea a trecut');
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@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ export function sealMessage({ from, beneficiary, ivms101, transfer, presentation
/**
* Beneficiarul deschide un mesaj: semnatura initiatorului, VASP-ul lui (prezentare pentru beneficiar, nonce = id-ul mesajului),
* destinatarul (cheile KEM ale beneficiarului), prospetimea, reluarea (`seen`: id-urile deja primite), apoi descifrarea.
* B-26 (2026-09-30, revizuirea adversariala): `seen` e OBLIGATORIU (un Set sau orice obiect cu has/add care tine id-urile cel putin
* maxAgeS); fara el, acelasi mesaj semnat si sigilat se deschidea de oricate ori, deci reluarea era prinsa numai de cine stia sa ceara.
* Intoarce { ok, motive, ivms101, transfer, from, messageHash }.
*/
export function openMessage(m, { me, kem, registries, now = new Date(), statusLists = [], seen = null, maxAgeS = 300 }) {
@@ -149,7 +151,8 @@ export function openMessage(m, { me, kem, registries, now = new Date(), statusLi
if (m.to.id !== me) motive.push(`the message is for ${m.to.id}, not for ${me}`);
if (canonical(m.to.kem) !== canonical(kem.public)) motive.push('the message is sealed to other KEM keys');
if (Math.abs(acum - timp(m.createdAt, 'createdAt')) > maxAgeS * 1000) motive.push(`the message was made at ${m.createdAt}, outside ${maxAgeS} s of this clock`);
if (seen && seen.has(m.id)) motive.push('replay: this message id was received before');
if (!seen || typeof seen.has !== 'function' || typeof seen.add !== 'function') motive.push('no replay store was given (seen: a set of the message ids already received, kept at least maxAgeS)');
else if (seen.has(m.id)) motive.push('replay: this message id was received before');
const v = eVasp(m.fromPresentation, { registries, audience: me, nonce: m.id, id: m.from.id, now, statusLists, maxAgeS });
motive.push(...v.motive.map((x) => 'originator VASP: ' + x));
if (motive.length) return { ok: false, motive };
@@ -168,7 +171,7 @@ export function openMessage(m, { me, kem, registries, now = new Date(), statusLi
try { const dc = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', d.key, d.iv); dc.setAAD(aad); dc.setAuthTag(ct.subarray(ct.length - 16)); pt = Buffer.concat([dc.update(ct.subarray(0, ct.length - 16)), dc.final()]); }
catch { return { ok: false, motive: ['the ciphertext or its header was modified, or it is not for these keys'] }; }
finally { d.key.fill(0); }
if (seen) seen.add(m.id);
seen.add(m.id);
return { ok: true, motive: [], ivms101: JSON.parse(pt.toString('utf8')), transfer: m.transfer, from: { id: m.from.id, claims: v.claims }, messageHash: sha(Buffer.from(canonical(semnat), 'utf8')), payloadHash: sha(pt) };
} catch (e) { return { ok: false, motive: [...motive, 'the message cannot be read: ' + e.message] }; }
}